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Abstract

The prevalence of anxiety disorders in the general population makes clarification of variables
that contribute to the onset or maintenance of these disorders essential. Two such contributory
variables are anxiety-induced selective processing bias and theorized subsequent explicit
memory avoidance. The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of one-session
in vivo exposure treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance
immediately following successful treatment of stimulus-specific anxiety as well as at one-week
and one-month follow-up. Participants (N = 60) were assigned to one of three groups: (1) the
treatment group, composed of individuals who were fearful of either a snake or a spider and who
received one-session in vivo exposure treatment for that fear; (2) the no-treatment group,
composed of snake- or spider-fearful individuals who did not receive treatment for this specific
fear; or (3) the control group, composed of individuals who were not fearful of either a snake or
spider. Comparisons of these three participant groups occurred prior to treatment (i.e. pre-test
assessment), following treatment (i.e. post-test assessment), and at one-week and one-month
follow-up on tests of selective processing bias and on tests of explicit memory for a previously
learned word list. It was hypothesized that treatment would cause immediate elimination of
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance, but that the effects of treatment would
reduce at one-week and one-month follow-up as no treatment maintenance procedures were used
in this study. Mostly null results were obtained on all dependent variable measures used in this
study at all assessment periods. This sample displayed no evidence of selective processing bias
and/or explicit memory avoidance at any of the four assessment points, halting the investigation
of the impact of treatment on these processes. Additionally, results pertaining to the impact of
state and trait anxiety were largely null. Thus, all questions the study was to address could not be
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adequately answered given the lack of evidence for the presence of the constructs in the sample.
Focus of the discussion is on the reasons for the null results, including methodological issues as
well as theoretical issues with the constructs of interest.
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Problem Statement
The estimated lifetime prevalence of anxiety disorders makes them among the most
pervasive of mental disorders; for example, recent lifetime prevalence estimates for social phobia
range from 3% to 13%, and lifetime prevalence estimates of specific phobia range from 7.2% to
12.5%. This is in contrast to the prevalence of other disorders such as bipolar I, which ranges
from 0.4% to 1.6%, and schizophrenia, which ranges from 0.5% to 1.5% (DSM-IV-TR;
American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994; Kessler, 1994; Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin,
Merikangas, & Walters, 2005). In light of their prevalence, understanding covert mechanisms
that maintain anxiety disorders and the impact of treatment, particularly empirically supported
behavioral treatments that directly address overt behavioral manifestations of anxiety, on these
mechanisms is essential. Two such cognitive mechanisms, selective processing and explicit
memory avoidance, have been studied extensively (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, BakermansKranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; and Mitte, 2008 for metaanalytic reviews) in an effort to determine the nuanced causes of some individuals perceiving the
world as threatening while other individuals exposed to the same stimuli perceiving the world as
innocuous. While these cognitive mechanisms have been examined across anxiety disorders, the
focus of this study was the examination of selective processing bias and explicit memory
avoidance in individuals who approximate fear characteristic of specific phobia compared to
non-fearful individuals.
Selective processing bias, also referred to as attentional bias or selective attention, refers
to preferential encoding of threat-related information by anxious individuals compared to the
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encoding of neutral information and to the encoding of the same threat versus neutral
information by non-anxious individuals. The occurrence of this bias, which is likely the product
of numerous factors, has been empirically demonstrated in anxious individuals exposed to
anxiety-inducing stimuli (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997) as well as in nonanxious individuals exposed to universally threatening material (Li, Wang, Poliakoff, & Luo,
2007), and an evolutionary element to such bias has been suggested (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008).
Selective processing bias theoretically occurs automatically and involuntarily, and there is
evidence that spider phobic individuals consciously recognize their responses to spiders as more
automatic in nature than non-fearful control subjects, although endorsement of high levels of
self-reported automaticity were not related to therapy outcome (Mayer, Merckelbach, & Muris,
2000). The occurrence of this reflexive and rapid attentional bias has been studied across a
variety of anxiety disorders, and specific neural correlates, particularly the amygdala, associated
with attentional bias have been proposed (Schienle, Schäfer, & Naumann, 2008; Straube,
Mentzel, & Miltner, 2006).
While a logical assumption may be that preferential recall for threat-relevant information
is an inherent result of selective encoding of that information, evidence of congruent explicit
memory bias is mixed (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). This lack of substantive evidence for explicit
memory bias and the possible presence of explicit memory avoidance, or inability to consciously
recall threat-relevant stimuli, may indicate distinctive adaptive reactions at various stages of
cognitive processing. In a comprehensive literature review on the topic, Williams et al. (1997)
reiterated their earlier proposal that initial automatic stages of processing favor bias for threatrelated information while later strategic stages favor avoidance of such information, thus
producing such discrepancy (see also Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987). However, the
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authors note that empirical findings incongruent with this theory suggest that the interplay
between selective processing bias and subsequent explicit recall is complex and that a singular
theory is an inadequate representation of all cases. Further research is required to determine the
relationship between selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance and the variables
that may affect the occurrence of these two phenomena. Additionally, further research is needed
on the impact of treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance (Mobini
& Grant, 2007), including research that investigates the long-term impact of treatment on these
biases; the present study represented an effort to address this void in the literature.
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the presence of selective processing
bias through the administration of an emotional Stroop task and an exogenous cueing task. In
addition, explicit memory avoidance was evaluated to determine whether there were significant
elaborative recall differences between snake- and spider-fearful individuals and non-fearful
controls. Finally, the immediate and long-term effects of one-session in vivo exposure therapy on
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance were examined. This study sought to
improve upon existing studies and marry the literature on selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance to produce data on differential cognitive processing in high- and low-anxious
individuals and the factors that may produce or enhance such bias, such as state and trait anxiety.
In addition, the assessment of treatment outcome will be used to determine whether an
empirically supported anxiety treatment can modify a necessary component of anxiety
maintenance—hypervigilance to and persistent rumination on anxiety-provoking information—
without overtly attempting to do so.
The following literature review will address all crucial elements and constructs included
in this study, beginning with selective processing bias. The theoretical foundation of selective
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processing as well as the empirical examination of the phenomenon will be discussed. Uses and
limitations of the emotional Stroop task, a primary methodological technique for detecting
selective processing, will be elucidated, and the exogenous cueing task as a progression from the
emotional Stroop task will be described. This will be followed by a discussion of the impact of
selective processing on explicit memory and the important moderating variables that may
produce discrepant results. The utility and hypothesized methods of change of exposure
treatment for specific phobia as well as the impact of treatment on selective processing and
explicit memory avoidance will complete the review.
Literature Review
Theories of Selective Processing Bias
Many anxiety disorders appear to be characterized by disruption in memory that allows
for the disproportionate recall of the feared situation or stimulus (DSM-IV-TR; American
Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; MacLeod, 1991); post-traumatic
stress disorder, for example, is characterized by both enhancement of memory for the traumatic
experience and concurrent paradoxical memory impairment of varied aspects of the event such
that recurrent, intrusive, and fragmented recollections disrupt the normal functioning of the
trauma victim (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 1994). An agoraphobic’s
fear may be exacerbated by recall of a single instance of an embarrassing or threatening situation
that prohibited immediate escape in the same manner in which a person with generalized anxiety
disorder may recall anxiety-provoking experiences more readily than positive experiences that
should balance or even negate that information. Memory bias in anxiety disorders is often
begotten from theories of selective processing, which broadly suggest that information that is
deemed threatening is preferentially and more thoroughly encoded than neutral or pleasant
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information and/or better encoded than a non-anxious individual’s encoding of that same
threatening information. Understanding selective processing and theoretically resulting explicit
memory bias has important clinical and scientific applications in that the maintenance of anxiety
disorders may be at least partially contingent on sustained selective processing, and successful
treatment should involve elimination or reduction of selective processing.
Because of the possible centrality of the issue, selective processing bias has received
extensive empirical attention and theoretical explanations, such as those posited by Aaron Beck
(Beck, 1976) and Gordon Bower (Bower, 1981, 1992). Beck’s schema theory of cognition and
emotion suggests that the development of maladaptive schema associated with depression and/or
anxiety occurs early in life, though those schemas lie dormant in the cognitive system until an
elevation in depression/anxiety occurs and activates specific schema. Once schemas are
activated, they produce processing biases for schema-consistent information, thereby limiting
cognitive processing availability for information that does not fit into the encompassing schema
(MacLeod, 1990; MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). The activated schemas distort all information
processing and prime an individual to experience thoughts related to each schema, make negative
predictions, and interpret ambiguous information in a manner such that it is schema-consistent
(Coles & Heimberg, 2002).
According to Bower’s network model, information in long term memory is stored in
figurative nodes, all of which are located within a network and have associative connections with
numerous related nodes. The activation of a single emotional node, produced by one’s current
corresponding emotional state, spreads throughout that node’s associative connections and
primes, or partially activates, those connections that contain mood congruent information. As a
result of primed associative nodes, mood congruent information is disproportionately available to
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the cognitive system, thereby inducing a processing bias favoring the encoding of emotionally
congruent stimuli (Bower, 1981, 1992). Bower’s network model has been applied to numerous
anxiety disorders; Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Carlson, and Twentyman (1988), for example,
described potentiation and inhibition of nodes, particularly the consistent potentiation of threat
arousal nodes despite the absence of threat, in the maintenance of post-traumatic stress disorder
in combat veterans. Both theories suggest that selective processing automatically occurs without
conscious intent or acknowledgement; the theories differ in that Beck’s model seems to suggest
that biases are result of an developmentally attained trait while Bower’s theory suggests that
one’s state is the cause of bias (MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992). It is important to note, however,
that neither model predicted different manifestations and varieties of memory bias for different
emotional disorders (Coles & Heimberg, 2002), as is suggested in current research.
Typical Experimental Paradigms that Assess Selective Processing Bias
Two main categories of experimental paradigms, identification tasks and interference
tasks, have been used to detect theoretical selective processing bias in anxious participants
(MacLeod, 1991). Identification tasks, in which emotionally threatening and neutral words are
presented to participants in a manner incompatible with conscious recollection, have been used
to determine if anxious individuals are more adept at identifying threat words in spite of
ambiguity. Included in this category is the dichotomous listening procedure (Foa & McNally,
1986), in which two valenced word types, typically threat and neutral, are simultaneously
presented into the right and left ears using headphones, and selective attention is revealed in the
participant’s ability to better identify threat-related words. Noteworthy, however, is a
methodological criticism for this particular procedure that was described by MacLeod (1991):
apparent attention biases found using this procedure may be due to an anxiety-linked guessing
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strategy rather than to encoding selectivity. The white noise paradigm, in which participants
encode threat-relevant and neutral sentences and attempt to accurately repeat the sentences when
they are presented with varying levels of background noise, has received limited use in phobia
research (Olatunji, Sawchuk, Lee, Lohr, & Tolin, 2008). Backward-masking techniques (Öhman
& Soares, 1993) have also been used to demonstrate possible preferential attention to threat by
making a threat stimulus ambiguous to determine if threat is still accurately detected.
Interference tasks, in which bias is indicated by a participant’s inability to ignore the
meaning of emotionally threatening stimuli in order to perform some other simple task, are used
extensively to determine if a participant allocates preferential attention to threatening stimuli
compared to neutral stimuli. Included in this category is the dot probe paradigm, in which threat
and neutral words or images are presented simultaneously in two different locations of a screen.
The presentation of these stimuli is then followed by a dot or a similar target stimulus in the
location of either the threat or neutral stimulus; this target stimulus serves to prompt participant
response. Shorter response latencies when the target stimulus is presented in the same area as the
threat stimulus is hypothesized to indicate more attentional resources devoted to that stimulus
rather than to the neutral stimulus, thus resulting in the rapid detection of the target stimulus that
replaces the preferentially attended to stimulus. The discriminative ability of the dot probe
paradigm has been questioned, however, as typical use of the measure lacks the refinement to
differentiate between vigilance and difficulty disengaging attention in anxious individuals (see,
for example, Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004). Also included in this category
is the popular emotional Stroop color-naming task, including the Spider Stroop (Watts,
McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986) that includes spider-related words. Emotional Stroop tasks
most often involve the presentation of threat and neutral linguistic stimuli in various colors; the
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participant is instructed to ignore the word’s meaning and simply name the color in which the
word is printed. Longer color-naming response latencies are believed to indicate more attention
devoted to the meaning of the word, which results in reduced speed in performing the required
color-naming task due to that increased attention. Because this task represents a dominant
experimental paradigm in this particular body of literature, the emotional Stroop task warrants
closer examination.
Uses and Limitations of the Emotional Stroop Task in Identifying Selective Processing Bias
J. Ridley Stroop introduced the original Stroop task in an experiment published in the
December 1935 edition of the Journal of Experimental Psychology; since its first appearance in
the literature, the Stroop task has been used extensively to test hypotheses regarding cognitive
processes such as interference, although it has undergone frequent modifications from its initial
form to better accommodate the goals of attentional bias research. The original Stroop task
(Stroop, 1935) involved color words, such as red and blue, printed in a matrix on a card. These
words were printed in a color different than the color named in the word; for example, the word
“red” appeared in blue ink. The same matrix of color words was also printed in black ink to
allow for a comparison in response latencies, which were measured with the use of a stopwatch
that was started when the participant began reading the words on the card and was stopped when
all words on the card had been read. Participants were to read the actual word while ignoring the
ink color in which the word was printed, correcting all errors in reading the words that might
have occurred as they proceeded. The significant finding of this task was that incongruent color
word-ink color matches produced a significantly greater response latency than color words
printed in black ink, intimating the presence of cognitive inhibition for incongruent color-ink
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words; that is, one must inhibit the readily available response of naming the color in which the
word is printed to name the actual word that suggests a different color.
The advent and propagation of computer and software technologies that allowed for
single word presentation, voice recognition, and millisecond response recordings for individual
words permitted the Stroop task to reveal interference effects in greater detail. As the
methodology of the original Stroop task evolved from a card format to a single trial
computerized format, uses of the Stroop expanded to include identification of interference
resulting from highly emotional words, and a modified form of the Stroop task was applied to
depressive and anxious individuals to ascertain processing of emotional stimuli. This emotional
Stroop task, which became a regularly implemented research methodology in the 1980s
(Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), is a derivation of the original Stroop task that involves
the presentation of emotionally-laden words (i.e. “spider” for spider phobic participants) that are
thought to cause cognitive interference and subsequent slower response times, as is congruent
with Beck’s schema theory and Bower’s network model. In a comprehensive review of the
literature on the use of the emotional Stroop in the attentional bias literature, Williams et al.
(1996) noted the success of the task in identifying selective processing in a wide range of anxiety
and depressive clinical disorders. By using a unique methodology, Kelly and Forsyth (2007)
demonstrated the utility of the Stroop task and, by extension, the emotional Stroop task in
identifying selective processing bias. The authors used an observational fear classical
conditioning procedure to condition healthy participants to fear previously neutral words that
were then presented in a Stroop task; results indicated that the fear conditioning procedures led
to the development of selective processing bias for the threatening words and that extinction
procedures attenuated Stroop interference, thus lending support not only to the ability of the
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Stroop task to detect attentional bias but also to the effectiveness of successful treatment in
reducing such bias.
Because of its dominance in the selective processing literature, research on the processes
underlying or mitigating the interference effects typically found in the emotional Stroop task is
fairly extensive, and there is an emphasis on understanding variables that may confound the
typical interference for threat words produced in an emotional Stroop task. Larsen, Mercer,
Balota, and Strube (2008) stated that many empirical studies on attentional bias that use the
emotional Stroop task fail to control for lexical features such as word length and word frequency,
two features that were controlled in the present study. The authors demonstrated that these
lexical features account for a significant amount of the variance in Stroop response times,
making due diligence to such potential confounds necessary for future emotional Stroop
implementation. Waters, Sayette, and Wertz (2003) commented on potential carry-over effects of
the Stroop task; that is, Stroop interference effects produced by repeating trials of negatively
valenced words may be inaccurately inflated due to a participant’s rumination on previous
words. Conversely, words presented in an unblocked format may decrease the emotional Stroop
effect because rumination on previously viewed negative words may cause longer response
latencies on subsequent neutral words. Several recommendations presented were to increase
inter-item intervals, which was done in the present study, or to add filler items between threat
and neutral words. Finally, the utility of the Stroop task has been questioned in several studies by
Thorpe and Salkovskis (1997a, 1997b). The authors suggest lack of reliability intrinsic in this
task given that an experiment they conducted revealed decreases in Stroop interference
regardless of word valence in both treated and untreated spider phobic participants (Thorpe &
Salkovskis, 1997a). They also suggest that Stroop interference may merely reflect preoccupation,
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which is not necessarily indicative of anxiety. Despite procedural issues with the emotional
Stroop, much empirical literature has been published using the emotional Stroop to establish the
presence of selective processing (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).
Empirical Examination of Selective Processing Bias Using Typical Paradigms
As is compatible with contemporary theories on cognitive bias, a great deal of empirical
support for enhanced processing of threat-related information in anxious participants has
emerged using such traditional paradigms as those previously mentioned, but many do not
evaluate subsequent explicit memory (Elsesser, Heuschen, Pundt, & Sartory, 2006; Foa, Feske,
Murdock, & Kozak, 1991; Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod,
1985; McNally, Riemann, & Kim, 1990; Öhman & Soares, 1993; Purkis & Lipp, 2007; Vrijsen,
Fleurkens, Nieuwboer, & Rinck, 2009). Using a dichotomous listening procedure, Burgess et al.
(1981), for example, tested the ability of individuals with agoraphobia, social phobia, and nonphobic controls to identify threatening and neutral words. Both phobic groups exhibited a
disproportionate ability to detect threatening words compared to neutral words, thereby
suggesting a selective processing bias for threatening words. MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata
(1986) found that anxious subjects demonstrated bias toward threat cues regardless of personal
relevance of those cues, indicating the potential for enhanced processing of all threat-related
information in anxious individuals. In a noteworthy study that evaluated both selective
processing bias and explicit memory, Kindt and Brosschat (1998) used a negative priming and
free recall task to investigate the hypothesis that selective processing bias operated in response to
threatening stimulus-related words and cognitive avoidance replaced that bias in the presence of
anxiety response-related words, such as “startled” or “terrified.” While individuals with spider
phobia did show a selective processing and recall bias for threatening stimulus-related words,
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there was no diminished recall for anxiety response-related words, thereby opposing the theory
of cognitive avoidance for such stimuli. Cognitive bias for threat-related information has also
been documented in the replicable phenomenon of “weapon focus,” which occurs when a
threatening stimulus (e.g., the weapon of an attacker) is selectively encoded and recalled at the
expense of other details, such as the appearance of the attacker (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987;
Steblay, 1992).
Although identification and interference tasks remain the mainstay of anxiety-induced
attentional bias research, other methodologies have recently been implemented in an attempt to
more effectively detect reflexive and subtle selective processing bias. These methodologies have
revealed evidence for such bias. In a novel paradigm employed by Cisler, Ries, and Widner
(2007), for example, spider-fearful and non-fearful participants were tested not on the latency of
their responses, as is the dependent variable in Stroop and dot probe paradigms, but on the
accuracy of probe detection following identification of a valenced target word. The study
employed a rapid serial visual presentation procedure (RSVP), which involved a computerized
stream of words that included one fear-relevant target word and one neutral probe word.
Participants in the control group were instructed to ignore the fear-relevant target word when it
appeared but report the presence of the neutral probe word, which appeared various milliseconds
later than the target word, while those in the experimental group were instructed to report both
the target word and the probe word. The authors hypothesized that those experimental group
participants who had elevations in anxiety would respond with earlier detection of the probe than
non-fearful participants following the presentation of the fear-relevant target word; this would be
primarily due to increased vigilance following presentation of the fear-relevant target word.
Indeed, results indicated that spider-fearful participants demonstrated faster processing of the
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target word and that these participants were better able to quickly identify the following probe,
which suggested increased vigilance as a result of anxiety arousal. There was, however, some
difficulty identifying the probe word if it immediately followed the target, which suggested
difficulty disengaging attention from a threat-relevant stimulus, although this result was also
demonstrated in the low spider-fearful group.
Despite relative support for selective processing bias, studies reporting confounds that
may operate to produce bias not attributable to preferential attention (Mathews & Klug, 1993)
and avoidance of threat-related information in anxious individuals (Foa, McNally, & Murdock,
1989; Pflugshaupt et al., 2007) or life-threatened individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2010) also exist.
One study reported visual avoidance of fear-relevant stimuli compared to neutral stimuli, but no
measure of automatic or strategic processing was administered (Tolin, Lohr, Lee, & Sawchuk,
1999). A study that implemented the white noise paradigm with spider-phobic and non-phobic
participants (Olatunji, Sawchuk, Lee, Lohr, & Tolin, 2008) found no evidence of preferential
processing of spider-related sentences in individuals with spider phobia, and null results such as
this have been reported elsewhere using other paradigms (i.e. Wenzel & Holt, 1999). A metaanalytic review of 165 studies that used, among other measures, word-stem completion and
lexical decision or stimulus identification implicit memory tasks found no relationship between
anxiety and implicit memory for threat-relevant information across anxiety disorders, although it
should be noted that these results may not generalize to other tasks of implicit memory (Mitte,
2008). A study that used visual tracking technology (Rinck & Becker, 2006) found initial visual
fixation on pictures of spiders by spider-fearful participants compared to non-fearful controls
when those images were presented with pictures of butterflies, dogs, and cats, a finding that the
authors hypothesized was attributable to automatic, involuntary processing of threat by spider-
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fearful individuals. However, this initial attentional bias was quickly followed by notable visual
avoidance of the spider picture by the spider-fearful participants in favor of a picture that was
subsequently rated as more pleasant: the picture of a cat. This result supports theoretical
reflexive bias toward threat followed by avoidance of further elaboration of threat, which is
deemed the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis that will later be discussed (Mogg et al., 1987; see
Pflugshaupt, Mosimann, von Wartburg, Schmitt, Nyffeler, & Müri, 2005, for further support of
this hypothesis), but the authors found no significant recognition differences between spider
phobic participants and non-anxious controls on a test of recognition despite the attentional bias
for threat-relevant information. Taken together, these results cast doubt on the existence of
consistently operating anxiety-induced selective processing and call for an examination of
possible moderator effects, such as anxiety-provoked rumination characteristic of trait anxiety, to
explain such findings, which will be further examined in this review.
Exogenous Cueing Task
The exogenous cueing task (Posner, 1980; Posner, 1988; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson,
1980) has been used to examine the allocation of attention, specifically orientation to and
detection of visual signals, in control participants as well as in participants with a variety of
disorders (i.e. schizophrenia and affective disorders, Sereno & Holzman, 1996; or major
depressive disorder, Leyman, DeRaedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2006). Typically, an individual is
instructed to indicate the location of a target stimulus either to the left or right of a fixation cross
after a peripheral cue has appeared in the same spatial location as the target (i.e. valid trials) or in
the opposite spatial location of the target (i.e. invalid trials). Generally there exists facilitated
responding, or decreased millisecond response times, to the target on valid trials due to increased
attention devoted to that spatial location and increased response time on invalid trials, which is
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known as the cue validity effect (Leyman et al., 2006). In his description of the exogenous
cueing task, Posner (1988) described facilitation of responding to cued locations as measured in
participant reaction times, the most typical measure, as well as other possible forms of
measurement. He further stated that three components of attention are involved to produce the
response facilitation observed during validly cued trials: (1) increased alertness to the target at
the sight of the cue, (2) cue-initiated spatially selective movement of visual attention to the cued
area, and (3) two unique forms of response inhibition. Those two forms of inhibition were
described as cost, which refers to inefficiency in handling information presented at any uncued
location due to orientation of attention to the cued location and difficulty disengaging that
attention, and inhibition of return, which refers to reduced efficiency in attending to a previously
cued location.
As in the emotional Stroop task, an emotional modification of this task has been
developed to evaluate the impact of emotional cues on attentional capture, which refers to an
individual’s immediate attention devoted to a stimulus, and attentional holding, which refers to
the impaired ability of an individual to disengage attention from a stimulus. A study that used
conditioned aversive stimuli as peripheral cues, for example, demonstrated attentional capture as
well as attentional holding by the aversive conditioned stimulus (i.e. CS+), thereby implying the
ubiquitous nature of attentional bias to threat (Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De
Houwer, 2004). That is, on valid trials, participants demonstrated a decreased reaction time to the
target under CS+ cue conditions compared to reaction time to the target under nonconditioned
stimulus (i.e. CS-) cue conditions, thereby demonstrating attentional capture. On invalid trials,
participants demonstrated an increased reaction time to the target under CS+ cue conditions
compared to their reaction time to the target under CS- cue conditions, thereby demonstrating
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attentional holding. These findings suggest preferential attention devoted to anxiety-provoking
stimuli followed by immediate inhibited disengagement of attention from such stimuli, although
it should be noted that both these phenomena occur fairly instantaneously (i.e. milliseconds
following the presentation of an anxiety-provoking stimulus) and may be followed by avoidance
of further processing of the stimulus.
This paradigm has infrequently been used to identify attentional bias in individuals with
anxiety disorders. In an attempt to distinguish between facilitated attentional capture and
impaired attentional disengagement of individuals with high and low trait anxiety, Koster,
Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, and Wiersema (2006) used a modified exogenous cueing
task and demonstrated both attentional capture and impaired disengagement in high trait anxious
individuals at 100ms presentation of threat cues in Experiment 1. At 500ms cue presentation,
however, these participants demonstrated attentional avoidance to threat-relevant pictures.
Notably, those participants who were low in trait anxiety exhibited no threat-biased attentional
capture. Waters, Wharton, Zimmer-Gembeck, and Craske (2008) used a visual probe task that
was similar to the exogenous cueing task to assess attentional bias in children with a variety of
anxiety disorders as well as the impact of treatment on bias. They found evidence for attentional
bias toward threat cues in anxious children using this task, and they also reported that successful
treatment of anxiety with cognitive behavioral group therapy did not alleviate such attentional
biases. Despite its somewhat limited use in the literature on threat-induced attentional bias
compared to the emotional Stroop, the exogenous cueing task overcomes some of the limitations
of the emotional Stroop, which includes the inability to distinguish increased response latencies
from attentional capture or attentional avoidance, by allowing for the assessment of possible
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attentional avoidance, which would be indicated by response patterns clearly distinct from those
indicative of attentional capture.
Explicit Memory Avoidance: Effect of Selective Processing Bias on Subsequent Recall
While the phenomenon of selective processing bias has received relatively substantial
empirical support, research on subsequent conscious recollection of threat stimuli has yielded
diverse results. One may logically expect that information that receives preferential attention
during encoding would enjoy subsequent enhanced recall; indeed, some studies seem to have
assumed this to be true (e.g., Wessel & Merckelbach, 1997), and there is evidence that supports
this assumption (Kindt & Brosschat, 1998; Smith-Janik & Teachman, 2008; Watts & Coyle,
1992). Friedman, Thayer, and Borkovec (2000), for example, found a significant explicit recall
bias for threat-related words compared to non-threat words in subjects with generalized anxiety
disorder. A study examining memory bias in high and low anxious adolescents used the Stroop
paradigm with the addition of a word-stem completion task and a recognition task to assess
explicit recall; although the high anxious group did not show memory bias relative to the low
anxious group on the word-stem completion task, there were significant between-group
differences in the recognition task (Potter, 1999). The high anxious group recognized more
threat-related words than the low anxious group, thus exhibiting explicit memory bias for threatrelated words on the recognition task. A meta-analysis by Mitte (2008) reported evidence of
congruent explicit memory bias exhibited by high anxious subjects in recall tasks but no
selective recognition of threat-relevant material in explicit recognition tasks, although betweengroup reported effect sizes were typically small (see Mitte, 2008, particularly Table 9).
Although these studies do suggest explicit memory bias for threat-relevant stimuli that is
congruent with the bias found in selective processing, there are a number of contrasting
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empirical studies that report explicit memory avoidance (Watts, 1986) or no significant recall
differences between threat and neutral stimuli. Mogg et al. (1987) reported no support for threatrelated memory bias in anxious study participants, who in fact demonstrated poorer recall of
threatening material than non-threatening material on recall and recognition tasks. Avoidance of
threat-related stimuli (Watts & Dalgleish, 1991) and nonsignificant results for threat stimulusrelated words have been reported elsewhere (Watts & Coyle, 1993), including in a study that
used video clips of spiders as the threatening stimuli and assessed explicit memory through recall
and recognition tasks of the clips and their details (Thorpe & Salkovskis, 2000). Reconciliation
for such divergent findings in explicit recall may be found in a theory hypothesized by Williams
et al. (1997), which posits that elevated anxiety results in emotionally-congruent integrative
processing characteristic of selective processing bias followed by emotionally-incongruent
elaborative processing characteristic of explicit memory avoidance; thus, selective processing
operates in anxious individuals such that they favor attention to threat but further elaboration
required to consciously recall threatening information is hindered, resulting in explicit memory
avoidance for threat-relevant stimuli.
This theory has been tested using a combination of implicit tasks to uncover selective
processing bias and explicit tasks to test for conscious avoidance of that information. As
described above, implicit memory tasks, such as the masked Stroop test, measure passive
acquisition of previously exposed material (MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995) while explicit
memory tasks, such as free recall tests, measure strategic recollection of previously viewed
material. A study by MacLeod and McLaughlin (1995) examined whether participants with
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) would show a recall advantage for threat-related words on
an implicit memory task (tachistoscopic identification) and on an explicit memory task
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(recognition test) compared to non-phobic controls. Results indicated that the GAD group did
show significantly higher levels of implicit memory for threat-related words than the control
group; however, there were no significant differences in explicit memory between participant
group or word valence. Other studies reported similar results in that implicit memory tasks
suggested selective processing while explicit memory tasks suggested no recall differences
between threat-relevant and neutral stimuli (e.g. Mathews, Mogg, May, & Eysenck, 1989). A
literature review by Coles and Heimberg (2002) on memory bias in panic disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder
reported that, while explicit memory bias for threat-relevant information enjoyed little support,
there was modest support for implicit memory bias specific to these disorders.
Thus, it appears that Williams’ theory is not fully supported by the literature, but partial
support arises from studies in which explicit memory avoidance was found (e.g. Wenzel & Holt,
2002). There is great difficulty in determining the impact of selective processing on subsequent
recall in light of the inconsistency of results. MacLeod and Mathews (2004) stated that, because
of the diversity of results in most anxiety disorders with the exception of panic disorder,
“memory bias does not represent a robust characteristic of anxiety” (p. 180). They note,
however, that possible inhibition of elaboration of selectively processed material or perceptual
representations of threat-relevant information rather than conceptual representations may be
possible explanations for the lack of consistent memory bias. Indeed, measures of implicit
memory or tasks that imposed restricted awareness of threat material tend to more reliably
produce biased recall rather than purely conceptual explicit measures.
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The Impact of Potential Moderator Variables on Selective Processing and Explicit Recall
Although there appears to be evidence supporting selective processing bias in anxious
subjects, contradictory results or failures to replicate have led to the exploration of variables that
may affect selective processing bias. The nature of the stimuli used in various paradigms
designed to test selective processing has been examined in an effort to determine the ecological
validity of the two most commonly used stimuli: valenced words and pictures. The presentation
and subsequent priming tests for valenced words have produced results suggestive of the
adequacy of such stimuli in detecting selective processing bias (Chen, Lewin, & Craske, 1996;
Kindt & Brosschot, 1998; Lavy, Van den Hout, & Arntz, 1993; MacLeod & McLaughlin, 1995;
MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Richards & Millwood, 1989). This has led to the use of valenced
words in most studies examining this topic, although other stimuli have been used infrequently.
In several studies, pictorial stimuli were presented to determine their efficacy in
producing bias. Lipp and Derakshan (2005) used the dot probe paradigm with pictures of snakes,
spiders, mushrooms, and flowers to detect possible attentional bias in snake- and spider-fearful
participants and found preliminary evidence for bias toward threat-relevant pictures in fearful
participants. Kindt and Brosschot (1999) used pictorial stimuli in an emotional Stroop test
modification that was administered to spider phobic and non-phobic children; more specifically,
they used pictures of spiders and chairs superimposed on a colored circle and labeled these
images as nonintegrated pictorial stimuli. They then compared recall for nonintegrated pictorial
stimuli to nonintegrated linguistic stimuli, which involved threat and neutral words superimposed
in a colored circle, and integrated linguistic stimuli, which were the traditional Stroop stimuli of
colored threat and neutral words. While bias was found for integrated and nonintegrated words,
pictures elicited no selective processing bias in individuals with spider phobia, despite the spider
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phobic participants’ judgment that pictures of spiders were the most aversive stimuli in terms of
valence and arousal. An earlier study, however, by Kindt and Brosschot (1997) examined the
same issue by exposing adult spider phobics and non-phobics to the same paradigm and found
bias for threat-related words and pictures, although pictures elicited no greater bias as predicted.
Similar results were presented by Lavy and Van den Hout (1993), but they reported that pictures
elicited slightly less selective processing bias than linguistic stimuli.
In addition to the nature of the stimuli, another frequently investigated variable that may
affect selective processing bias is the relative contributions of state and trait anxiety, but the
effects of each are often difficult to dissociate due to their high correlation (MacLeod, 1990).
MacLeod and Matthews (1991) and Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, and Painter (1997) suggested that
increased levels of state anxiety produce the most consistent results favoring selective processing
of threatening information: indeed, a study by Foa and McNally (1986) found that clinically
anxious participants’ memory bias for threat-related words was completely eliminated by
reduction in state anxiety through imaginal exposure and exposure and response prevention
treatments. Chen, Lewin, and Craske (1996) used the linguistic emotional Stroop paradigm to
test the effects of increased state anxiety in spider phobic participants by presenting the feared
stimulus before the Stroop test and eliciting continued state anxiety by informing participants
that they would be physically contacting the spider after the computerized test. Spider phobic
participants demonstrated selective processing bias toward threat-related information that was
enhanced by elevated state anxiety. The authors concluded that elevations in state anxiety
magnify bias that may have already been introduced by elevated trait anxiety, which other
studies that will be reviewed momentarily have also regarded as a necessary condition for
selective processing (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Richards & Millwood, 1989; but see
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Wikström, Lundh, & Westerlund, & Högman 2004, for disparate results). A study exploring the
effects of trait anxiety on autobiographical memory (Richards & Whittaker, 1990) suggested that
high trait anxious individuals showed autobiographical memory bias for anxiety-related
memories in that they were able to produce memories associated with anxiety-related cue words
faster than happiness-related cue words; this result was not, however, replicated in a later similar
study (Levy & Mineka, 1998). There was no evidence that high trait-anxious individuals
detected fear-relevant stimuli faster than low-trait anxious individuals in a study that used a
change detection paradigm, which involved subtle fear-relevant or fear-irrelevant changes to a
computerized picture of a social scene (Mayer, Muris, Vogel, Nojoredjo, & Merckelbach, 2006).
MacLeod and Mathews’ (1988) study involving college students with either high or low
trait anxiety suggested an interaction between trait and state anxiety. Testing occurred once when
state anxiety was low, which was early in the semester, and again when state anxiety was high,
which was before a course examination. Word pairs consisting of threat and neutral stimuli were
used in a probe detection task to determine amounts of visual attention to each stimulus. Results
indicated that selective processing was not present when state anxiety was low for either high or
low trait anxious participants but, with increases in state anxiety, high trait anxious individuals
showed selective processing for threat-related stimuli while low-trait anxious individuals showed
avoidance of threat-related stimuli. These results were tested in a similar study (MacLeod &
Rutherford, 1992) that sought to determine the contribution of state and trait anxiety as well as
automaticity of bias using a masked and unmasked Stroop procedure. On masked trials used to
evaluate selective processing bias, elevations in state anxiety increased bias for threat-related
information in high trait-anxious subjects but increased avoidance for such information in lowtrait subjects. In the unmasked exposure condition designed to test for explicit memory bias, high
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state anxiety led to conscious avoidance of threat-related stimuli for both high- and low-trait
subjects. Egloff and Hock (2001) used an emotional Stroop task containing general physical and
ego threat words on a large nonclinical sample to clarify the effects of state and trait anxiety on
Stroop interference and found results somewhat similar to MacLeod and Rutherford (1992);
these authors found that only for individuals with elevated trait anxiety did concurrent elevated
state anxiety produce Stroop interference. Participants who were low in trait anxiety and high in
state anxiety showed reduction of Stroop interference. These studies suggest a difference in the
nature of selective processing bias as a function of both state and trait anxiety variables as well
as conscious versus unconscious awareness.
One-Session In vivo Exposure Treatment for Specific Phobia
The prevalence of specific phobia, as mentioned above, has prompted the development of
a robust literature on efficacious treatments with a considerable focus on the treatment developed
by Lars-Göran Öst, which is deemed one-session in vivo exposure treatment; exposure treatment
is, of course, a hallmark treatment for anxiety disorders, but the rapidity of one-session in vivo
exposure treatment distinguishes it from other exposure methods. Behaviorally-based treatments
for specific phobia have received much empirical support, with one-session in vivo exposure
treatment in particular producing moderate to large effect sizes and positive treatment response
rates of 76% or better (Wolitzky-Taylor, Horowitz, Powers, & Telch, 2008; see Zlomke &
Davis, 2008, for a relevant review of the literature). The positive treatment outcomes produced
by such brief treatments appear to be long-standing, with significant treatment gains remaining at
follow-up of up to one year (Buchanan & Houlihan, 2008; Choy, Fyer, & Lipsitz, 2007; Gilroy,
Kirby, Daniels, Menzies, & Montgomery, 2003; Koch, Spates, & Himle, 2004; Öst, Ferebee, &
Furmark, 1997), although it should be noted that specific conditions (i.e. context changes, see
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Mystkowski, Craske, & Echiverri, 2002; or trait anxiety, see Muris, Mayer, & Merckelbach,
1998) have been implicated to cause eventual reemergence of fear responses or hindrance of
treatment effectiveness. In a review of specific phobia and its treatment, Antony and Swinson
(2000) reported that several variables predicted relapse of fear following successful treatment,
including rate of fear decrease during treatment, alteration of anxiety-related cognitions as a
result of treatment, and heart rate elevation at the beginning of treatment. Nevertheless, rapid
behavioral treatment of specific phobias has proven effective in both single-session and multiplesession formats. It appears that multiple-session formats add no significant treatment gains
compared to single-session formats, however, thus making single-session formats practically
preferred over multiple sessions (Hellström, Fellenius, & Öst, 1996; Öst, Alm, Brandberg, &
Breitholtz, 2001; Öst, Brandberg, & Alm, 1997; Öst, Hellström, & Kåver, 1992; but see
Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008). Additionally, small group exposure therapy also appears
efficacious (Öst, 1996; Öst, Ferebee, & Furmark, 1997), thereby increasing the feasibility of such
treatment for some providers or individuals for which individualized treatment poses challenges
or hardships. Technological advances have permitted creative new methods for administering
one-session in vivo exposure treatment, such as those that implement virtual reality, and
controlled clinical studies have shown promise of these methods (Garcia-Palacios, Hoffman,
Carlin, Furness, & Bortella, 2002; Gilroy et al., 2003). The significant empirical support, the
ease of implementation, and the cost-effectiveness of one-session in vivo exposure treatment
have made it a primary treatment for the alleviation of anxiety produced by specific phobia.
Öst (1997) described the rationale and foundational treatment procedures of one-session
in vivo exposure treatment for a number of specific phobias, including arachnophobia (fear of
spiders), ophidiophobia (fear of snakes), dental phobia, and claustrophobia (fear of enclosed
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spaces), among others. Öst notes that the purpose of such treatment is to allow the participant to
gain exposure to a feared stimulus in a controlled manner in order to demonstrate that the
catastrophic events the participant fears will happen do not actually occur. As outlined by Öst
(1997) and exhibited in several studies examining similar issues (Koch, Spates, & Himle, 2004;
Lavy & Van den Hout, 1993; Lavy, Van den Hout, & Arntz, 1993; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997a),
exposure treatment typically begins with pre-treatment instructions that explain procedures of
treatment and introduce the Subjective Units of Distress scale (SUDs) that will be used to
ascertain level of anxiety during treatment steps. The experimenter then verbally introduces
treatment steps, which are arranged in a hierarchical fashion according to difficulty, individually
to the participant and instructs on completion of the first step. Following verbal description and
instruction, the experimenter then models the necessary components of the treatment step,
permitting the participant to carefully observe as he/she demonstrates the treatment step. The
importance of such modeling has been suggested by findings that participant observation seems
to reduce anxiety cognitions while exposure activities reduce avoidant behaviors (Götestam &
Götestam, 1998). Following modeling, the participant is asked to complete each successive
component of the treatment step either independently or with the initial assistance of the
experimenter, which is gradually faded such that the participant eventually completes the step
independently. SUDs levels are taken at each treatment step and treatment continues until all
treatment steps are completed with satisfactorily low SUDs levels. Thus, treatment steps may be
sequentially repeated in cycles until all treatment steps are completed at satisfactorily low SUDs
levels. The exposure that occurs in treatment is gradual and controlled, although such treatment
represents only a portion of the therapeutic work that must be done; the participant is expected to
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maintain therapeutic gains outside of treatment by initiating regular exposure to the previously
feared stimulus.
Effects of Treatment on Selective Processing Bias and Explicit Memory Avoidance
Foa and Kozak (1986) proposed that behavioral treatments such as in vivo exposure
therapy reduce anxiety by evoking fear and allowing for habituation of anxiety and
disconfirmation of threat associated with the feared-stimulus. Thus, if stimuli are no longer
threatening, one may expect that they will not induce preferential encoding and cause no
retrieval disruption. Again, few studies have been conducted to determine the effects of
empirically supported treatment on anxiety, particularly specific phobia, and cognitive bias,
although those that have been conducted have generally found that treatment reduces cognitive
bias toward threat information (Teachman & Woody, 2003; Van den Hout, Tenney, Huygens, &
De Jong, 1997; Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986). Lavy, Van den Hout, and Arntz
(1993) tested spider phobic participants and non-phobic controls using a Stroop task followed by
one-session elaboration or non-elaboration exposure for phobic participants. The elaboration
treatment condition encouraged participants to elaborate as much information about the spider
stimulus as possible, thus preventing avoidance of threat stimuli, while the non-elaboration
condition discouraged such elaboration. Selective processing bias for threat-related stimuli, as
measured by the dependent variable of response latencies on the Stroop task, was reduced but not
eliminated by treatment, and elaboration did not aid selective processing bias reduction. Lavy
and Van den Hout (1993) used a linguistic and pictorial Stroop task to test one-session in vivo
exposure treatment outcome in spider phobic participants and found reduction in bias for
linguistic stimuli and elimination of bias for pictorial stimuli. Stanley-Kime (2008) reported that,
following successful one-session in vivo exposure treatment, individuals who were previously
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fearful of a snake or spider did not exhibit explicit memory deficits for environmental peripheral
details that were exhibited by individuals who did not receive treatment and remained fearful
throughout the experiment. In vivo exposure treatment therefore appears to impact cognitive
processing based on the limited available data.
The examination of treatment outcome studies involving other anxiety disorders is
warranted due to the potential generalizability of the results produced by variations of exposure
treatment. Many studies focusing on a variety of anxiety disorders have reported reduction of
selective processing bias, but most do not evaluate explicit memory (e.g. Mathews, Mogg,
Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995). A study by Masia, McNeil, Cohn, and Hope (1999), for example,
provided treatment of social phobic individuals by (1) exposing participants to social anxiety
words; (2) asking participants to imagine an anxiety-provoking image related to the content of
the word, a pivotal component of imaginal exposure; and (3) performing an emotional Stroop
task with social anxiety words to assess changes in color-naming response time. The authors
reported a significant reduction in Stroop interference following treatment, but limitations of this
study, including the small sample size (N =7) and the uncertainty of whether the same social
threat words that were presented during treatment were also presented in the emotional Stroop,
preclude tenable conclusions. Lundh and Öst (2001) reported reduced emotional Stroop
interference exhibited by social phobic participants for social threat words following individual
as well as group CBT, but it should be noted that similar reduced interference was found for all
participants for physical threat words and a floor effect may have existed for treatment nonresponders. Interestingly, latency between pre-test and post-test measurement varied widely
among participants in this study, with some participants receiving post-test measurement up to
two years after treatment; this variable latency was not accounted for in any reported statistical
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analysis. McKay (2005) used a directed forgetting task, a Stroop task, and a dot-probe task to
establish whether selective processing and memory biases were evident after “worrier” and “nonworrier” participants actively engaged in positive imagery, a component of many treatment
programs for anxiety. Compared to participants who were in the worry-induction group, the
“worrier” participants who were instructed to engage in positive imagery showed a reduction in
selective processing and memory biases for threat-related information. Finally, several studies
examining the impact of medication on attentional and interpretive bias (i.e. the tendency for
anxious individuals to interpret ambiguous information as threatening in nature) in individuals
with generalized anxiety disorder and other anxiety disorders have found reduction in these
biases with anxiety medication use (Mogg, Baldwin, Brodrick, & Bradley, 2004). However, lack
of medication effect on bias (Golombok, Stavrou, Bonn, Mogg, Critchlow, & Rust, 1991) and
potential increases in bias as a result of medication (Stewart, Westra, Thompson, & Conrad,
2000) have also been reported.
Despite the small literature that supports the efficacy of treatment in reducing cognitive
bias, some studies have produced incompatible results (see, for example, Waters, Wharton,
Zimmer-Gembeck, & Craske, 2008, although note that this study’s sample consists only of
children). Thorpe and Salkovskis (1997a) administered a Stroop task of spider, disgust,
emotional, and neutral words to spider phobic participants to test the effect of one-session
cognitive behavioral treatment for phobia. Although the treatment was effective in reducing fear
and negative beliefs toward the feared stimulus, participants who both did and did not receive
treatment showed a decrease in Stroop interference for all word types, including spider stimuli.
The authors suggested that the Stroop may be an inadequate measure of selective processing
given that phobic participants may not respond to semantic stimuli in the same manner in which

Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias 29
they would respond to an actual spider stimulus. An experiment that assessed implicit and
explicit attitudinal change (Huijding & de Jong, 2009) in spider-fearful individuals immediately
post-treatment and at two-month follow-up found explicit but not implicit attitude change
following one-session in vivo exposure treatment. The resistance of implicit attitudinal change to
treatment (e.g. Hermans et al., 2005) and the eventual spontaneous return of fear following
treatment (e.g. Mineka et al., 1999; Vansteenwegen, Vervliet, Hermans, Thewissen, & Eelen,
2007) have been suggested elsewhere; the possible inadequacy of brief treatment in addressing
core implicit attitudes toward the feared stimulus and reemergence of clinically significant fear
symptoms creates uncertainty as to the ability of such treatment to address similarly functioning
attentional bias. The effect of in vivo exposure therapy was also tested on general memory, recall
for anxiety level, and recall for the phobic stimulus in spider-fearful subjects (Zoellner,
Echiverri, & Craske, 2000). Improved recall for anxious responses was noted post-treatment, but
there was no improved recall for stimulus details. This may indicate possible interference or
avoidance caused by anxiety, even following one session of exposure treatment. As is evident,
theoretical reduction in recall avoidance of threatening words as a result of empirically supported
treatment has received limited attention, and there have been requests for greater examination of
the effects of treatment on cognitive bias as well (Mobini & Grant, 2007).
Empirical Limitations and the Present Study in Relation to the Literature
While the literature on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance is
extensive, there are several significant limitations that were addressed in the current study.
Although the impact of state and trait anxiety has been studied, the empirical literature lacks
methodologies that use the feared stimulus to produce the highest levels of state anxiety. Many
studies use linguistic stimuli or, more infrequently, pictures to assesses the occurrence of these
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cognitive phenomenon; the assumption adopted by researchers who employ these methods is that
linguistic and pictorial stimuli alone are adequate representations of the feared stimulus such that
they induce anxiety without the aid of any additional anxiety-arousing stimulus. This assumption
appears accurate upon review of the literature, but there is opportunity for improvement given
typically small effect sizes (Cohen’s d = .45; Bar-Haim et al., 2007). While the current study
used both linguistic and pictorial stimuli to assess for selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance, participants anticipated that contact would be made with the feared stimulus
after completion of the assessment measures per the instructions of the experimenter prior to
assessment. Additionally, the question of whether behavioral treatments address cognitive
mechanisms, particularly automatic and unconscious preferential attention to threat, that may be
experienced by anxious individuals warrants further investigation (see Huijding & de Jong,
2009) and the long term impact of treatment on these mechanisms in the absence of maintenance
procedures is uncertain. The introduction of treatment into the typical experimental paradigm in
this literature also allows for a more complete assessment of the role of state and trait anxiety as
one would expect within-group reduction of state anxiety in participants who receive treatment.
Hence, the protocol of this study permitted examination of selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance in individuals who theoretically experienced decreases in state anxiety
compared to individuals who remained highly state anxious.
The methodology of the current study enabled it to contribute significantly to the
empirical literature. The current study sought to examine the impact of one-session in vivo
exposure treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance immediately
following successful treatment and at one-week and one-month follow-up. Pre-treatment
measures of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance were incorporated to
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support the assertion that potential changes in cognitive processing were indeed a result of
treatment. Selective processing bias was initially measured through an emotional Stroop task and
further analyzed through the exogenous cueing task, which was fairly unique to the literature and
used to further delineate results found in the emotional Stroop. Explicit memory avoidance was
assessed through free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition tests of previously presented
threat-relevant and neutral words. One-week and one-month follow-up assessment points were
chosen based on the protocol of a treatment outcome study by Koch, Spates, and Himle (2004)
that demonstrated maintenance of treatment effects at these assessment periods. In light of the
limited literature on the enduring impact of treatment on the cognitive phenomena targeted in
this study, more limited follow-up periods have been selected and could be extended in
subsequent research if treatment showed continued mitigation effects on maladaptive cognitive
processing at these assessment points.
The performance of three participant groups, specifically a group of fearful individuals
who received one-session in vivo exposure treatment, a group of fearful individuals who did not
receive any anxiety treatment, and a non-fearful control group, on measures of implicit and
explicit memory was compared to assess the presence of selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance. Every participant who fully completed the protocol received four
assessments of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance: a pre-test assessment, a
post-test assessment, a one-week follow-up assessment, and a one-month follow-up assessment.
One important contribution that this study offered is the evaluation of both attention and memory
during anxiety-induction; most studies in this literature examined only one of these cognitive
processes, and, as mentioned previously, many did not include contact with the live feared
stimulus to maximize the likelihood of increased state anxiety. Additionally, the impact of state
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and trait anxiety was assessed with a focus on the fluctuation of state anxiety over time as result
of treatment. The most significant contribution of the current study was the exploration of the
enduring impact of one-session in vivo exposure therapy (Öst, 1997) on both selective processing
and explicit memory avoidance. As mentioned previously, limited studies have examined
treatment outcome in selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance in participants
with specific phobia, and no studies to the knowledge of the author had addressed the issue of
durability of behavioral treatment effects on these phenomena. While the prolonged treatment
effects of one-session in vivo exposure treatment have been suggested (i.e. Koch et al., 2004;
Wolitzky-Taylor et al., 2008), there is little research examining the sustainability of the indirect
cognitive effects of such a treatment when maintenance and generalization procedures are
excluded. Zlomke and Davis (2008) indeed asserted that no studies to the date of their article
examined the impact of maintenance procedures in the preservation of treatment gains in
exposure treatment, making their necessity ambiguous.
By addressing relevant points in the literature and attempting to integrate methods used in
various studies, this study represented a potential contribution to both the scientific and applied
aspects of anxiety disorders in that further knowledge was anticipated to be gained about a
crucial component of anxiety—heightened cognitive sensitivity to threat-relevant stimuli—and
how that component differentially operates to maintain anxiety. The ultimate goal of the study
was to provide information that would inform treatment of specific phobia, specifically through
the establishment of whether a strictly behavioral treatment with no cognitive component could
alleviate cognitive biases by allowing for the assimilation of non-threatening information
regarding the feared stimulus and whether this treatment could maintain its effects over time in
the absence of maintenance procedures. If theorized vigilance toward threatening stimuli and
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subsequent avoidance of that stimuli can be reduced, innocuous and positive stimuli might be
integrated, perhaps eliminating the cyclic cognitive patterns involved in anxiety.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The current study used a quasi-experimental longitudinal design with three participant
groups. Each participant group received four periods of assessment: a pre-test assessment that
occurred before treatment, a post-test assessment that occurred immediately following treatment,
one-week follow-up assessment, and one-month follow-up assessment. There are several primary
research questions that were addressed in the current study, and these questions have been
divided into thematic groups for ease of reporting and enhancement of understanding.
Question Group 1: Presence of Selective Processing Bias and Explicit Memory Avoidance
The first question group addressed the existence of selective processing and explicit
memory avoidance in light of the lack of definitive evidence for either in the literature. To
examine this, the results obtained from pre-test assessments of the treatment and no-treatment
groups were compared to the pre-test assessment results of control group. There were also
within-group comparisons; that is, responses to threat stimuli versus neutral stimuli were
compared in the pre-test assessments of the no-treatment and treatment groups. Thus, the
following research questions and hypotheses within this question group refer to results obtained
from the pre-test assessment of the treatment group and the no-treatment group.
It should also be noted that, in regard to the exogenous cuing task, hypotheses included
reference to facilitated responding and attentional capture. Facilitated responding refers to
decreased response times of participants to targets presented in valid trials; the mechanism
underlying this occurrence is thought to be preferential attention paid to the cue that precedes the
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target such that the target that replaces that cue is able to be detected more rapidly. Attentional
capture, also known as attentional holding, refers to an increase in response times of participants
to targets presented in invalid trials; the mechanism underlying this occurrence is thought to be
an inability to disengage attention from the cue that precedes the target such that the target that
appears in the rectangle opposite the cue is detected more slowly.
The first group of research questions and hypotheses are (1) will there be selective
processing bias found in the emotional Stroop task? It was hypothesized that selective
processing bias would be found in these groups at the above mentioned assessment period, as
would be evidenced by longer response times on the emotional Stroop task for threat words
compared to neutral words. (2) Will there be selective processing bias on the exogenous cueing
task? It was hypothesized that selective processing bias would be found in the exogenous cueing
task in these groups. This would be evidenced by greater levels of facilitated responding to
targets presented with valid threat cues compared to targets presented with valid neutral cues. (3)
Will there be attentional capture on the exogenous cuing task? It was hypothesized that these
groups would exhibit attentional capture on the exogenous cuing task when threat invalid cues
were compared to neutral invalid cues and uncued trials. Finally, (4) will there be explicit
memory avoidance on the tests of free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition? It was
hypothesized that there would be explicit memory avoidance in these groups, which would be
evidenced by decreased explicit recall of threat-relevant words. Although the results of empirical
examinations of anxiety-induced cognitive bias are mixed, there seems to be substantial evidence
suggesting the presence of selective processing bias for threat-relevant stimuli and some
empirical support for later explicit memory avoidance of those threatening stimuli.
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Question Group 2: Impact of Treatment on Anxiety-Induced Cognitive Processes
The second group of research questions concerned the impact of treatment on
hypothetically indicated selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. Questions in
this group were answered by a within-group comparison involving the treatment group; that is,
pre-test assessment results were compared to post-test assessment results in treatment group
participants. Additionally, the post-test results of the treatment group were compared to the
results of the no-treatment and control groups at post-test. The research questions and hypotheses
in this group were (1) will one-session in vivo exposure treatment, an empirically supported and
highly effective rapid behavioral treatment for specific phobia, immediately eliminate selective
processing bias and reduce potential inhibitory processes operating to suppress explicit recall of
threat-relevant information? It was hypothesized that one-session in vivo exposure treatment
would immediately eliminate selective processing bias and reduce inhibition of threat-relevant
information characteristic of explicit memory avoidance. If this pattern of results indeed
occurred, one would expect the results of the treatment group to be roughly equivalent with the
results of the control group on all dependent measures. One would also expect to find equivalent
response latencies for threat-relevant and neutral stimuli on the emotional Stroop task in the
treatment group at post-test; that is, the results obtained from treatment group on the emotional
Stroop task should closely match those obtained by the control group, while the no-treatment
group should have demonstrated selective processing bias for threat words. On the exogenous
cueing task, one would expect to find equivalent reaction time to targets presented after threat
and neutral cues on valid trials in the treatment group at post-test. One would also expect that
reaction time would be equivalent on invalid trials when neutral and threat cues were compared
in the post-test measurement of the treatment group. Additionally, if treatment was immediately
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effective, one would expect equivalent recall for both threat-relevant and neutral words on
explicit tests of memory in the treatment group at post-test, which should have resembled the
results obtained by the control group; the no-treatment group should have demonstrated explicit
memory avoidance.
In addition to immediate effects, prolonged effects of treatment were assessed at oneweek and one-month follow-up. To examine the prolonged impact of treatment, results from the
treatment group obtained at one-week and one-month follow-up were compared to the results of
both the no-treatment and control groups at the same assessment time periods. Also, there was
within-group comparison that occurred in the treatment group; that is, post-test results obtained
in the treatment group were compared to one-week and one-month follow-up results within that
group. The research question was (2) will hypothesized treatment gains exhibited in the
treatment group remain stable at one-week and one-month follow-up? It was hypothesized that
the immediate treatment gains exhibited by the treatment group, as described above, would
gradually decrease over time in the absence of treatment maintenance procedures. That is, the
treatment group should have shown gradually increasing response times for threat-relevant
words on the emotional Stroop and gradually enhanced facilitated responding (i.e. decreased
response times) on valid trials and increased response times (i.e. attentional capture) for threat
stimuli on invalid trials on the exogenous cueing task. One would also expect progressively
decreased recall of threat words on tests of explicit memory. This return of selective processing
bias and explicit memory avoidance was hypothesized to be due to increased state anxiety in the
treatment group. All treatment gains, however, were not anticipated to be lost, and results of the
treatment group were not anticipated to equate with those of the no-treatment group.
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Question Group 3: Impact of State and Trait Anxiety on Selective Processing Bias and
Explicit Memory Avoidance
The final group of research questions addressed the impact of state and trait anxiety on
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. To examine these questions,
participants were recategorized according to levels of state and trait anxiety such that four
mutually exclusive categories were created: high in both state and trait anxiety, high in state
anxiety but low in trait anxiety, low in state anxiety but high in trait anxiety, and low in both
state and trait anxiety. The grouping of participants into one of the four anxiety groups was based
on pre-test assessment of anxiety levels, although the study author initially planned to group
participants by anxiety level at each assessment point. These anxiety groups were compared on
the dependent variable measures at each assessment period with the main assessment point of
interest being pre-test assessment. The research questions were (1) will selective processing bias
and explicit recall differences arise as a result of high or low state or trait anxiety in participants?
For example, will those participants with high levels of both state and trait anxiety demonstrate
greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance than those who had high levels
of either state or trait anxiety or low levels of both state and trait anxiety? It was hypothesized
that state and trait variables would interact. Those participants who demonstrated high levels of
both state and trait anxiety would exhibit the greatest selective processing bias and produce more
explicit recall avoidance of threat-relevant stimuli. Also, (2) will possible increases in state
anxiety, as may be seen in the one-week and one-month assessments, in the treatment group
result in greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance? It was hypothesized
that, if state anxiety increased in the treatment group at one-week and one-month follow-up
assessments, greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance would be found.
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Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from undergraduate psychology courses at Eastern Michigan
University and, at the discretion of their professors, offered extra credit for their voluntary
participation. In addition to the possibility of extra credit, all Experimental Phase fearful
participants were offered one-session in vivo exposure treatment if they did not receive such
treatment during the course of their participation in the experiment; no no-treatment group
participant accepted this offer for free treatment. Participants were first asked to complete several
online questionnaires and a background survey during the Screening Phase of the study. A
portion of those individuals who completed the Screening Phase and indicated interest in the
Experimental Phase of the study were recruited for the Experimental Phase via email or phone
contact made by the primary investigator. Given the demographic features of the students of
Eastern Michigan University (Eastern Michigan University website, n.d.) as well as similar past
recruitment efforts, the samples for the Screening and Experimental Phases included more
women than men and the sample was mostly Caucasian; African Americans and individuals of
other ethnicities composed a small portion of the sample. Due to narrowly focused recruitment
efforts, the individuals included in the Experimental Phase of the study were quite young with a
mean age of 22.38 (range = 18-56). This participant sample was chosen based on evidence that
anxiety-related cognitive bias can be induced in individuals whose anxiety is perhaps not
clinically diagnosable (e.g. Kelly & Forsyth, 2007; Li, Wang, Poliakoff, & Luo, 2007), thereby
making distinction between individuals who meet diagnostic criteria for specific phobia and
those whose fear is diagnostically subthreshold unnecessary. Thus, no participant was formally
screened for any clinically diagnosable disorder.
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The online Screening Phase of the study was made available to any individual recruited
from undergraduate psychology courses, and there was no limit placed on the number of
participants for this phase. An affiliate of the study, with the prior permission of the instructor of
the class, entered a classroom and provided a very brief and scripted description of both the
Screening Phase and the Experimental Phase of the study. Following this description, the
affiliate answered any questions and circulated a sign-up sheet around the class that asked for
each interested individual’s email address. An email that included general information about the
Screening Phase of the study and the unique web link to the study was sent to all individuals who
provided a valid email address. By clicking on the study’s link or copying that link from the
email into the internet address bar, participants accessed the Screening Phase assessments.
Potential Screening Phase participants were initially presented with a Screening Phase Informed
Consent Agreement (see Appendix A) that outlined, among other relevant topics, the purpose,
procedures, risks, and benefits of participation in the Screening Phase of the study. In order to
complete the online assessments, an individual had to select that he/she agreed to the terms
presented in the informed consent agreement. A phone number and email address of the primary
investigator and the faculty advisor was provided to ensure that questions regarding the informed
consent agreement could be addressed prior to the potential participant giving consent.
There was to be an anticipated total of 60 participants, or 20 per participant group, for the
Experimental Phase of the study; this number, which achieved a power of .80 at a 95%
confidence interval, was based on a power analysis conducted using the primary investigator’s
thesis data (Stanley-Kime, 2008). Participants for the Experimental Phase were recruited from
the sample that completed the Screening Phase online assessments and indicated on the
background questionnaire that they were interested in being contacted for further participation
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opportunities. Participants were contacted via their preferred method of contact, and those who
accepted the primary investigator’s invitation were those who are included in the Experimental
Phase. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for the Experimental Phase were assessed using each
participant’s response to the Screening Phase assessments. Individuals were fearful of either a
snake or a spider to be considered for either the treatment group or the no-treatment group. To be
considered fearful, participants need not have met Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders Fourth Edition Revised (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association [APA],
1994) criteria for specific phobia; rather, they must have obtained a score in the significantly
fearful range (70-126) on the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) or on the Fear of Snakes
Questionnaire (FSnQ). For individuals assigned to the treatment and no-treatment groups, the
animal/arachnid that he/she reported to most fear was used in the case that the participant met
criteria for both. Individuals were required to be non-fearful of either a snake or a spider to be
considered for the control group, meaning that they obtained a score in the non-fearful range (10
or below) on the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) or on the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire
(FSnQ). For individuals assigned to the control group, the animal/arachnid corresponding to the
lowest score on either measure of fear (i.e. FSQ or FSnQ) was used in the case that the
participant was not fearful of both. If an individual feared one stimulus, thus meeting criteria for
inclusion in the treatment or no-treatment group, but did not fear the other stimulus, thus meeting
criteria for the control group, that individual was selected for either the treatment or no-treatment
group.
Exclusionary criteria for the Experimental Phase of the study were assessed during the
Screening Phase of the study, specifically using the Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales-21
item version (DASS-21) and the background questionnaire. All participants had nominal levels
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of depression, as indicated by a score of six or below on the Depression subscale of the DASS21. On the background survey, those individuals who endorsed a condition that may affect
normal brain functioning, a learning disability, allergies to a snake or a spider, a compromised
immune system, or color blindness were excluded from the study. In accordance with ethical
considerations, those individuals who reported medical conditions, including pregnancy and
heart conditions that could be negatively impacted or exacerbated by anxiety induction, were
excluded from the study. Prior to participation in the Experimental Phase, participants were
placed into one of three groups (i.e. treatment group, no-treatment group, or control group; see
Procedures: Initial Experimental Phase Procedures for All Participants section for details on
group assignment). Upon meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant for
Experimental Phase participation, all individuals were presented with an Experimental Phase
Informed Consent Agreement (see Appendix B) that detailed, among other topics, the purpose,
procedures, risks, and benefits of participation in the Experimental Phase of the study, including
follow-up procedures.
Measures
Screening Phase Online Assessments
Fear evaluation.
Two brief questionnaires were used to assess fear level toward the snake and arachnid
used in the experiment; these questionnaires were administered online and psychometric
properties of such an administration were assessed using data collected from the author’s thesis
(Stanley-Kime, 2008) and are reported below. The recently developed Fear of Spiders
Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995; see Appendix C) is an 18-item self-report
instrument that evaluates current fear of spiders with statements that are rated on an 8-point
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Likert scale where 0 indicates totally disagree and 7 indicates totally agree. Items are scored by
summing the participant responses to form a composite score and no items are reversed scored.
Scores range from 0 to 126 with higher scores indicating greater amounts of fear elicited by a
spider stimulus. The mean score for spider phobic individuals on the FSQ in a study by Muris
and Merckelbach (1996) was 89.1 (SD = 19.6), and this was used to establish the cutoff score of
70 on either of these questionnaires for individuals to be considered fearful in the current study.
In addition to the FSQ, the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire (FSnQ; see Appendix D) was
developed from the FSQ for this study; again, psychometric properties of this questionnaire were
obtained from previously collected thesis data and are reported below. The FSnQ was created by
substituting the word “snake” for the word “spider” in the questionnaire and rewording several
questions, specifically question numbers 5, 10, 11, and 12, to enhance the logic of the question
given that slight change of topic.
According to Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995), the FSQ is designed to evaluate five
domains of spider fear, including (1) cognitive, (2) behavioral, (3) physiological, (4) negative
attitudes, and (5) fear of harm by spiders. This instrument was chosen over the widely
implemented Spider Phobia Questionnaire (SPQ; Watts & Sharrock, 1984) due to evidence that
the FSQ provides greater specificity between phobics and non-phobics, is a more accurate
measure of fear in the non-phobic range, and is capable of detecting reduction in phobic
responses after treatment (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996; Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995). The
FSnQ was chosen over the Snake Questionnaire (SNAQ; Klorman, Hastings, Weerts, Melamed,
& Lang, 1974) due to evidence that scores on the SNAQ did not correspond with behavioral
avoidance tests, which may indicate the tendency of the SNAQ to yield greater rates of false
positives (Klieger, 1987).
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Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995) reported internal consistency of the FSQ to be at an
alpha of .92 in a sample of undergraduate phobic and non-phobic participants. Muris and
Merckelbach (1996) also reported high levels of internal consistency based on an initial
administration (α = .95) and on a subsequent administration 3-weeks later (α = .97) for both
spider phobic participants and non-phobic controls on the FSQ; the SPQ fell below acceptable
limits (α = .43) for non-phobic controls during a second study by the same authors in which
treatment was administered to phobic individuals. Based on 608 responses collected during the
author’s online administration of the FSQ for a thesis project (Stanley-Kime, 2008), internal
consistency for online administration of the FSQ to a sample of undergraduates was very high (α
= .98). Internal consistency for the online administration of the FSnQ based on the same sample
of undergraduates was equivalently high (α = .98). Additionally, test-retest correlations reported
by Muris and Merckelbach (1996) from the initial administration to the 3-week administration
was high (r = .91). Szymanski and O’Donohue (1995) reported a split half reliability coefficient
of .89 and convergent validity with both the SPQ (r =.65) and with a behavioral avoidance test (r
= .19). In addition, all authors reported the ability of the FSQ to differentiate between spider
phobic participants and non-phobic control participants (Muris & Merckelbach, 1996;
Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995). Finally, the FSQ detected changes in fear as a result of both
behavior therapy (Muris & Merckelbach’s, 1996) and cognitive restructuring (Szymanski &
O’Donohue, 1995). Thus, the instrument demonstrated good test-retest reliability, internal
consistency, and validity and is briefer than the 31-item SPQ, thereby increasing efficiency.
Assessment of comorbid depression, anxiety, and stress.
To ensure that a comorbid condition of depression did not introduce a significant
confound, the brief version of the 42-item Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales (DASS;
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Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995), the DASS-21 (see Appendix E), was administered online in
addition to the FSQ and FSnQ. Again, the psychometric properties of the online administration
were assessed using data collected from the author’s thesis study (Stanley-Kime, 2008) and are
reported below. The DASS-21 is a 21-item self-report instrument containing three subscales that
assess the occurrence and severity of the emotional symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress
on a 4-point scale (0 = did not apply to me at all, 3 = applied to me very much, or most of the
time). Items are scored by summing the participant responses to form a composite score for each
subscale and no items are reversed scored. There are seven items on each of the three subscales
(i.e. Depression subscale, Anxiety subscale, and Stress subscale) and subscale scores range from
0 to 21 with higher scores indicating greater levels of the construct the subscale purports to
measure. A total score can also be derived by summing the subscale scores, though this was not
done in the current study. Given the mean and standard deviation of a normal population (M =
2.83, SD = 3.87; Henry & Crawford, 2005) on the depression scale, a cutoff score of 6 or below
(i.e. the approximate mean and one standard deviation, rounded down for prudence) on the
depression subscale was used as inclusion criteria. The scores on the Anxiety and Stress
subscales were not used as inclusion or exclusion criteria.
Henry and Crawford (2005) evaluated the psychometric properties of the DASS-21 on a
non-clinical adult sample and found satisfactory internal consistency of the three subscales (α =
.88 for Depression, α = 82 for Anxiety, and α = .90 for Stress) as well as the total scale (α = .93).
Additionally, the 21-item version of the scale yields scores similar to those derived from the full
42-item scale. A study by Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, and Swinson (1998) supported the
reliability and validity of the DASS-21 in assessing features of depression, anxiety, and stress in
both clinical and non-clinical adult populations. They reported good internal consistency; indeed,
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their data yielded Cronbach’s alphas for the DASS-21 Depression, Anxiety, and Stress subscales
of .94, .87, and .91, respectively, and they found comparable scores on the DASS and the DASS21 among several diagnostic groups and controls. Based on the sample of 608 undergraduate
responses to online administration of the DASS-21 (Stanley-Kime, 2008), internal consistency
for the total scale (α = .94) as well as the Depression (α = .91), Anxiety (α = .83), and Stress (α =
.88) subscales were good. Antony et al. (1998) also found high convergent validity when scores
on the DASS-21 Depression Subscale and scores on the Beck Depression Inventory were
compared (r = .79) and discriminant validity when scores on the DASS-21 Depression Subscale
were compared with scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory (r = .51). Finally, both Henry and
Crawford (2005) and Antony et al. (1998) found a three-factor solution that reflected the three
subscales in the DASS-21, thus increasing the similarity of the brief version of the scale to the
42-item version. Henry and Crawford (2005), however, also noted that combining the three
subscales to form a measure of general psychological distress may also be a valid interpretation
of the scale, although the three subscales can be used separately.
Assessment of participant characteristics and exclusionary factors.
A primary investigator-created background questionnaire (see Appendix F) was used to
assess relevant characteristics of participants as well as to screen participants for exclusionary
factors. Basic demographic information was collected, including age, sex, ethnicity, occupation,
and current college standing. Although all participants were required to disclose their first name,
full disclosure of first and last name, university identification number, and contact information
was voluntary and could be omitted at will; the purpose of collecting such identifying
information was to allow students to receive course extra credit for their participation in the
online screening portion of the study and allow the primary investigator to contact persons
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interested in the treatment phase of the study. Exclusionary criteria queried in the questionnaire
included the self-reported presence of health conditions (i.e. asthma, heart conditions,
hypertension, lung disease, migraines, neurological problems, pregnancy, recurring chest pain,
seizer, stroke, and ulcers), traumatic brain injury, epilepsy, dementia, learning disabilities,
allergies to snakes or spiders, a compromised immune system, and color blindness. Other
information was included to provide ancillary information to the primary investigator, such as
how the participant heard of the study and if the participant had any intensely fearful experiences
with either a snake or spider.
Experimental Phase Assessments
Level of state and trait anxiety.
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970),
specifically Form Y (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), is a 40-item self-

report instrument that was used to assess each participant’s current and general levels of anxiety
during the Experimental Phase of the study, although no assignment to any of the three
participant groups was made based on the obtained data. Participants received the full STAI at
pre-test assessment. At post-test assessment and one-week and one-month follow-up
assessments, only the State subscale was administered as part of the Cognitive Assessment
Sequence. The STAI consists of items designed to assess two dimensions of anxiety: state
anxiety, which is temporary anxiety that may be elicited by a feared stimulus or situation, and
trait, which is stable and enduring characterological anxiety. The State Anxiety subscale contains
20 statements regarding current anxious feelings that are self-rated on a 4-point Likert scale
where 1 indicates not at all and 4 indicates very much so. The Trait Anxiety subscale contains 20
statements regarding general feelings of anxiety that are also self-rated on a 4-point Likert scale
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(1 = almost never, 4 = almost always). Scores on each subscale range from 20 to 80 with higher
scores on either scale indicating higher levels of state or trait anxiety; items are scored by
summing the participant responses and several items on each scale are reverse scored as they
indicate an absence of anxiety. On the State Anxiety subscale, there are 10 reverse scored
(numbers 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 19, and 20) and there are 9 reverse score items on the Trait
Anxiety subscale (numbers 21, 23, 26, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36, and 39).
The STAI was chosen for its psychometric soundness, brevity, and ease of administration
and scoring (Spielberger, 1985); its use also permitted comparison with other studies that
included this measure. Test-retest reliability over a period of several weeks has been reported to
be between .86 and .71 for the Trait Anxiety subscale and .54 and .27 for the State Anxiety
subscale (Hedberg, 1972). In addition, good internal consistency has been reported (above α =
.86 for the Trait Anxiety subscale and above α = .83 for the State Anxiety subscale), and
construct validity is demonstrated by fluctuations in State Anxiety scores resulting from variable
states of stress and overall stability of Trait Anxiety scores (Hedberg, 1972). The discriminative
ability of the State Anxiety subscale in a sample of undergraduates in high- and low-stress
conditions has been established (Metzger, 1976), thereby making it particularly useful in the
current study in which fluctuations in state anxiety may occur.
Cognitive Assessment Sequence
Identification of selective processing bias: Emotional Stroop task.
A computerized version of the single-item emotional Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was used
to assess for selective processing of threat-relevant words compared to neutral words as well as
to discern the effects of treatment over time; mean reaction time in milliseconds to name the
color of threat-relevant words was compared to the mean reaction time in milliseconds to name
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the color of neutral words to determine the presence of selective processing in the three
participant groups. Stroop protocol was conducted in accordance with the procedures described
in MacLeod (2005a). All participants were given instructions to respond as quickly as possible
with the color in which each word is printed while avoiding errors. All participants were
instructed to ignore the meaning of each word. Eight practice blocks of 12 words each were
completed to ensure accurate comprehension of the task. This was followed by the experimental
trials, in which 12 words were pre-selected from the threat and neutral word categories to form a
block of 24 words. This block of 24 words was presented three times, yielding 72 trials total.
During each block, the word order and word color was semi-randomized; that is, the same word
color was not permitted to occur in two consecutive trials. A single trial began with a visual
fixation (e.g. ++++) of 1000 ms followed by a blank screen for 1000 ms. A threat-relevant or
neutral word was individually presented in the center of the screen in the same location as the
visual fixation; the word, which was displayed in one of four colors (i.e., red, yellow, blue, or
green), was printed in 72-point Times New Roman font in lower case and appeared against a
white background. Participants were seated directly in front of the computer screen and were
instructed to use the keyboard keys of “z”, “x”, “.” and “/”, each of which corresponded to one of
the four colors used in the experiment, to indicate the color of each word as it is presented on the
screen. These four keys were covered in a transparent adhesive sticker that was colored one of
the four colors. Computer timing began at the appearance of the word and ceased when the
participant selected a response. The item disappeared from the screen when the participant
selected a response or a 1,500 ms time limit interval was reached. The visual fixation then
reappeared, and the procedure began again until all words in a block were completed. Data was
collected by the computer software (i.e. SuperLab) that was used to create the emotional Stroop
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procedure. Participant errors, which constituted incorrectly naming the color of a word, were
tracked, although errors were not included as a dependent variable in any primary analysis. Both
error proportions and mean correct response times were calculated, and individual response
times for each condition (threat-relevant vs. neutral words) were collapsed so that a mean
response time for each condition was obtained. Outliers of less than 300 ms were removed from
the data before calculating the mean response time for each condition.
Selection of the threat-relevant and neutral words was dependent on the individual
participant’s fear and separate emotional Stroop tasks were created for snake- and spider-fearful
participants. Control participants received the emotional Stroop task that corresponded with their
least feared stimulus (i.e. the snake or the spider). Threat-relevant words included relevant
animals and their commonly associated characteristics (i.e. spider, web, snake), animal features
(i.e. hairy, scaly, venom), and animal actions (i.e. crawl, strike, bite). Neutral words were
matched for length and word frequency (Carroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971; Francis & Kučera,
1982); these words were unrelated to the feared animal and included nouns (i.e. chair), adjectives
(i.e. lazy), and verbs (i.e. bounce). Snake and spider word lists for the emotional Stroop task are
available in Appendix G.
The emotional Stroop paradigm is frequently used in the literature on selective
processing, although it should be noted that it is significantly divergent from the original card
format of the standard Stroop procedure and must therefore be subjected to psychometric
evaluation. A study by Kindt, Bierman, and Brosschot (1996) sought to establish test-retest
reliability and convergent validity of the card format and single-trial format of the standard and
emotional Stroop procedures. For color-naming response times, the authors reported highly
significant convergence between the card and single-trial format (r = 0.35 – 0.57) and test-retest
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reliability for both the card (r = 0.64 – 0.75) and single-trial (r = 0.66 – 0.84) formats. In regard
to interference indices, however, the authors found no convergent validity for the card format
and single-trial format for both the standard and emotional Stroop procedures, which they
attributed to unique mechanisms measured by both tasks. Furthermore, the authors noted a lack
of test-retest reliability on the emotional Stroop interference in a single-trial format (r = 0.25);
however, one should note that, when the authors included only participants who were fearful of
spiders according to scores on the Spider Phobia Questionnaire, there was a significant increase
in the test-retest reliability of the emotional Stroop interference on the single trial format (r =
0.54).
A later study by Eide, Kemp, Silberstein, Nathan, and Stough (2002) also found
unacceptably low test-retest reliability when interference indices were calculated (r = 0.24, -0.11,
depending on word category) but high test-retest reliability when response time was examined (r
= 0.77-0.80, depending on word category). Eide et al (2002) concluded that, while the reliability
of interference effects remains uncertain but likely given the reliability of response time,
response times derived from different emotional conditions remains reliable. Strauss, Allen,
Jorgensen, and Cramer (2005), who reported similar results in a study examining color-word and
picture-word standard and emotional Stroop tasks, noted that the error in measurement from two
conditions (emotional and neutral, in the case of an emotional Stroop task) combines when these
are used to calculate an interference index. The combination of the two valenced word conditions
compounds measurement error and results in reduction of the correlation coefficient for the
interference indices. Given the findings of these studies, mean response latencies (i.e. reaction
times) in each condition rather than an interference index obtained from difference scores in
response latencies in emotional and neutral stimuli were used to report test performance on threat
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and neutral words (support of this method was also reported by Dresler et al., 2012). In addition
to issues with test-retest reliability of the Stroop task, there are other limitations to this task. As
noted in MacLeod (2005b), the limitations of the Stroop preclude definitive judgments regarding
the existence of selective processing; alternative explanations for longer response latencies to
threat-relevant words could be due to word frequency, emotional reactivity to word content, or
diversion of attention away from the word entirely. Inclusion of this task, however, was preferred
given the need for comparison of the results of this study with the body of literature that has
established selective processing through the emotional Stroop task.
Identification of selective processing bias: Exogenous cueing task.
Thirty pictorial cue stimuli for the exogenous cueing task were selected from the
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and, in the case
of the threat-relevant pictures for creation of a spider exogenous cueing task, from public domain
pictures using the internet. Three spider pictures were selected from the public domain due to
limited availability of spider pictures on the IAPS. Twenty threat cues were selected, ten of
which were pictures of snakes and ten of which were pictures of spiders. Using previously
collected data on valence and arousal induction of each picture for both male and female subjects
(Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), the mean valence for the ten snake pictures was 4.00 (SD =
.08) and the mean arousal was 5.95 (SD = .10). The mean valence for the seven rated spider
pictures was 3.75 (SD = .12) and the mean arousal was 5.64 (SD = .21). Neutral pictorial cues
were composed of household items, people, and environmental stimuli. The mean valence for the
neutral pictures was 4.93 (SD = .03) and the mean arousal was 2.56 (SD = .09). Subject ratings
from the Lang et al. data (2008) were based on a 9-point Likert scale (range of 1 to 9) with
higher scores indicating high rating on each dimension (i.e., high pleasure, high arousal). A one-

Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias 52
way ANOVA with Tukey comparison revealed significant between group differences on both
valence and arousal for neutral compared to threat-relevant words. Neutral words were rated
higher in valence, F (2, 26) = 64.18, p < .01, indicating greater participant pleasure upon viewing
the picture, and lower arousal, F (2, 26) = 221.04, p < .01, compared to both snake and spider
pictures. Snake and spider pictures did not significantly differ on valence or arousal, although
data were not available on three spider pictures given that they were selected from the public
domain.
The exogenous cueing task was programmed using SuperLab for its millisecond response
time measuring capability. The task was presented on a Dell desktop computer with color
monitor. Participants were first instructed to sit in front of the computer. Instructions appeared on
the screen and were presented verbally to each participant. The participants were told that they
would see a cross in the middle of the computer screen flanked by two white rectangles on either
side of the cross and that they should focus their attention on the cross. After a short time, a
picture would appear to the right or left of the cross in one of the rectangles followed by a black
square in one of the rectangles; participants were informed that the picture that appears was not
predictive of where the target square would appear. Participants were instructed to indicate the
location of the black target square as quickly as possible without sacrificing accuracy, and they
were asked to use two keys on the keyboard that indicated left or right target spatial location to
perform this task. Following instruction, there were twelve trials of practice in which threat or
neutral cues were not used; rather, a rectangle simply filled with the solid color green. After
completion of the practice trials, the test phase began and consisted of 240 trials. These 240 trials
were proportionally divided into valid, invalid, and uncued trials as modeled in Amir, Elias,
Klumpp, and Przeworski (2003) and described in Posner (1988). Specifically, two thirds (2/3) of
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the total trials were validly cued (10 pictures x 2 picture valences x 2 picture positions x 4
repetitions = 160), one sixth (1/6) of the total trials were invalidly cued (10 pictures x 2 picture
valences x 2 picture positions = 40) , and one sixth (1/6) of the total trials were uncued (10
pictures x 2 picture valences x 2 picture positions = 40), meaning that there was no picture
stimulus preceding the target. Trials were randomized by assessment point, but software
limitations precluded randomization by participant.
All stimuli were presented against a black background. On every trial, a white fixation
cross appeared in the center of the screen and this cross was flanked by two white rectangles; the
fixation cross and white rectangles appeared for 500ms. A threat or neutral pictorial cue then
appeared in one of the two rectangles for a period of 200ms and completely filled the area of the
rectangle. The target, which was a black square, appeared immediately following cue offset and
was located in the center of one of the white rectangles. The target remained on the screen until
the participant entered a response using the keyboard and, after a response had been made, a new
trial immediately began. Latency between target onset and participant response was the primary
dependent measure. Outliers, which were defined as reaction times of less than 150ms or greater
than 750ms based on previous studies (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema
2006) and commented on by Ratcliff (1993), were rejected from data analysis. Participant errors,
which constituted incorrectly indicating the location of the target, were tracked, although error
rate was not included as a dependent variable in any primary analysis.
Measure of intellectual ability.
In order to evaluate and control the potential confound of intellectual ability on tests of
memory, the Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS; Shipley, 1940; Zachary, 1991), a brief
measure used for testing intelligence and detecting mild degrees of intellectual impairment, was
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administered to each participant. The SILS is divided into two main subscales, namely a 40-item
Vocabulary Test and a 20-item Abstract Thinking Test, and yields six summary scores: the
vocabulary score (based on the raw score of the 40 vocabulary items), abstraction score (based
on the raw score of the 20 Abstract Thinking items), total score, conceptual quotient, abstraction
quotient, and estimated full scale Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale or Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-Revised IQ scores. The Vocabulary subscale measures general verbal abilities
such as knowledge, reading ability, and verbal comprehension, while the Abstract Thinking
subscale measures cognitive and reasoning ability; significant discrepancy between scores on the
two subscales indicates possible cognitive impairment that may warrant further testing. Subscale
items are scored by number of correct answers out of the total possible, although one should note
that there are further calculations described in the SILS manual that are needed to produce the
subscale scores and certain circumstances (i.e. participant omission of a response) warrant
modification of the calculation. The total raw scores on each of the two subscales range from 0 to
40 and it should be noted that the raw score on the Abstract Thinking subscale is multiplied by
two to achieve a range equivalent to that of the Vocabulary subscale. The SILS manual is used to
transform raw scores into the summary scores. Higher scores on a subscale indicate greater
ability in that respective area.
Each subscale has a ten-minute time limit which was adhered to in this study. The
Vocabulary subscale was administered immediately following the exogenous cueing task to
avoid potential confounding due to presentation of this linguistic task after explicit word list
presentation. The Abstract Thinking subscale was administered after the explicit word list
presentation, during which time it also served as an interpolated activity to reduce recency
effects on tests of explicit memory. Martin, Blair, Stokes, and Lester (1977) found acceptable
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test-retest reliability (r = .80) after a 45-day interval in a normative college sample. These same
authors also found that the SILS was moderately correlated (initial testing r = .46, second testing
r = .54) with the Slosson Intelligence Test, another brief measure of IQ, thus providing support
for the measure’s convergent validity. Factor structure or discriminant validity data on the SILS
is unavailable to the knowledge of the author.
Explicit memory evaluation.
In order to evaluate theorized explicit memory avoidance and the impact of treatment on
such avoidance, several tests of explicit memory were administered following an encoding phase
of threat and neutral linguistic stimuli. In a recent meta-analysis of the literature on anxietyinduced memory bias, Mitte (2008) noted that 67% of a total 165 studies included in the analysis
used a recall task and 38% of that total used a recognition task; to facilitate comparison among
studies in this literature and in keeping with the linguistic stimuli presented in the Stroop
attention task, this study used similar methods to evaluate explicit memory, despite the lowered
ecological validity of such a methodological selection. Following several tasks (i.e. STAI,
emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, SILS Vocabulary subscale) in the Cognitive
Assessment Sequence, explicit word list presentation began. One of two word lists, one for
snake-fearful participants and one for spider-fearful participants, were employed, depending on
the participant’s fear. All participants were seated at a Dell personal computer and shown a
Microsoft PowerPoint presentation of a total of 20 words, half of which were threat-relevant (i.e.
spider) and the other half of which were neutral (i.e. pencil). It was attempted that all words
differed in the first two letters with which they began, which was important for the word-stem
cued recall test that occurred during explicit memory evaluation; this did not happen in practice
due to the challenge in selecting threat and neutral words and matching them on relevant
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characteristics. Participants were instructed that, during the encoding phase, they were to pay
close attention to each word as it appeared on the screen because their memory for the words
would be tested at a later point in the experiment. Words appeared individually in the center of
the computer screen for a total of five seconds, after which time the word disappeared, leaving a
blank screen that remained for three seconds. Another word then appeared for five seconds. All
words were presented in lower case black ink in Times New Roman 72-point font. Explicit
memory word lists for both snake and spider participants are presented in Appendix G.
Following the interpolated task of the SILS Abstract Thinking subscale, memory for the
words was evaluated via free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition tasks, which were
not counterbalanced across participants or time of assessment due to the progressive recall cues
inherent in each test. The dependent variable on each test was the number of threat-relevant
words recalled compared to the number of neutral words recalled. All tests had a time limit of 10
minutes, although participants were permitted to finish the task before 10 minutes and continue
on to the next task. Once a participant completed one test and began the next, however, he/she
was not permitted to return to the previous test at any time during the experiment. During the
free recall test, the primary investigator/research assistant provided the participant with a sheet of
paper with instructions written on the top, which were also provided verbally. The primary
investigator/research assistant indicated that the participant should write down all the words that
he/she could recall that were presented during the encoding phase of the experiment. Participants
were informed of the 10-minute time limit. The word-stem cued recall test was administered
following the free recall test. The primary investigator/research assistant provided the participant
with a paper that contained 40 word stems for the 20 words presented during the encoding phase
(primed words) as well as 20 words not presented during the encoding phase (unprimed words);
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word stems consisted of the first two letters of the word followed by a line (e.g., sp______).
Participants were instructed to read the first two letters of the word and attempt to recall the word
that was presented during the encoding phase that began with those letters. They should then
print that word on the line following the first two letters. Again, participants were informed of
the 10-minute time limit. Finally, a recognition task was conducted. Participants were provided
with a sheet that contained forty words, half of which were presented during the encoding phase
and the other half of which were new words. The primary investigator/research assistant then
informed the participant that he/she had 10 minutes to review the list of words and circle any
word that he/she recalled as having been presented during the encoding phase of the experiment.
Given that these tests of recall are created specifically for this experiment, no psychometric
properties of the explicit memory tests were available. The free recall, word-stem cued recall,
and recognition tests for snake and spider participants are available in Appendices H through J;
note, however, that each of these tests changed for each assessment period due to different words
being presented at each assessment point. Additionally, the tests differed by the feared stimulus
being employed for each participant. Thus, the tests provided in Appendices H through J were
used in the pre-test assessment only and were specifically given to snake-fearful participants.
Distress when presented with the feared stimulus.
A Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) was used to assess each participant’s ability to
approach the snake or spider stimulus and also served to hypothetically elicit greater amounts of
state anxiety prior to the testing for selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. As
described in Koch, Spates, and Himle (2004), participants were instructed to approach the
arachnid/snake stimulus as much as he/she was able; unlike Koch et al. (2004), however,
participants were instructed to avoid physical contact with the animal or its container in an effort
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to standardize exposure to the stimulus for all participants and to minimize distraction from
handling the animal. Distance from the door to the animal was measured with the aid of a
laminated ruler that was secured to the floor of the room and distance was recorded on the
Participant BAT Record (see Appendix K). Participants approached the stimulus until a
subjectively determined intolerable level of fear was reached. At the participant’s initial stopping
point, the primary investigator/research assistant examined the ruler and recorded the distance
traveled from the door as well as any overt signs of anxiety that the participant was displaying,
such as shaking or crying. Subjective Units of Distress scale (SUDS; see description below)
ratings were taken. The primary investigator/research assistant then asked the participant if
he/she could approach the stimulus any further; if further approach was rejected, SUDs ratings
were taken and the BAT ceased. If the participant indicated that further approach was possible,
he/she was permitted to approach further. When the participant reached a point at which he/she
could go no further (i.e. the final stopping point), SUDS ratings were again taken and the BAT
ceased. This procedure allowed for quantifiable assessment of level of fear toward the stimulus
through approach; greater fear should result in less approach. As mentioned above, the SUDs
was used in the BAT procedure to further quantify each participant’s distress by requiring
him/her to assign a numeric value to the anxiety experienced at the initial and final stopping
points in the BAT procedure. Participants were instructed to assign a score of 100 to the worst
possible anxiety that they have or can imagine experiencing and a score of 0 to complete
calmness. Thus, the primary dependent variables from this procedure were both distance traveled
by the participant from the door and SUDs ratings.

Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias 59
Design
This study used a quasi-experimental longitudinal design with three participant groups;
the purpose of this design was to permit the comparison of fearful individuals who received
treatment, fearful individuals who do not receive treatment, and non-fearful individuals on
measures of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance (see Appendix L for a
diagram of study procedures). The design promoted not only the detection of selective
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance, but also the identification of immediate and
enduring treatment effects. The first group, which was to consist of 20 randomly assigned snakeor spider-fearful participants, received one-session in vivo exposure treatment with either the
snake or the spider, depending on the individual’s primary fear. This treatment group was
included in an effort to address the question of whether exposure treatment produced an initial
and durable effect on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance, if indeed these
processes did occur in the sample. The second group, which was to consist of 20 randomly
assigned snake- or spider-fearful participants, did not receive any treatment for snake or spider
fear during the course of the experiment. The purpose of this no-treatment group was to evaluate
the presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance in fearful participants
who did not receive treatment and, theoretically, experienced no abatement of anxiety during the
experiment. This group was used to determine if indeed selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance was exhibited in the participant sample and to understand the stability of
these processes across time. Additionally, this group was used to control for treatment effects
observed in the treatment group that may be induced by the passage of time alone; it further
controlled for participant history effects, maturation, testing and instrumentation effects, possible
regression to the mean, selection, mortality, and the interaction between selection and mortality
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(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Fearful individuals were selected for inclusion in the
Experimental Phase of the experiment based on their responses to the Screening Phase online
assessments. They were randomly assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment group.
The control group, which consisted of 20 non-fearful participants, was included to
determine if selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance of highly emotional
information is unique to snake- or spider-fearful individuals; perhaps salient information, such as
linguistic stimuli related to snakes or spiders, could enjoy preferential encoding due to its novelty
rather than its level of threat. This group was also included to allow for comparison of formerly
fearful individuals (i.e. the treatment group) and presently fearful individuals (i.e. the notreatment group) to a group of non-fearful individuals to determine the presence of these
cognitive processes at various points in the experiment; thus, the control group controlled for the
variable of anxiety level. These individuals were randomly selected through identification of a
subset of participants who qualified for the control group based on Screening Phase responses
and random selection of 20 individuals to compose the control group. It should be noted that
University Human Subjects Review Committee/Internal Review Board policies and procedures
were closely adhered to in an effort ensure ethical treatment of all participants (see Appendix M
for UHSRC approval letters).
The procedure of the experiment also allowed for additional controls of potential
confounding variables that could have been problematic if left unaddressed. The inclusion of
three participant groups, two of which could be regarded as functional control groups (i.e. the notreatment and control groups), allowed for greater support of results given that more numerous
comparisons could be made. Each of the two functional control groups (i.e. the control group and
no-treatment group) reduced the likelihood of confounds, as described above. The pre-test and

Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias 61
post-test assessments of all participant groups, although particularly the treatment group,
permitted the determination of the effects of treatment. The DASS-21 was included as a
necessary screening measure to reduce the potentially confounding effects of comorbid
depression, which was particularly important given that research seems to indicate that the
presence of depression introduces its own cognitive biases (i.e. evidence for both moodcongruent attentional bias as well as attentional avoidance; see Dalgleish & Watts, 1990, for a
review). The DASS-21 was used only as a screening measure and not as a covariate in primary
data analysis. The SILS was used to assess not only the variable of IQ, which could impact
memory, but also to reduce recency effects for explicit memory testing as well as provide an
intervening activity between implicit and explicit memory evaluations. If between-group
differences were found on IQ scores, IQ could be used as a covariate in subsequent analyses,
thereby requiring analyses of covariance rather than analyses of variance. If IQ was found to be
comparable across groups, analyses of variance were to be used as IQ would not be considered a
covariate. Thus, the effects of several important but often uncontrolled variables were reduced in
this study, suggesting greater clarity in the obtained results.
Procedures
Screening Phase Procedures
The Screening Phase was conducted online. Participants who engaged in the Screening
Phase were able to use any computer at any time to access the study’s specific web address at
SurveyMonkey.com, a website that allows online surveys to be created and used in a secure,
password-protected format. Upon accessing the study’s web address, participants first reviewed
the Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement (see Appendix A) before any assessment
commenced. Contact information for the primary investigator was provided so that questions
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regarding information contained within the Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement could
be addressed. Upon agreeing to the terms of the online phase of the study detailed in the
Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement, all the online assessments, including the FSQ,
FSnQ, DASS-21, and the background questionnaire, were administered. The sequence of these
assessments was chosen based on order of the same assessments used in the author’s thesis study
(Stanley-Kime, 2008). Scores on the FSQ, FSnQ, and the DASS-21 were used to determine
eligibility for the Experimental Phase of the study. Those individuals who obtained a score equal
to or greater than 70 on the FSQ or FSnQ (one standard deviation below the mean based on
Muris and Merckelbach, 1996 for consideration for the treatment group or no-treatment group)
or equal to or lesser than 10 on the FSQ or FSnQ (for consideration for the non-fearful control
group) were considered for the Experimental Phase of the study. These cutoff scores were
chosen based on the mean and standard deviation of spider phobic and non-phobic individuals on
the FSQ, as reported by Muris and Merckelbach (1996). In the instance that an individual
obtained scores above the cutoff on both the FSQ and the FSnQ, the primary investigator
selected the highest score and the participant received the most feared stimulus in the
Experimental Phase.
In addition to obtaining a cutoff score of 70 or more or a 10 or less on either the FSQ or
the FSnQ, participants were also required to meet inclusion criteria based on the DASS-21 to be
considered for the Experimental Phase. Those who scored below the clinically significant range
(< 6; Henry & Crawford, 2005) on the Depression subscale of the DASS-21 were considered for
participation in the Experimental Phase. Finally, the background questionnaire was used to
ascertain the presence of exclusionary criteria. Those individuals who self-reported health
conditions (i.e. asthma, heart conditions, hypertension, lung disease, migraines, neurological
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problems, pregnancy, recurring chest pain, seizer, stroke, and ulcers), traumatic brain injury,
epilepsy, dementia, learning disabilities, allergies to snakes or spiders, a compromised immune
system, and color blindness were excluded from further participation. All Screening Phase
participants must have indicated on the background questionnaire that he/she was interested in
being contacted by the primary investigator for further participation opportunities. He/she had to
also provide at least one valid method of contact in order to be considered for the Experimental
Phase. Participants could provide additional identifying information if they desired so that their
participation in the Screening Phase of the study can be reported to one instructor of their
choosing for the purpose of possibly obtaining extra credit.
Screening Phase participant demographics.
A total of 1,185 students fully completed the online Screening Phase assessments but did
not participate in the Experimental Phase for a variety of reasons (i.e. participant voluntarily
decided against further participation, participant did not meet Experimental Phase criteria,
participant did not provide valid contact information, etc.). Mean age for these participants was
22.84 and, like the Experimental Phase sample, this sample was also 76% female.
White/Caucasian was the most frequently endorsed race, constituting 62% of the Screening
Phase sample, with Black/African American being the second most frequently endorsed race,
constituting 22% of the sample. Ninety-nine percent of respondents were current university
students and sixty-five percent of participants were employed in addition to their student status.
Distribution of the participant sample was skewed slightly toward upperclassman undergraduates
(16% freshman, 23% sophomore, 30% junior, and 28% senior) and only three participants
identified as a graduate student, seven as a graduate of a two-year college, and seven as a
graduate of a four-year college. The Screening Phase sample did not statistically significantly
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differ from the Experimental Phase sample on any of the above mentioned demographic
characteristics.
The Screening Phase sample, which was not classified into fearful participants or nonfearful participants based on FSQ/FSnQ criteria, had a mean on the FSQ of 41.88 (SD = 36.51)
and a mean on the FSnQ of 58.62 (SD = 39.24), and the Screening Phase sample did not
significantly differ from the Experimental Phase sample on these measures. The DASS-21
yielded the following means and standard deviations for the Screening Phase sample: M = 4.43
(SD = 4.60) for the Depression subscale, M = 4.09 (SD = 4.46) for the Anxiety subscale, M =
6.92 (SD = 5) for the Stress subscale, and M = 15.44 (SD = 12.65) for the DASS-21 total score.
Screening Phase participants significantly differed from the Experimental Phase sample on the
following measures: DASS-21 Depression subscale, t (92.89) = 7.13, p < .001, DASS-21
Anxiety subscale, t (69.87) = 2.42, p < .05, DASS-21 Stress subscale, t (69.76) = 2.00, p < .05,
and DASS-21 total score, t (76.66) = 4.04, p < .001. Thus, the Screening Phase sample scored
higher on all DASS-21 subscale scores and total score compared to the scores of Experimental
Phase participants.
Initial Experimental Phase Procedures for All Participants
Based on FSQ and FSnQ scores obtained during the Screening Phase, all participants
who met criteria for Experimental Phase participation were invited to participate. Although
random selection from the group of qualified individuals was planned in an effort to maximize
external validity (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), the dearth of individuals who qualified for
and desired to participate in the Experimental Phase was a practicality that prohibited random
selection. Fearful participants were randomly assigned to either the treatment group or the notreatment group prior to meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant; non-fearful
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participants were selected from the sample that completed the Screening Phase questionnaires
and immediately assigned to the non-fearful control group. Random assignment of fearful
individuals was achieved through a random number generation process. After determining that a
Screening Phase participant met criteria for Experimental Phase participation, a random group
assignment number that corresponded with either the treatment group (i.e. even numbers) or the
no-treatment group (i.e. odd numbers) was generated by a computer, thus determining the group
to which that participant belonged. One should note that all participant data collected in this
study, including group membership and dates of participation, were carefully tracked by the
primary investigator using Microsoft Excel, the contents of which were later exported into a
statistical software package that was capable of greater data analysis.
All participants who meet criteria for Experimental Phase participation were then
contacted by the preferred contact method indicated in the Screening Phase background
questionnaire. Of the 302 who met criteria for Experimental Phase participation, 227 were
actually invited to participate; some individuals who met criteria for Experimental Phase
participation were not invited to participate due to the group that he/she met criteria for being
already completed (i.e. the control group) or the participant’s contact information being invalid.
Group membership was not initially revealed to participants; rather, all groups were briefly
described and participants were told that group membership would be revealed upon meeting
with the primary investigator/research assistant for the Experimental Phase. Individuals were told
of the general time commitment required (i.e. anywhere between 1 hour and 4 hours, depending
on group membership and assessment period) and that, within the context of treatment, he/she
could be asked to physically contact a live snake or spider. Emphasis was placed on the
voluntary nature of such contact and the role of the primary investigator/research assistant in
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helping the individual become comfortable with such contact before it was initiated so that it
could be done safely. Those participants who were interested in further participation were
scheduled based on the mutual availability of the participant and the primary investigator or
research assistant. Of the 227 participants who were successfully contacted for possible
Experimental Phase participation, 73 indicated definite interest in being scheduled to participate
in the Experimental Phase. Eight individuals declined to participate while one hundred forty-two
did not respond to the primary investigator’s attempts to contact them. Several individuals
indicated that he/she might be interested in participating at a later date, although none of these
individuals followed through with participation. Those who failed to return the initial contacts of
the primary investigator were recontacted one additional time via their preferred contact method,
although this method was met with very limited success in terms of Experimental Phase
participant recruitment. Those who indicated no interest in further study participation on the
Screening Phase background questionnaire were administered an opt-out questionnaire (see
Appendix N), which provided information on the characteristics of individuals who opted out of
further participation so that those characteristics could be compared to the characteristics of
those who opted in. Those who were interested in further participation were asked to arrive at a
designated office space to meet with the primary investigator/research assistant at an appointed
time. Upon meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant and prior to the initiation of
any additional experimental procedures, all potential Experimental Phase participants were given
a copy of the Experimental Phase Informed Consent Agreement (see Appendix B) and received a
verbal explanation of the agreement as well as an opportunity to read the form in its entirety and
ask questions. Following obtainment of informed consent, the full STAI was administered to all
participants regardless of group membership.
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Treatment group procedures.
Members of the treatment group were then given the pre-test Cognitive Assessment
Sequence, which included the emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, SILS, explicit
memory list presentation and testing, and the BAT with SUDS ratings. Following this, onesession in vivo exposure treatment followed by post-test assessment was scheduled for another
day based on the mutual availability of the primary investigator/research assistant and the
participant; all efforts were made to schedule the participant within the same week but this was
often precluded by schedule considerations of both the primary investigator/research assistants
and participant. Typically, the primary investigator/research assistant who conducted the
participant’s pre-test appointment did not also conduct the participant’s post-test appointment,
although there were several instances in which the same experimenter conducted two or more of
a treatment group participant’s appointments. Upon returning on the scheduled day, a member of
the treatment group was informed that he/she would be exposed to the feared stimulus, although
the exposure would involve one-session in vivo exposure treatment in an attempt to reduce fear
of that stimulus. The feared stimulus was either a corn snake of approximately two feet in length
or a rose hair tarantula. Participants were given a brief and scripted description of treatment as
well as a treatment rationale, and then the treatment commenced according to the procedures
outlined in the Treatment Procedures section of this manuscript. The description of treatment
included a general report of the hierarchy of steps that were to be used in treatment, although
exact details of the steps were not provided. The description of treatment also included an
explanation of the primary investigator/research assistant modeling of each step, the assistance a
participant could request, and the means through which a participant could request a brief break
from treatment procedures. The treatment rationale included a discussion of the side effect of
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heightened anxiety that would likely be produced by the treatment and an abridged description of
the hypothesized mechanisms of action of the treatment (i.e. maintenance of current avoidance
response through negative reinforcement, the concepts of extinction and habituation, etc.).
Treatment success was quantitatively defined as participant report of a SUDS level of 19 or less
on every step in the treatment hierarchy, but one should note that participants were not made
privy to this information.
Following exposure treatment of three hours maximum duration, the participant and the
primary investigator/research assistant exited the treatment room and returned to the original
office space for the reminder of the Experimental Phase procedures. Upon returning to the office
space, participants were informed that they would next be given the same cognitive measures
that they had previously received at the pre-test appointment. They were also informed that, after
completion of all the measures, they would be recontacting the snake or spider stimulus but that
physical touch would not be permitted in this instance. The cognitive measures that followed
composed the post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence, which included the State subscale of the
STAI, emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, SILS, explicit memory list presentation and
testing, and the BAT with SUDS ratings; this precise sequence was administered again at the two
remaining follow-up appointments (see Experimental Phase – One-Week and One-Month
Follow-Up Procedures section of this manuscript).
During the pre-test and post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequences, participants received
either the full STAI in the case of pre-test assessment or the State subscale only of the STAI in
the case of post-test assessment. Participants were asked to sit at a Dell personal computer to
complete the emotional Stroop task, which was conducted in accordance with the procedural
outline presented in the Measures section. Again, selection of the threat-relevant and neutral
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words were dependent on the individual participant’s fear and separate emotional Stroop tasks
were administered to snake- and spider-fearful participants. Following completion of the
emotional Stroop task, participants completed the exogenous cueing task, the details of which are
outlined in the Measure section. Participants were then given the Vocabulary subscale of the
SILS, which had a 10-minute time limit. If participants finished before the 10-minute time limit
was announced, they were instructed to review their responses until the time limit had expired.
The purpose of the SILS was not only to provide an estimation of IQ in the participant sample,
but also to provide an intervening distraction activity between implicit and explicit memory
assessment procedures, thus making the time limit particularly important.
Following the SILS Vocabulary subscale, participants were again seated in front of a Dell
personal computer to view the Microsoft PowerPoint presentation of the explicit memory word
list presentation. They were instructed to closely attend to each word as memory for all words
would be tested later in the experiment. Included in the presentation were 20 words, half of
which were threat-relevant and the other half of which were neutral, as described in the Measures
section. Following completion of the presentation, the Abstract Thinking subscale of the SILS
was administered with a 10-minute time limit. Again, participants were instructed to review their
responses until the time limit had expired if they finished the subscale early. In addition to IQ
estimation, this activity also served to reduce recency effects on tests of explicit memory recall.
The three tests of explicit memory (i.e. the free recall test, word-stem cued recall test, the
recognition test, respectively) were then administered, each of which having a 10-minute time
limit. Participants who finished one explicit memory test before the time limit could progress to
the next explicit memory test. Finally, after completion of the explicit memory tests, the
participant was escorted back to the treatment room to complete the BAT with SUDs ratings.
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The same snake or spider stimulus used for treatment was used for the BAT with SUDs rating
procedure. The participant was then thanked for his/her participation and a one-week or onemonth follow-up appointment was ideally scheduled prior to the participant leaving the
appointment.
No-treatment and control group procedures.
The no-treatment and control group procedures were identical to the treatment group
procedures with the exception of treatment procedures. These groups still received the four
assessment periods as the treatment group: pre-test assessment, post-test assessment, one-week
follow-up assessment, and one-month follow-up assessment. Following obtainment of
Experimental Phase informed consent and after the administration of the full STAI, individuals
in the no-treatment group and the control group were administered the pre-test Cognitive
Assessment Sequence. These participants were informed that they would complete several
cognitive measures. They were also informed that, after completion of all the measures, they
would be contacting the snake or spider stimulus. This contact was to occur exclusively during
the BAT with SUDs ratings procedure and they received either a snake or spider stimulus. As
was described above for the treatment group and illustrated in the study diagram (see Appendix
L), the sequence began with the emotional Stroop task and exogenous cueing task, which was
then followed by the Vocabulary subscale of the SILS. This was followed by explicit memory
word list presentation, the Abstract Thinking subscale of the SILS, the three tests of explicit
memory, and the BAT with SUDs ratings. All procedures described above for administration of
the Cognitive Assessment Sequence to the treatment group were adhered to for the no-treatment
and control groups. Following completion of the pre-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence, each
participant was thanked for his/her participation and asked to schedule a time, preferably within
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the same week, to return to complete the post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence. Subsequent
to the post-test assessment, he/she was asked to return a third and fourth time for one-week and
one-month follow-ups. One should note that all the procedures described here were approved by
the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board of Eastern Michigan University, and all animal
care and use for the snakes in this study were approved by Eastern Michigan University’s
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (see Appendix O).
One-Week and One-Month Follow-Up Procedures
Approximately seven days from the date that a participant completed the post-test
assessment described above, the participant was recontacted and asked to meet with the primary
investigator/research assistant a second time to complete the one-week follow-up procedures,
which consisted of readministration of the Cognitive Assessment Sequence. Often times,
recontact was not necessary as the primary investigator/research assistant who conducted the
post-test was able to schedule the one-week follow-up appointment prior to the participant
leaving the post-test appointment. This did not always occur, however, due to the availability of
the primary investigator or research assistant; in the case that a research assistant could not
accommodate the participant’s preferred time for any of the follow-up appointments, that
research assistant referred the participant to the primary investigator of the study, who
collaborated with the participant to ensure that scheduling of all appointments occurred based on
the participant’s preferences. The participant was also recontacted approximately thirty days
from the date he/she completed the post-test assessment procedures to meet for a final time with
the primary investigator/research assistant to complete the one-month follow-up procedures.
Note that the date the participant completed the post-test Cognitive Assessment Sequence was
used to determine the dates of the one-week and one-month follow-up procedures. Participants
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were contacted in advance to schedule follow-up appointments as close to seven days for the
one-week follow-up and thirty days for the one-month follow-up as possible, although mutual
availability of the primary investigator/research assistant and the participant precluded exact
timing of follow-up for most participants. All participants regardless of group membership
received equivalent follow-up procedures at both one-week and one-month appointments.
Upon meeting with the primary investigator/research assistant, participants were
informed that they would complete several cognitive measures that were equivalent to the
measures received at the preceding two appointments. They were also informed that, after
completion of all the measures, they would be contacting, although not physically contacting, the
snake or spider stimulus. The State subscale of the STAI was administered first. The emotional
Stroop task followed the State subscale of the STAI, and this task was followed by the
exogenous cueing task and then the Vocabulary subscale of the SILS. In the follow-up
procedures, the SILS primarily served as an intervening activity to reduce possible effects of the
measures of selective processing bias on explicit memory word list presentation as well as
recency effects from explicit memory word list presentation and recall. Thus, SILS data were
collected at one-week and one-month follow-up, but analysis of the data was not planned given
its limited utility due to potential practice effects. Explicit memory word list presentation
occurred, followed by the Abstract Thinking portion of the SILS. Again, the SILS time limit of
10 minutes per subscale was enforced. The three explicit memory tests, namely the free recall,
word-stem cued recall, and recognition tests, were administered. Finally, the BAT with SUDs
ratings procedure completed the follow-up appointments. All participants could have
demonstrated practice effects on dependent variable measures, but the primary investigator
attempted to control such effects by varying stimuli (i.e. words or pictures) as much as possible
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and randomizing the order in which stimuli that composed each test were presented. Complete
alternate forms of tests of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance were not
used, however, due to the limited selection of the threat-relevant stimuli.
One-Session In vivo Exposure Treatment Procedures
One-session in vivo exposure therapy with no overt cognitive component was provided
by the primary investigator or a research assistant to those individuals assigned to the treatment
group. While no overt cognitive component was incorporated into treatment, one should
appreciate the implied ability of one-session in vivo exposure treatment to indirectly modify
cognitions (e.g. de Jong, Vorage, & van den Hout, 2000). Treatment was provided in a small
classroom or conference space in a university classroom building. All extraneous material was
moved in the room so as to leave a clear path between the participant and the feared stimulus,
which remained in a secure container on a table. A brief description of treatment procedures and
treatment rationale was provided to each participant in a separate meeting room before treatment
began and any questions regarding treatment were addressed by the primary
investigator/research assistant. Following the description and rationale, the primary
investigator/research assistant escorted the participant to the treatment room. The participant was
asked to begin at the doorway of the treatment room and approach the feared stimulus as close as
he/she was able. As outlined by Öst (1997) and used in several studies examining similar issues
(Koch et al., 2004; Lavy & Van den Hout, 1993; Lavy, Van den Hout, Arntz, 1993; Thorpe &
Salkovskis, 1997a), exposure treatment steps, which are enumerated below, began with the
verbal presentation of one treatment step to the participant; successive steps in the predetermined
treatment step hierarchy were individually presented after completion of the previous step.
Following verbal description of the treatment step, the primary investigator/research assistant
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modeled the necessary components to full completion of that step, allowing the participant to
carefully observe. The participant was then asked to complete each successive component either
with initial physical assistance from the primary investigator/research assistant, which was
gradually faded out, or independently, if possible. If anxiety became elevated to a level at which
the participant did not feel that he/she could continue with the treatment step, he/she was
instructed to say, “pause,” which signaled to the primary investigator/research assistant to cease
further treatment progression for approximately one minute. After the passage of approximately
one minute, the primary investigator/research assistant resumed treatment. If the participant said
“pause” a second time during one treatment step, that step was terminated and the previous step
was undertaken again. SUDs levels were obtained during each treatment step at the time of
completion of the final components of the step; for example, if a treatment step involved
touching the stimulus’ container for 60 seconds, SUDs levels were gathered during the last few
seconds of contact with the container. One-session in vivo exposure treatment continued until all
treatment steps were completed with little to no subjective anxiety, as indicated by SUDs ratings
of less than 20 on each treatment step, or when the maximum time limit of three hours was
reached. Thus, treatment success was quantitatively defined as achieving all steps in the
treatment step hierarchy with a SUDs rating of 19 or less. If one or more of the treatment steps
were completed with a SUDs level of 20 or more, each treatment step was repeated until all
treatment steps were completed with a SUDs rating of 19 or less. Thus, one participant may have
engaged in two or more treatment cycles, or additional repetitions of all of the treatment steps.
Similar treatment steps (Koch et al., 2004; Lavy & van den Hout, 1993; Lavy, van den
Hout, Arntz, 1993; Öst, 1997; Thorpe & Salkovskis, 1997a) were used for both the spider and
the snake, although there were several notable differences based on Koch et al.’s (2004)
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procedure. Initial treatment steps for both the spider and the snake were (1) progressing from the
participant’s initial BAT location to the outside of the container, (2) touching the container for 10
seconds while looking at the spider/snake, (3) putting his/her fingertips inside the cage for 10
seconds while looking at the spider/snake, and (4) touching the inside of the container with the
hand on the bottom of the cage for 10 seconds while looking at the spider/snake. The spider
treatment steps were then (5) using an index card to guide the spider into a clear plastic cup three
times, (6) directing the spider around the cage with two fingers, (7) touching the spider with two
fingers for 3 seconds, (8) touching the spider with at least two fingers for up to 60 seconds, (9)
directing the spider across one hand with two fingers, (10) independently lifting the spider and
allowing it to remain/crawl on the hand for up to 60 seconds, and (11) independently lifting the
spider and allowing it to remain/crawl on the hand for more than 60 seconds but not in excess of
3 minutes.
Following steps 1 – 4 described above, the snake treatment steps (Koch et al., 2004) were
(5) touching the snake with two fingers for 3 seconds, (6) touching the snake with two fingers for
up to 60 seconds, (7) touching the snake from underneath, or cupping, for up to 60 seconds, (8)
touching the snake with two fingers while the primary investigator/research assistant held the
animal above the cage for up to 60 seconds, (9) touching the snake with one full hand while the
primary investigator/research assistant held the animal above the cage for up to 60 seconds, (10)
touching the snake with both hands while the primary investigator/research assistant held the
animal above the cage for up to 60 seconds, (11) independently lifting the snake directly above
the cage with both hands for up to 60 seconds, and, finally, (12) independently lifting the snake
with both hands for more than 60 seconds but not in excess of 3 minutes.
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Research Assistant Training Procedures
Because numerous research assistants aided in the data collection of the current study,
training procedures were warranted. These procedures ensured within- and between-group
equivalence of the procedures described above. Research assistants were provided with access to
a manual that described the protocol for all groups as well as a manual that described and
outlined the steps in administering one-session in vivo exposure treatment. Only research
assistants in the university graduate program in clinical psychology were, however, permitted to
administer one-session in vivo exposure treatment to treatment group participants. All research
assistants were required to meet with the primary investigator for an exposure treatment
workshop, which included a description, demonstration, and practice of proper protocol for onesession in vivo exposure treatment. During this workshop, a live snake or spider was used. After
reading the manual and completion of the exposure treatment workshop, research assistants met
with the primary investigator to conduct a practice trial with the primary investigator serving as
the mock participant. Upon successful completion of the training period described above,
research assistants were permitted to conduct one-session in vivo exposure treatment with
participants. Additional training was provided to research assistants upon request. No protocol
adherence monitoring occurred during the course of the experiment.
Ethical Treatment of Participants and Animals
Because the procedure of exposing a participant to a feared stimulus was anticipated to be
aversive, procedures were outlined to assure that all those involved in the experiment were
treated with the utmost care. In order to maintain the comfort and well-being of all participants,
an explanation of the experimental procedure was provided verbally and in writing on the
informed consent form, which was signed before participation of any kind commenced. Each
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participant was told that his/her participation was strictly voluntary and that he/she could choose
to terminate participation at any time for any reason.
Prior to choosing to participate in the study, each participant was told that he/she would
be exposed to the feared stimulus and that he/she could choose to end that exposure at any time.
All participants were informed that the animal would remain in its container throughout the study
unless the participant chose to handle the animal during treatment, and any contact with the
animal would be completely initiated and controlled by the participant. The participant could
choose to advance toward the animal to any point where he/she felt comfortable, and at no time
would the primary investigator/research assistant force contact or approach as part of treatment.
In addition, all fearful participants who are interested in receiving treatment for his/her snake or
spider fear were offered one-session in vivo exposure treatment after completion of their
participation in the study if they did not already receive such treatment. At the conclusion of the
experimental procedures, an informal assessment was conducted with each participant to
determine if, as a result of participation in the study, the participant could benefit from assistance
relaxing before leaving the research laboratory. All data collected in this study was coded to
protect confidentiality; that is, participants were assigned a unique identification number and all
data were kept in a locked file cabinet. Following cessation of data collection, the code sheet that
contained the participant’s unique identification number and their name was destroyed, thus
ensuring confidentiality.
The animals used in this study - the rose-haired tarantula and the corn snake - were
treated with care under the supervision of the primary investigator. Proper handling, feeding, and
sanitation procedures were used and the animals were not exposed to harmful or aversive stimuli.
All participants were informed before attempting to handle the animal that any handling must be
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done gently and, if the participant became fearful during handling, that he/she should
immediately notify the primary investigator/research assistant standing beside them so that the
animal could be released quickly and safely. Both the snake and the tarantula were lifted from
their container during the course of treatment, but they remained in close proximity to the
container and the primary investigator/research assistant at all times.
Results
Description of Primary Statistical Analyses
Question group 1: Presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory
avoidance.
As previously described in the Research Questions and Hypotheses section, the first
group of research question sought to establish the existence of selective processing bias and
subsequent explicit memory avoidance. An a priori hypothesis stated that the pre-test results
from the treatment group and the no-treatment group would display data patterns indicative of
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance; that is, the pre-test assessment of the
treatment group and the no-treatment group was anticipated to reveal significant response
differences to threat-relevant stimuli on measures of selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance compared to neutral stimuli on the same measures and compared to control
group responses to the same stimuli. Three analyses of variance, one for each dependent variable
of emotional Stroop task response latencies, exogenous cueing task response latencies, and
explicit recall, were planned to determine whether selective processing bias and explicit memory
avoidance were indeed evident in fearful individuals. This was accomplished by comparing the
emotional Stroop task and exogenous cueing task response latencies and explicit recall of threatrelevant stimuli of those in the treatment and no-treatment groups at pre-test to these
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participants’ response to neutral stimuli on these measures. The pre-test results of the treatment
and no-treatment groups were also compared to the pre-test results of the control group.
Additionally, the temporal stability of the cognitive patterns of interest were to be
assessed through a mixed analysis of variance with group assignment as the between condition
and time of assessment as the within condition. Missing data prohibited the use of the planned
mixed analysis of variance in this circumstance, however. At the conclusion of data collection,
five participants, three of which were in the no-treatment group and two of which were in the
treatment group, presented missing data due to the participant’s discontinuation of participation
at some point after completion of post-test. Reason(s) for attrition were not collected in this
study. When the demographic information for the individuals who discontinued participation
were compared to the demographic information for the Experimental Phase sample, these two
groups of individuals were closely matched demographically. No significant differences existed
between these two groups on Screening Phase fear assessment. Limited missing data also existed
elsewhere in the Experimental Phase participant sample due to technical failure or participant
non-response. Notably, technical failure interfered with recording of data for half of the post-test
emotional Stroop task for one control group participant and all of the pre-test emotional Stroop
task data for another control group participant. In the case of item-level missing data (e.g.
participant non-response to one item of the State subscale of the STAI), mean substitution was
used.
For the five participants whose discontinued participation generated substantial missing
data (i.e. one or more assessment points), the generalized linear model was employed to analyze
the data such that an F value was obtained via comparison of the sum of squares and the mean
square of each dependent variable of interest. A procedural mixed model, specifically a restricted
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maximum likelihood (REML) estimation method with unstructured covariance structure and
between-within degrees of freedom, was used to estimate missing values based on the available
data points of each participant with missing data. Maximum likelihood estimation “maximizes
the likelihood of observing the sample data that were actually observed” based on a likelihood
function, or the value(s) of one or many parameters that make the occurrence of the actual
observed data most likely (Long, 1997, pp. 26-27; see also Eliason, 1993). Clarke (2008)
described the substantial agreement between the ANOVA method and REML in the case of
assumed normality, balanced designs, and nonnegative estimates of variance parameters,
although he championed the application of REML even in cases of unbalanced data.
Question group 2: Impact of treatment on anxiety-induced cognitive processes.
The second group of research questions involved understanding the immediate and
prolonged impact of one-session in vivo exposure treatment on selective processing bias and
explicit memory avoidance. It was hypothesized that one-session in vivo exposure treatment
would immediately eliminate selective processing bias and reduce inhibition of threat-relevant
information characteristic of explicit memory avoidance; these effects, however, were not
anticipated to remain stable over time in the absence of treatment maintenance procedures. To
address this question, a 2 (word/cue valence) x 3 (group assignment) x 3 (time of assessment)
repeated measures analysis of variance for the emotional Stroop task, exogenous cueing task, and
all explicit memory tests was to be used to determine the effect of treatment on the selective
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance that may have been indicated in the analyses of
variance conducted on pre-test assessment data. Treatment effects were also to be evaluated
immediately following treatment and at one-week and one-month follow-up assessments. As was
the case for questions in the previous question group, however, the same general linear mixed
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model incorporating a maximum likelihood method of missing value estimation was used to
predict the limited amount of missing data present for five treatment and no-treatment group
participants as well as the missing data present due to technical error.
Question group 3: Impact of state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and
explicit memory avoidance.
The final group of research questions addressed the impact of state and trait anxiety on
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. It was hypothesized that state and trait
anxiety variables would interact such that those participants who demonstrated high levels of
both these variables would display the greatest levels of selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance. In order to address this question, participants were recatergorized into one of
four anxiety groups. Participants’ scores on the STAI were grouped according to cutoff scores
implemented in studies that evaluated the effects of trait anxiety on implicit memory (i.e.
Harrison & Turpin, 2003; Schwerdtfeger, 2006). Participants were assigned to one of the
following mutually exclusive groups: high in both state and trait anxiety, low in both state and
trait anxiety, high in state anxiety and low in trait anxiety, and high in trait anxiety and low in
state anxiety. In accordance with Harrison and Turpin (2003) and Schwerdtfeger (2006), a high
score on either scale was defined by a score of 40 or above while a low score on either scale was
defined by a score of 39 or below. A 2 (word valence) x 4 (anxiety group) analysis of variance
was to be conducted to compare the response latencies on the emotional Stroop task and
exogenous cueing task and recall on each test of explicit memory. Again, the same general linear
mixed model incorporating a maximum likelihood method of missing value estimation was used
to address this group of questions as well.
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In recognition of the necessity to conduct multiple planned comparisons to examine
several of the research questions/hypothesis, a Bonferroni multiple comparison procedure was
used to control for potential alpha inflation; this method permits pairwise comparison based on a
priori hypotheses regardless of equality of sample size and has narrow confidence intervals
(Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996). Additionally, the assumptions of the general
linear model, namely sample normality, equality of variance, and randomness/independence of
factor-level responses (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, & Wasserman, 1996), were presumed to have
been met. As was congruent with the results of the primary investigator’s thesis study (StanleyKime, 2008), the Experimental Phase sample was not dramatically skewed on demographic
variables, and similar population variances appeared to result from the random assignment of
fearful individuals to either the treatment or no-treatment groups. One should note that all groups
possessed approximately equal numbers of participants, thereby offsetting inaccuracies that
could have arose resultant of elevated between-group variance. Based on statistical screening, the
Experimental Phase sample appeared to achieve normality with no significantly skewed
variables. However, limited extreme score outliers existed on the following variables: age (one
significantly older participant in the treatment group and in the control group, respectively) and
the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (one control group participant scored significantly higher than
other control group participants on this measure). Potential confounds such as estimated IQ, age,
or sex that may have impacted results were identified using a chi-square or analysis of variance
procedure and are described in detail below.
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Sample Characteristics
Demographics.
A total of 1,403 students from a Midwestern university participated in whole or part in
the online Screening Phase of the study from November 2009 to December 2011; of those 1,403
participants, 1,245 participants fully completed the Screening Phase, and a majority of those
individuals (N = 908) indicated interest in participation in the Experimental Phase of the study. A
total 302 met all screening criteria for the Experimental Phase and were eligible to be invited to
participate in that phase of the study; of this 302, 227 individuals were actually invited to
participate in the Experimental Phase. Some participants who met Experimental Phase criteria
were not invited for further participation as they met criteria for a participant group that was
already completed at the time (i.e. the control group) or they did not provide valid contact
information. Sixty individuals participated in the Experimental Phase of the study; of this sixty,
55 fully completed all four assessment periods while 5 voluntarily discontinued participation.
Four of the five withdrew participation after completing post-test assessments while one
withdrew participation after completing one-week follow-up assessment. Two of the study noncompleters were members of the treatment group while the remaining three participants were
members of the no-treatment group. The treatment group was composed of 19 individuals, 12 of
whom contacted a snake and 7 of whom contacted a spider during participation, and the notreatment group was composed of 21 individuals, 11 of whom contacted a snake and 10 of whom
contacted a spider during participation. The control group was composed of 20 individuals, 10 of
whom contacted a snake and 10 of whom contacted a spider during participation. Mean age for
all participants in both study phases was 22.38 with a range of 18 to 56 years and no significant
between group differences were found on this variable. The majority of the participant sample
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identified as female (76%) and White/Caucasian was the race most often endorsed (75%).
Significantly more female participants composed the treatment group compared to the control
group (p < .05). Race/ethnicity was not significantly different by group. Sixty percent of
participants were employed in addition to their student status. Most participants identified as a
freshman, sophomore, junior, or senior and only two participants identified as being a second
bachelors student. Mean estimated IQ based on administration of the SILS was 107 with a range
of 88 to 118, and this variable was not significant by group. Table 1 illustrates the between-group
similarity found on demographic variables. .
Table 1. Demographic Variables by Participant Group and Total Sample
Treatment

No-Treatment

Control

Total Sample

21 (18-37)

21 (18-33)

24 (19-56)

22 (18-56)

Female

17

18

11

46 (76%)

Male

2

3

9

14 (24%)

African American

1

3

1

5 (8%)

Asian

0

0

1

1 (2%)

Caucasian

16

13

16

45 (75%)

Hispanic

0

1

0

1 (2%)

Middle Eastern

0

0

1

1 (2%)

Multi-Ethnic

1

3

1

5 (8%)

Other/Decline

1

1

0

2 (3%)

Mean Age (Range)
Sex*

Ethnicity
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Employment
Employed

15

9

12

36 (60%)

Unemployed

4

12

8

24 (40%)

Freshman

7

6

2

15 (25%)

Sophomore

4

5

8

17 (28%)

Junior

5

5

5

15 (25%)

Senior

3

4

4

11 (18%)

Second Bachelors

0

1

1

2 (3%)

107 (98-116)

104 (89-118)

108 (88-118)

107 (88-118)

Student Standing

Mean IQ (Range)

* Significant at the .05 level
Performance on screening phase assessments.
The Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ) and the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire (FSnQ)
was administered electronically to all participants as described in the Procedure section. Of the
fearful participants assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups, 23 interacted with a
snake during the Experimental Phase and 17 interacted with a spider. Mean score on the FSQ for
fearful participants who interacted with the spider was 91.41 with a standard deviation of 14.50
while mean score on the FSnQ for fearful participants who interacted with the snake was 90.70
with a standard deviation of 16.34. Mean score on the FSQ for fearful participants who did not
interact with the spider (i.e. rather, these participants interacted with the snake due to greater fear
of the snake) was 46.93 with a standard deviation of 34.25 while mean score on the FSnQ for
fearful participants who did not interact with the snake (i.e. rather, these participants interacted
with the spider due to greater fear of the spider) was 35.82 with a standard deviation of 34.10. Of
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the control group participants, the mean score on the FSQ for those who interacted with the
spider was 3.80 with a standard deviation of 3.58 while mean score on the FSnQ for those who
interacted with the snake was 2.10 with a standard deviation of 1.97. Mean score on the FSQ for
control participants who did not interact with the spider (i.e. rather, these participants interacted
with the snake due to less fear of the snake) was 9.90 with a standard deviation of 17.19 while
mean score on the FSnQ for control participants who did not interact with the snake (i.e. rather,
these participants interacted with the spider due to less fear of the spider) was 22.00 with a
standard deviation of 18.65. For those who interacted with the snake, the difference between
fearful participants assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups and non-fearful
participants (i.e. the control group) on the FSnQ was significant, t (23.43) = 25.58, p < .001, and
this was also true on the FSQ for those who interacted with the spider, t (19.13) = 23.73, p <
.01). When the three participant groups were compared, the treatment and no-treatment
participants significantly differed only from the control group for both snake-fearful participants,
F (2, 30) = 140.80, p < .001, and spider-fearful participants, F (2, 24) = 170.89, p < .001.
The 21-item version of the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scales (DASS-21) was also
administered electronically to all participants during the Screening Phase. The mean for the
depression subscale across all participants was 2.32 (SD = 2.05) while the means for the anxiety
and stress subscales were 2.98 (SD = 3.38) and 5.88 (SD = 3.81), respectively. The mean total
score for the DASS-21 was 11.18 (SD = 7.61). These means are within non-clinical limits for all
subscales and for the total scale (Sinclair, Siefert, Slavin-Mulford, Stein, Renna, & Blais, 2011).
Significant between-group differences existed on the anxiety subscale, F (2, 57) = 3.24, p < .05,
on which the no-treatment group scored significantly higher than the control group.
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Performance on experimental phase assessments.
The latency between Experimental Phase appointments was planned to occur as follows
for all participants: one to six days between pre-test and post-test, seven days between post-test
and one-week follow-up, and thirty days between post-test and one-month follow-up. Mean
number of days between pre-test and post-test was 4.48 (SD = 3.75, range 1-19). Mean number
of days between post-test and one-week follow-up was 10.48 (SD = 6.47, range 4-34). Mean
number of days between post-test and one-month follow-up was 31.75 (SD = 8.63, range 14-55).
No significant differences by group were found on any of the three appointment latencies
mentioned above.
The State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) was administered at the beginning of each
appointment the participant attended; both the State and Trait Anxiety subscales were given at
pre-test appointments while only the State Anxiety subscale was given at subsequent
appointments. The mean score on the Trait Anxiety subscale at pre-test assessment of those
participants who were fearful (i.e. assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups) was
significantly different from the mean score of non-fearful participants on this subscale (M =
37.15, SD = 10.51 for fearful participants, M = 30.70, SD = 6.43 for non-fearful participants; t
(55.46) = 2.93, p < .01), and the groups were also statistically significantly different on the State
Anxiety subscale as well (M = 34.75, SD = 9.83 for fearful participants, M = 27.50, SD = 5.61
for non-fearful participants; t (56.87) = 3.63, p = .001). When only the fearful participants were
compared in an independent samples t-test, the treatment and no-treatment groups did not
significantly differ from one another on either the State or Trait Anxiety subscales at pre-test. A
one-way ANOVA with participant group membership as the independent variable and State and
Trait anxiety score as the dependent variable revealed significant differences on both the Trait
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Anxiety subscale, F (2, 57) = 5.19, p < .01, and the State Anxiety subscale, F (2, 57) = 5.04, p =
.01, at pre-test; on both subscales, the treatment group differed significantly from the control
group with the treatment group earning higher scores on each subscale. No significant betweengroup differences on the State Anxiety subscale of the STAI were found at post-test, one-week
follow-up, or one-month follow-up, although one-month follow-up approached significance, F
(2, 52) = 2.99, p < .06. A repeated measures ANOVA with scores on the State Anxiety subscale
as the dependent variable suggested significant differences by assessment point only, F (3, 50) =
5.93, p < .01, indicating that all total scores regardless of participant group membership changed
over time on this measure. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the change in STAI – State Anxiety
subscale scores over time by group.
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Figure 1. STAI- State subscale scores across assessment points by participant group.
The Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT) was used as a behavioral measure of participant
fear toward the snake or spider. Several BAT variables were coded for analysis, including (1) the
participant’s Subjective Units of Distress (SUDs) ratings prior to entering the room with the
animal, (2) the participant’s distance traveled in feet from the door of the room in which the BAT
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was conducted to the participant’s initial stopping point, (3) the participant SUDs rating at the
initial stopping point, (4) the participant’s distance traveled in feet from the door of the room in
which the BAT was conducted to the participant’s final stopping point, and (5) the participant’s
SUDs rating at the final stopping point. None of these five BAT measures significantly differed
by animal used in the Experimental Phase, thereby permitting analysis without animal as a
covariate. At pre-test assessment, all BAT variables were significant at the .01 alpha level or less
with the exception of the participant’s distance traveled in feet from the door of the room in
which the BAT was conducted to the participant’s final stopping point, which approached
significance; significant differences existed between the treatment and control groups in several
instances and between the fearful groups (i.e. treatment and no-treatment groups) and the control
group. In all instances of statistical significance, fearful groups exhibited more fear on the BAT
variables at pre-test assessment (i.e. higher SUDS ratings, less willingness to approach the
animal). At post-test, one-week, and one-month follow-up assessments, all BAT variables
continued to be significant by group at the .05 alpha level or lower with the no-treatment group
demonstrating significantly more fear on all variables than both the treatment and control groups.
Means and standard deviations for all BAT variables are presented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations for SUDS Ratings and Distance Traveled by Participants During the BAT at All Assessment

Control

No-Treatment

Treatment

Points

Pre-test

Pre-approach
SUDS
(0-100)
22.32 (28.47)

Distance (ft) to
Initial Stopping
Point
11.03 (3.74)

SUDS (0-100) at
Initial Stopping
Point
41.42 (33.29)

Distance (ft) to
Final Stopping
Point
12.17 (3.85)

SUDS (0-100) at
Final Stopping
Point
43.47 (35.87)

Post-test

.68 (1.60)

14 (0)

3.63 (8.30)

14 (0)

3.63 (8.30)

One-week

2.28 (5.19)

13.94 (.24)

3.44 (4.44)

14 (0)

3.44 (4.44)

One-month

2.88 (6.59)

14 (0)

3.47 (6.19)

14 (0)

3.47 (6.19)

Pre-test

14.76 (21.68)

10.95 (3.92)

32.24 (30.75)

12.15 (3.23)

38.81 (35.37)

Post-test

16.38 (24.73)

12.19 (2.56)

33.29 (33.96)

13 (2.03)

36.10 (37.16)

One-week

14.61 (23.03)

12.89 (2.17)

32.11 (33.35)

13.36 (1.47)

32.39 (35.03)

One-month

11.39 (18.54)

12.61 (2.77)

29.56 (35.79)

13.03 (2.02)

31.50 (39.01)

Pre-test

0.16 (.50)

14 (0)

3.21 (11.44)

14 (0)

3.21 (11.44)

Post-test

.25 (.72)

13.32 (2.98)

2.74 (10.28)

14 (0)

2.60 (10.02)

One-week

.50 (1.28)

14 (0)

.74(2.35)

14 (0)

.74 (2.35)

One-month

.60 (2.26)

14 (0)

.60 (2.26)

14 (0)

.60 (2.26)
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Treatment statistics.
Of the nineteen participants in the treatment group, all but one successfully met criteria
for treatment cessation by reaching a SUDs level equivalent to or below 19 on all steps in the
treatment hierarchy. The single treatment participant who did not meet this criterion voluntarily
chose to discontinue treatment prior to the end of the three hour maximum time limit. This
participant did continue to complete the reminder of the post-test and all follow-up appointments.
Several treatment group participants said “pause” one or more times during treatment, but the
exact frequency of requested pauses is unknown as these data were not reliably collected. One
treatment group participant required brief relaxation before leaving the post-test appointment;
note that this individual successfully completed treatment. Many participants completed
treatment with a single exposure to treatment steps but some participants required additional
treatment cycles, or instances in which the treatment steps had to be sequentially repeated due to
unsatisfactorily high SUDs levels. Mean SUDs levels for the treatment cycles were as follows:
49.21 (SD = 24.65, range 0-85) for cycle one for which the total number of participants was 19,
13.76 (SD = 18.08, range 0-54) for cycle two for which the total number of participants was 17,
14.20 (SD = 12.11, range 1-34) for cycle three for which the total number of participants was 5, 9
(SD = 8.54, range 0-17) for cycle four for which the total number of participants was 3, and 4
(SD = 0) for cycle five for which there was one participant. Mean treatment time was 67.26
minutes (SD = 30.04 minutes, range 26-180 minutes). Mean treatment time did not differ by type
of animal (e.g. snake versus spider) used in the Experimental Phase. Mean SUDs rating for each
treatment cycle also did not differ by animal.
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Primary Statistical Analyses
Question group 1: Presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory
avoidance.
The first group of research questions sought to establish the presence of selective
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance in the fearful individuals in the present
participant sample. The emotional Stroop task, frequently used to demonstrate the existence of
attentional bias across anxiety disorders, was used to connect the study’s methodology with the
broader empirical literature through utilization of equivalent methods. The first research question
was (1) will there be selective processing bias found in the emotional Stroop task? It was
hypothesized that selective processing bias would be found in the treatment and no-treatment
groups at pre-test assessment, as would be evidenced by longer response times on the emotional
Stroop task for threat words than neutral words and than the response times of control group
participants for threat words. Statistical comparison of the mean response times for threat and
neutral words on the pre-test emotional Stroop task for each of the three groups yielded
acceptance of the null hypothesis; that is, no significant differences were found between
participant groups for threat- or neutrally-valenced words on the pre-test emotional Stroop task.
Contrary to the literature cited above in which selective processing bias was detected on the
emotional Stroop task, no selective processing bias was detected in this sample at pre-test.
The exogenous cueing task, a relatively novel methodological application in this
empirical literature, was employed to further clarify the presence of selective processing bias in
fearful participants by differentiating between facilitated responding, a unique detection
capability exclusive to this task, and attentional capture, as would have also been revealed by the
emotional Stroop task. The second research question in question group one was (2) will there be
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selective processing bias on the exogenous cueing task? It was hypothesized that selective
processing bias would be found in the exogenous cueing task in the treatment and no-treatment
groups at pre-test, which would be evidenced by facilitated responding (i.e. faster responding
such that millisecond response times would be lesser) to targets presented with threat cues
compared to targets presented with neutral cues on valid trials. This specifically would suggest
that there would be smaller mean response latencies to threat valid trials than neutral valid trials
and uncued trials in treatment and no-treatment groups as compared to mean response latencies
to threat valid trials in the control group. Comparison of the treatment and no-treatment groups to
the control group on mean response times to targets presented with valid threat cues to mean
response times to targets presented with valid neutral cues revealed no significant differences
between groups on threat valid trials or neutral valid trials on the pre-test exogenous cueing task.
The third research question was (3) will there be attentional capture on the exogenous cuing
task? It was hypothesized that the treatment and no-treatment groups would exhibit attentional
capture on the exogenous cuing task at pre-test assessment when threat invalid trials were
compared to neutral invalid trials. That is, longer response times to threat invalid trials than
neutral invalid trials and uncued trials in the treatment and no-treatment groups as compared to
response latencies on the same trials in the control group would be observed. No significant
differences, however, were found between groups on threat invalid trials or neutral invalid trials
on the pre-test exogenous cueing task. Additionally, no between-group differences existed in
millisecond reaction time for uncued trials on the pre-test exogenous cueing task.
Along with attentional processes, explicit memory was also a focus of this study with the
dependent variables being performance on three tests of recall (i.e. free recall, word-stem cued
recall, and recognition) of a previously presented valenced word list, each test of recall offering
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the participant progressively more recall cues. The final research question in question group one
was (4) will there be explicit memory avoidance on the tests of free recall, word-stem cued
recall, and recognition? It was hypothesized that explicit memory avoidance would be found in
the treatment and no-treatment groups at pre-test, which would be evidenced by decreased
explicit recall of threat-relevant words compared to recall of neutral words. Thus, the dependent
variable for explicit memory evaluation was mean number of threat-valenced words correctly
recalled/endorsed compared to mean number of neutrally-valenced words correctly
recalled/endorsed across groups. On the free recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition tests,
no significant differences were found between groups on recall/recognition for threat-valenced
words or neutrally-valenced words on the pre-test explicit memory measures.
Question group 2: Impact of treatment on anxiety-induced cognitive processes.
In light of the uniformly null results for all questions in question group one, questions in the
second grouping could not be addressed as anticipated given that they presupposed the initial
existence of selective processing bias and/or explicit memory avoidance in this participant
sample. The two research questions in this grouping were (1) will one-session in vivo exposure
treatment immediately eliminate selective processing bias and reduce potential inhibitory
processes operating to suppress explicit recall of threat-relevant information? and (2) will
hypothesized treatment gains exhibited in the treatment group remain stable at one-week and
one-month follow-up? It was hypothesized that the treatment group would not significantly
differ from the control group on all dependent variables at post-test. Also, the immediate
treatment gains exhibited by the treatment group was predicated to gradually decrease over time,
although the results of the treatment group were not anticipated to eventually equate with those
of the no-treatment group due to this decrease. Because neither selective processing bias nor
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explicit memory avoidance was found in fearful participants at pre-test assessment,
determination of immediate and prolonged impact of treatment on the absent processes is
unwarranted in this sample.
The temporal stability of patterns of cognitive processing among anxious and nonanxious individuals was, however, an ancillary focus presented in question group one, the intent
of which was to determine if hypothetically present selective processing bias and explicit
memory avoidance found at pre-test assessment remained stable in the no-treatment group across
all assessment points. It was hypothesized that response patterns indicative of selective
processing bias and explicit memory avoidance would be temporally stable in the no-treatment
group. As previously mentioned, no patterns of responding suggestive of selective processing
bias or explicit memory avoidance were found in any group at pre-test, thereby negating the
necessity to determine temporal stability of these constructs in the no-treatment group.
Longitudinal participant performance by group on all dependent variables was, however,
examined in an effort to detect any changes in performance due to the receipt of treatment or the
effects of an unknown, unmeasured variable.
Measures of selective processing bias, namely the emotional Stroop task and the
exogenous cueing task, were initially analyzed to ascertain longitudinal participant performance.
For the emotional Stroop task, the fixed effect of assessment point did not yield significant
results, suggesting that the mean response times for both threat and neutral words did not change
across time regardless of group membership. The interaction between group and assessment
point was also not significant for either threat or neutral words. Thus, all participants performed
approximately equivalently on the emotional Stroop task regardless of word valence, and
performance did substantially not change over time. Again, this sample demonstrated no
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selective processing bias on the emotional Stroop task, and response patterns remained stable
across assessment points. On the exogenous cueing task, the fixed effect of assessment point was
significant for threat valid trials, F (3, 57) = 44.69, p < .0001, threat invalid trials, F (3, 57) =
4.62, p < .01, uncued trials, F (3, 57) = 17.98, p < .0001, neutral valid trials, F (3, 57) = 40.73, p
< .001, and neutral invalid trials, F (3, 57) = 11.16, p < .0001 (see Figure 2). For threat valid and
neutral valid trials, all participants became faster in their response times when assessment points
were compared with the exception of the comparison between the one-week follow-up and the
one-month follow-up, for which there existed no significant differences. For the threat invalid
and neutral invalid trials as well as uncued trials, only the pre-test assessment point significantly
differed from all other assessment points. This suggests that, regardless of group membership, all
participants became significantly faster in responding over time to all trial types presented on the
exogenous cueing task; this increasingly rapid responding, however, did dissipate between oneweek and one-month follow-ups for valid trials and between post-test and one-week follow-up
for both invalid and uncued trials. The interaction between group and assessment point was not
significant for any trial type on the exogenous cueing task, indicating that changes in response
time to all trials on the exogenous cueing task were not a product of group membership.

Response Time in Milliseconds
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Figure 2. Response times in milliseconds for all participants on all trials of the exogenous cueing
task.
Tests of explicit memory avoidance were also analyzed for temporal change. On the free
recall test, the fixed effect of assessment point was significant for recall of both neutral words, F
= (3, 57) 7.01, p < .001, and threat words, F (3, 57) = 2.83, p < .05, (see Figure 3). For neutral
words, all assessment points differed significantly from the one-week follow-up, when
participants recalled significantly more neutral words than recalled at the other assessment
points. For threat words, recall at pre-test and one-month follow-up significantly differed from
recall at post-test, which evidenced the greatest recall for threat words across participants. The
interaction between group and assessment point was not significant for either word valence on
the free recall test. On the word-stem cued recall test, the fixed effect of assessment point was
significant for recall of both neutral words, F (3, 57) = 16.25, p < .0001, and threat words, F (3,
57) = 9.09, p < .0001, (see Figure 4). For neutral words, recall was greater at post-test, one-week,
and one-month follow-up, all of which did not significantly differ from one another, than recall
at pre-test. For threat words, recall was significantly greater at post-test than all other assessment
points, which did not differ from one another. The interaction between group and assessment
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point was not significant for either word valence on the word-stem cued recall test. Finally, on
the recognition test, the fixed effect of assessment point was not significant for recognition of
neutral words but was significant for recognition of threat words, F (3, 57) = 6.40, p < .001, (see
Figure 5 for recall of threat words across all participants). Significant differences were found in
the comparison between pre-test and one-month follow-up (i.e. more threat words recognized at
pre-test) and between post-test and one-week and one-month follow-ups (i.e. more threat words
recognized at post-test in than one-week and one-month follow-up, respectively). As was evident
for the free and word-stem cued recall tests, the interaction between group and assessment point
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was not significant for either word valence on the recognition test.

Figure 3. Number of threat and neutral words correctly recalled by all participants on the free
recall test.
Each assessment point was analyzed to detect main effects on dependent variables. At
post-test, no significant differences between groups were noted on any dependent variable.
Notably, however, several dependent variables approached significance, including response time
to threat invalid words on the exogenous cueing task, F (2, 55) = 2.14, p < .13. At post-test
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assessment, the treatment and control group almost exactly equated in response time to threat
invalid trials (mean response times of 390 and 389, respectively) while the no-treatment group
responded faster with a mean response time of 365 milliseconds, perhaps suggesting attentional
diversion from threat. Also approaching significance at post-test assessment was recognition of
threat words on the recognition test, F (2, 57) = 2.32, p < .11. On the recognition test, the notreatment group recalled more threat words than the treatment and control groups. At one-week
follow-up, the mean difference between recall of threat and neutral words on the free recall test
was significant, F (2, 53) = 3.24, p < .05. Specifically, the no-treatment group exhibited a
significantly smaller mean difference in recall between threat and neutral words than the mean
difference in recall in the control group. This same trend was observed on the cued recall test,
although this result failed to reach significance, F (2, 53) = 2.14, p < .13. Near significant
differences were also present on the recognition test, specifically for recognition of neutral
words, F (2, 53) = 2.37, p < .11. The mean difference between recognition of threat and neutral
words on the recognition test was significant, F (2, 53) = 3.48, p < .05. The control group
displayed the largest mean difference between recognition of threat words and neutral words.
Finally, at one-month follow-up, response times to uncued trials of the exogenous cueing task
almost reached significance, F (2, 51) = 2.20, p < .13; the no-treatment group responded faster
than both the treatment and control groups to these trials. Number of neutral words recalled on
the free recall test almost reached significance, F (2, 52) = 2.13, p < .13; the treatment group
recalled more neutral words than the no-treatment group. Once again, the mean difference
between recall of threat and neutral words on the free recall test almost reached significance, F
(2, 52) = 2.00, p < .15, with the treatment group exhibiting the smallest mean difference (M =
0.88), followed by the control group (M = 1.95) and the no-treatment group (M = 2.22). As
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reported in one-week follow-up, the mean difference between recognition of threat and neutral
words on the recognition test was significant, F (2, 52) = 3.73, p < .05 with the control group
demonstrating the largest mean difference between recognition of threat words and recognition
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of neutral words.

Figure 4. Number of threat and neutral words correctly produced by all participants on the wordstem cued recall test.
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Figure 5. Number of threat words correctly recognized by all participants on the recognition test.
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Question group 3: Impact of state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and
explicit memory avoidance.
The final group of research questions involved the recategorization the participant sample
based on levels of state and trait anxiety in order to assess their impact on the measures of
cognitive processing. Thus, participants were categorized as follows based on pre-test responses
on the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI): high on both state and trait anxiety (i.e. STAI
scores greater than 40 on each subscale; N = 6), low on trait anxiety (i.e. STAI-Trait subscale
score of 39 or less) and high on state anxiety (i.e. STAI-State subscale score of 40 or greater; N =
3), high on trait anxiety (i.e. STAI-Trait subscale score of 40 or greater) and low on state anxiety
(i.e. STAI-State subscale score of 39 or less; N = 11), and low on both state and trait anxiety (i.e.
STAI scores of 39 or less on both subscales; N = 39). The research questions in this group were
(1) will selective processing bias and explicit recall differences arise as a result of high or low
state or trait anxiety in participants? and (2) will possible increases in state anxiety, as may be
seen in the one-week and one-month assessments, in the treatment group result in greater
selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance? For question one, an interactive effect
between state and trait anxiety was hypothesized such that those participants who were high in
both types of anxiety at pre-test would display the greatest selective processing bias and produce
more explicit recall avoidance of threat-relevant stimuli. For question two, it was hypothesized
that, if state anxiety increased in the treatment group at one-week and one-month follow-up
assessments, greater selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance would be found.
At pre-test assessment, no significant differences were found among any of the anxiety
groupings on the emotional Stroop task, the exogenous cueing task, or the three tests of memory,
thereby negating question one of this question group. Question two requires initial establishment
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of elevations in state anxiety in the treatment group at one-week and one-month follow-up
assessments. Therefore, a repeated measures ANOVA with the independent variable as
participant group assignment and the dependent variable as STAI – State subscale score revealed
that scores on the State subscale were significantly different across time, F (3, 50) = 5.39, p <
.01, and the effect of group assignment on STAI – State scores across time almost reached
significance, F (3, 50) = 2.18, p < .06. Specifically, the mean difference over time in the State
subscale scores of the control group compared to those of the no-treatment group almost reached
significance (p < .06) in that the no-treatment group exhibited higher State subscale scores than
the control group. As noted previously, Figure 1 illustrates that no significant increase in state
anxiety as measured by the STAI State subscale occurred in the treatment group at one-week and
one-month follow-up. Thus, evidence of increase in magnitude of selective processing bias and
explicit memory avoidance based on the presumption of increased state anxiety in the treatment
group cannot be made as no such increase in anxiety existed in this sample. In fact, the marked
decrease in STAI – State scores from pre-test to post-test in the treatment group appears to be
maintained across one-week and one-month follow-up, perhaps a testament to the effectiveness
of treatment.
The prolonged impact of both state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and
explicit memory avoidance was examined in spite of the lack of evidence at pre-test assessment
that this variable impacts the constructs of interest given that the absence of these constructs in
this sample. Again, no significant differences were found on any dependent variable measure at
pre-test when participants were categorized according to levels of state and trait anxiety.
Differences at post-test were observed, mostly on the tests of explicit recall but one of which
occurred on the emotional Stroop task. On the post-test emotional Stroop task, significant
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differences were found for neutral words only, F (3, 56) = 2.80, p < .05; those who had low trait
and high state anxiety took significantly more time to name the color in which neutral words
were printed compared to participants who were classified as high in both types of anxiety. On
the post-test free recall test, the mean difference between recall of neutral and threat words by
anxiety grouping almost reached significance, F (3, 56) = 2.66, p < .06. Greater mean disparity
in recall for threat words versus neutral words on the post-test free recall test occurred in those
who were high in trait and state anxiety and those who were low in trait and high in state anxiety
with threat words enjoying preferential recall over neutral words by these groups. Finally, on the
post-test cued recall test the mean difference between recall of neutral and threat words by
anxiety grouping also almost reached significance, F (3, 56) = 2.63, p < .06. Greater mean
disparity in recall for threat versus neutral words on the post-test cued recall test was suggested
in participants who were high in both state and trait anxiety only with threat words being
preferentially recalled by this group. No group differences were observed at one-week follow-up.
At one-month follow-up, recall of threat words on the free recall test approached significance, F
(3, 51) = 2.47, p < .08, with those with low trait and high state anxiety recalling the fewest threat
words than the other three anxiety groups.
Numerous differences on the dependent variables were observed across time irrespective
of anxiety grouping; in fact, almost all dependent measures with the exception of threat invalid
trials on the exogenous cueing task and recognition of neutral words on the recognition test were
significant across time when participants were grouped according to anxiety. Even results of the
emotional Stroop task were significant across time with anxiety grouping as the independent
variable, a finding that was not indicated when participant grouping was assigned as the
independent variable; specifically, the latency for color-naming on threat trials at post-test was
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greater for all participants at post-test than all other assessment points, F (3, 56) = 2.81, p < .05).
One result was significant by anxiety grouping and time – response time to neutral words on the
emotional Stroop task, F (9, 56) = 2.62, p < .02, with the group classified as high in both state
and trait anxiety responding more rapidly to such words.
Secondary Statistical Analyses
Description of Screening Phase participants who opted out of further participation.
During the Screening Phase assessments, participants who indicated that they did not
wish to be considered or contacted for further participation were directed to a brief “opt-out”
survey (see Appendix N) inquiring about the reason(s) for their decision. Demographically, the
group of participants who opted out of Experimental Phase participation did not significantly
differ from the Experimental Phase participants on any measured demographic variable based on
Pearson’s chi-squared tests, nor did the two groups differ on totals for the FSQ, FSnQ, DASS-21
and any DASS-21 subscale. The brief opt-out questionnaire was fully completed by all but one
participant. One multiple choice question inquired as to the reason the participant wished not to
be considered for the Experimental Phase of the study. Options to this question were as follows:
I do not have the time to participate further, I have no interest in this project, I am too frightened
or nervous to participate in the next phase of the experiment, I am not comfortable providing my
contact information to the experimenter of this study, I do not understand what further
participation would involve, I do not feel like continued participation in this project could benefit
me, I disagree with the purposes of this research project, I do not participate in research projects
in general, and an “other” option in which participants could supply a personal response. Three
hundred thirty five participants completed the opt-out survey, and two hundred eighty-eight
(86%) of those participants opted out of Experimental Phase participation for a reason that was
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not fear-related (e.g. I do not have the time to participate further). Six specific statements
regarding level of fear toward the experimental procedures (e.g. I am much too scared of snakes
and/or spiders to be a part of this study) were requested to be rated on a four point Likert scale
with 0 indicating Completely False and 3 indicating Completely True. Participants who indicated
that his/her reason for opting out of further participation was indeed fear-related scored
significantly higher than those who opted out for non-fear-related reasons on all opt out survey
questions as well as the total of all opt out survey questions at the .0001 alpha level. Of those
whose reason for opting out was fear-related, the statement that had the highest mean (M = 2.59,
SD = .78) was, “I am afraid that I would be forced to touch a snake or spider if I participated in
this experiment.” Those participants who opted out of further participation for a fear-related
reason scored significantly higher on both the FSQ (M = 68.20, SD = 32.96) and FSnQ (M =
86.52, SD = 33.82) compared to those who opted out of further participation for non-fear-related
reasons (FSQ: M = 37.93, SD = 30.77, FSnQ: M = 62.13, SD = 36.44), t (332) = -6.13, p < .000
for the FSQ, t (332) = -4.26, p < .000 for the FSnQ.
Discussion
Summary of Results
One goal of the present study was to investigate the presence of selective processing bias
and explicit memory avoidance in fearful participants versus non-fearful participants at pre-test.
Selective processing bias was assessed via the emotional Stroop task as well as the exogenous
cueing task while explicit memory avoidance was examined via three tests of recall (i.e. free
recall, word-stem cued recall, and recognition) for a previously presented valenced word list. No
significant differences on any dependent variable were found, thus failing to establish the
existence of the constructs of interest in this sample. Absence of these constructs prohibited the
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primary investigator’s ability to fully address the second goal of the study, which was to examine
the impact of one-session in vivo exposure treatment on the constructs. The temporal stability of
the constructs was, however, examined as data were collected at four assessment points (pre-test,
post-test, one-week follow-up, and one-month follow-up). The effect of time on each group’s
performance on the measures of selective processing bias was again mostly insignificant with the
exception of the exogenous cueing task, to which all participants became increasingly rapid in
respond times to all trial types. Several significant differences were found on tests of explicit
recall avoidance when examined longitudinally, none of which were significant by the
intersection of time and group. Interestingly, measures of explicit memory consistently revealed
significant differences by assessment point with more threat words being recalled across the
three memory measures at the post-test assessment period (although a significant increase in
recall of neutral words began at post-test and maintained until one-month follow-up as well);
again, this finding is irrespective of participant group. When each assessment point was analyzed
independently, several results approached significance at one-week and one-month follow-up,
such as the results of the exogenous cueing task, and mean differences between recalled words
on tests of explicit memory became significant in several instances. Based on these results, the
impact of anxiety treatment on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance is
uncertain as the data cannot address the question. Finally, the third goal of the study was to
examine the respective impacts of both state and trait anxiety on the dependent variables by reanalyzing data based on participants’ high or low levels of each type of anxiety. While some
between group differences on explicit recall approached significance, most intriguing in these
results was that the previously impotent emotional Stroop task displayed significant and
perplexing results; those participants who were low in trait anxiety and high in state anxiety were
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delayed in response to neutral words at post-test while those participants who had elevated trait
and state anxiety demonstrated more rapid responding to neutral words across assessment points.
Based on these results, the impact of state and trait anxiety on the constructs of interest is
unknown. In summary, the questions for which this study was designed to clarify cannot be
clarified by the obtained results, which may in fact pose additional questions or challenges.
Implications of Results
Lack of selective processing bias and/or explicit memory avoidance at pre-test.
One of the most notable findings in the current study is the failure to reject the null
hypothesis in regard to the presence of both selective processing bias and explicit memory
avoidance at pre-test assessment, resulting in an inability to examine several primary research
questions that were dependent on the presence of these constructs in the experimental sample.
While the elusiveness and instability of these constructs has been previously discussed, the
absence of significant result on any measure of these constructs was unanticipated, particularly
the lack of selective processing bias detected on the emotional Stroop task, and suggestive of
further inquiry into possible causes of the null results. Perhaps the most apparent component of
the study that may have impacted the results is the representativeness of the participant sample.
Participants were college students who did not necessarily meet diagnostic criteria for any
particular anxiety disorder; rather, they were screened for fear level toward a particular stimulus,
namely a spider or a snake, using the FSQ and FSnQ, thereby diagnostically approximating
individuals with a diagnosis of specific phobia. Williams, Mathews, and Macleod (1996) noted
that researchers who have used the emotional Stroop task to capture attentional bias have most
often successfully done so by including only clinically diagnosed individuals. One should recall
that most participants (N = 39) were categorized as low on both state and trait anxiety at pre-test
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assessment despite their fear-indicative responses to the FSQ or FSnQ. Thus, the level of anxiety
experienced by the participants in this study may have been insufficient to elicit the cognitive
constructs of interest. Additionally, the small number of participants in this study, while
appropriate to detect medium to large effect sizes, was not appropriate to detect small effect
sizes. Examination of Table 3 in which the means and standard deviations of each participant
group on all dependent variables reveals no trend in the expected directions on any of the
dependent variables; the absence of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance is
evident at pre-test assessment, and there is no clearly discernible hypothesized response patterns
across assessment points when examining group performance. When inspecting tests of explicit
recall, in fact, one may note that all participant groups displayed somewhat enhanced recall for
threat words on each of the three explicit memory tests, the opposite of results that would be
expected given the theory of explicit memory avoidance. Given the lack of pattern in the data,
the role of power issues in contributing to the null results of the study is doubtful. Additionally,
this participant sample was drawn from the same population as the participant sample used in the
primary investigator’s thesis project (Stanley, 2008), a related study in which significant results
were found.
Inclusion of the feared animal in the experiment may have also impeded detection of
selective processing bias, as was reported in a series of experiments by Mathews and Sebastian
(1993), by altering the cognitive processing priorities of participants. Williams, Mathews, and
Macleod (1996) hypothesized that this lack of detection of selective processing bias may be due
to an increase in response effort required to perform the emotional Stroop task under conditions
in which cognitive resources are devoted to the presence or anticipated presence of the live
feared animal. This increase in response effort is thought to abolish the emotional Stroop
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interference effect. Related theories of the interference suppression effect include a prioritization
of attention to only the most potent threat and additional narrowing of attentional focus such that
cues previously regarded as threat-relevant (e.g. threat-relevant linguistic or pictorial stimuli)
become peripheral in nature (Constans, McCloskey, Vasterling, Brailey, & Mathews, 2004).
Amir and colleagues (1996), who found an interference suppression effect in an experiment
involving participants with social phobia, suggested that perhaps the ability to suppress the
interference effect for threat-relevant words is indicative of the enhanced ability of clinically
anxious individuals to avoid threat-relevant stimuli.
While the sample-specific or methodological limitations of the study likely contributed to
the encompassing inability to reject the null hypothesis, one must also consider the measures
used to assess the dependent variables, namely the emotional Stroop task and the exogenous
cueing task to measure selective processing bias and the three tests of recall to examine explicit
memory avoidance. The empirical and clinical utility of the emotional Stroop task in detection of
selective processing bias has been questioned previously by Thorpe and Salkovskis (1997b), who
reference the “real and unanswered questions about precisely what tasks such as the Stroop are
actually measuring,” (p 142). The exogenous cueing task, despite its conceptual similarity to the
dot probe paradigm, is not frequently used in this literature but is capable of detecting anxietyinduced attentional bias and is arguably preferable to other more common measures as discussed
above based on the exogenous cueing task’s strengths. The only main effect that was significant
for the exogenous cueing task in this experiment was time, suggesting possible practice effects
that existed across participants on this task, and no evidence of attentional bias at pre-test
assessment was found. Practice effects on the exogenous cueing task could be indicative of
habituation to the task in spite of the randomization of trial type and the increasing latency in
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days between assessment points. In a series of experiments that specifically tested practice
effects on inhibition of return, a phenomenon detected by the exogenous cueing task, Weaver,
Lupiáñez, and Watson (1998) found a decline in inhibition of return across a relatively small
number of trials (i.e. 150 unvalenced test trials), but did not conclude that this decline was due to
habituation as there was no evidence of spontaneous recovery of the habituated response across
days of testing. Lupiáñez, Weaver, Tipper, and Madrid (2001) reported similar results and
posited a habituation-to-the-cue hypothesis, which stated that participants quickly learn to
habituate to a non-predictive threat cue such that the cue becomes peripheral in nature. Thus, it
would appear possible participants may “learn” the task of the exogenous cueing task over time,
although the exact nature of such learning is not understood.
In addition to the macro-level methodological and measure characteristics described
above, micro-level nuances of the measures may have contributed to the lack of significant
findings. A major limitation of the traditional emotional Stroop task is that threat and neutral
stimuli are restricted to words; the number of threat words related to the feared stimulus in
specific phobia is somewhat limited and one might question the ability of linguistic stimuli alone
to elicit attentional bias in a sample whose fear may or may not be clinically significant.
Duration of valenced cue presentation may have also impacted results, particularly on the
exogenous cueing task. Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Vanvolsem, and De Houwer (2007)
employed the exogenous cueing task to examine the time-course of attentional processing of
threat information. In these experiments, threat cue duration was varied (28, 100, 200, and 500
ms) as was threat level of the cue (neutral, moderate, and high threat); results suggested
facilitated attention to high threat cues at 100ms but reduced attentional cueing of high threat
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cues at 200ms and 500ms. Cue presentation in the present study occurred for 200ms, thereby
potentially leading to lack of facilitation of attention toward threat cues.
Table 3. Means and Standard Deviations by Participant Groups on All Dependent Variables at
Each Assessment Point
Pre-Test

Post-Test

One-Week

One-Month

Treatment

720 (103)

747 (118)

725 (110)

695 (106)

No-Treatment

758 (106)

721 (109)

741 (96)

727 (101)

Control

708 (120)

715 (138)

681 (212)

710 (146)

Treatment

734 (100)

755 (112)

716 (111)

710 (112)

No-Treatment

761 (110)

736 (115)

748 (98)

735 (109)

Control

724 (120)

731 (135)

688 (215)

726 (128)

Treatment

381 (65)

348 (40)

328 (34)

330 (43)

No-Treatment

391 (50)

341 (28)

331 (50)

319 (35)

Control

396 (52)

350 (53)

340 (43)

333 (47)

Treatment

382 (68)

342 (39)

324 (33)

327 (44)

No-Treatment

393 (50)

331 (28)

327 (46)

312 (36)

Control

394 (53)

347 (51)

335 (47)

336 (48)

406 (76)

381 (39)

378 (38)

369 (37)

Stroop Neutral

Stroop Threat

ECT Neutral Valid

ECT Threat Valid

ECT Neutral Invalid
Treatment
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No-Treatment

397 (56)

364 (28)

374 (49)

353 (35)

Control

410 (59)

372 (45)

373 (43)

372 (40)

Treatment

399 (80)

390 (38)

381 (45)

379 (33)

No-Treatment

398 (53)

365 (30)

370 (41)

364 (32)

Control

400 (59)

389 (55)

387 (46)

382 (39)

Treatment

402 (63)

380 (40)

376 (37)

378 (44)

No-Treatment

404 (45)

371 (31)

369 (34)

357 (31)

Control

420 (53)

388 (49)

383 (48)

382 (39)

Treatment

3.11 (1.91)

3.95 (1.93)

5.00 (2.22)

4.35 (2.87)

No-Treatment

3.71 (2.05)

3.90 (1.97)

5.00 (2.03)

2.83 (1.54)

Control

3.40 (1.43)

3.85 (2.16)

4.15 (2.16)

3.95 (2.26)

Treatment

5.32 (1.42)

5.95 (1.78)

6.00 (1.71)

5.24 (2.31)

No-Treatment

5.43 (1.33)

5.86 (1.42)

5.22 (1.21)

5.06 (1.76)

Control

5.20 (1.67)

6.05 (1.88)

5.90 (1.68)

5.90 (2.22)

Treatment

3.32 (1.92)

5.00 (1.94)

5.33 (2.03)

4.76 (2.36)

No-Treatment

3.62 (1.72)

5.33 (1.85)

5.17 (1.47)

3.78 (2.10)

Control

3.35 (1.69)

4.60 (2.21)

4.25 (2.20)

4.50 (2.24)

ECT Threat Invalid

ECT Uncued

Free Recall Neutral

Free Recall Threat

Cued Neutral
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Cued Threat
Treatment

5.21 (1.69)

7.31 (1.77)

6.28 (1.71)

5.65 (2.00)

No-Treatment

5.76 (2.02)

7.00 (1.92)

5.72 (1.90)

6.00 (1.85)

Control

5.25 (1.74)

6.20 (2.02)

6.05 (1.88)

6.10 (2.05)

Recognition Neutral
Treatment

8.00 (1.67)

7.89 (1.73)

8.44 (1.50)

8.11 (2.03)

No-Treatment

8.00 (1.70)

8.57 (1.25)

8.17 (1.54)

7.67 (2.25)

Control

7.30 (1.38)

7.90 (1.65)

7.15 (2.52)

7.50 (2.26)

Treatment

9.32 (1.00)

9.16 (1.07)

8.72 (1.32)

7.88 (2.23)

No-Treatment

9.24 (1.45)

9.57 (0.75

8.50 (1.10)

8.50 (1.65)

Control

8.90 (0.97)

8.95 (1.00)

8.75 (1.45)

8.75 (1.55)

Recognition Threat

Note. Standard deviations noted in parentheses. Stroop and ECT data are reported in millisecond
response times while explicit recall data are reported in number of words correctly recalled.
Evaluation of success of one-session in vivo exposure treatment.
Although this study provided no evidence of the ability of one-session in vivo exposure
therapy to reduce or eliminate the constructs of interests, one would be remiss to neglect the
success of this treatment in significantly reducing anxiety in treatment group participants. All but
one treatment group participant successfully completed all treatment steps, including the last
treatment step in which the participant was asked to independently hold the feared animal for a
period of time between one to three minutes. Quantitatively, the STAI – State subscale scores for
the treatment group significantly decreased from pre-test assessment with a mean of 36 to posttest assessment with a mean of 27 and remained stable from post-test assessment to one-week
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and one-month follow-up with a mean of 29 at both assessments. The no-treatment group also
demonstrated a significant decrease in STAI – State subscale scores such that they equated with
the treatment group at one-week follow-up with a mean of 29 on this measure; these group
members returned to pre-test levels at one-month follow-up as both assessment point means were
34, demonstrating unstable levels of anxiety that may have impacted results that were dependent
on stability of anxiety in no-treatment group participants. Notably, scores on the STAI – State
and Trait subscales were generally low for all groups regardless of assessment point, and other
researchers conducting empirical studies on specific phobia have even found lack of significant
difference between phobic participants and non-anxious controls on the STAI (see, for example,
Gerdes, Alpers, & Pauli, 2007). Nevertheless, STAI scores did decline in fearful individuals, but
whether this result is attributable to treatment is uncertain due to the pre-to post- to one-week
decline in the no-treatment group scores. Stability of STAI-State subscale scores was achieved in
the treatment group.
In addition to the STAI – State subscale scores, evidence of the success of exposure
treatment can be readily observed in the BAT as the results of the BAT across time reveal
notable differences between the treatment and no-treatment group. Examination of SUDs levels,
three data points of which are presented in Table 2, reveals marked similarity between the
treatment and no-treatment groups on all reported SUDs levels at pre-test assessment, although
this is not the case at any other assessment point subsequent to the treatment group’s receipt of
exposure treatment. Distance traveled in feet from the initial stopping point and the final
stopping point also reveals differences apparent in the treatment group only after post-test such
that members of this group traveled farther toward the feared animal than members of the notreatment group. One will note, however, that differences in distances and SUDs levels, while
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apparent, are quite small. At post-test and thereafter, for example, all treatment group
participants traveled the full 14 feet toward the feared stimulus in the cage for the final stopping
point, thus equating with control group participants on this measure. The differences in feet
traveled to the final stopping point between the treatment group and no-treatment group from
post-test assessment to one-month assessment was an average of a single foot or slightly less.
This may be evidence that, in spite of quantifiable differences in fear level between treatment
and no-treatment group participants following exposure treatment for those in the treatment
group, these differences may not have been so pronounced as to create a measurable effect on the
dependent variable assessments. Indeed, even at their most fearful point when the participants
had traveled as close as possible to the feared stimulus, mean SUDs levels, which were taken on
a 0 to 100 scale, were 43.47 for treatment group participants and 38.81 for no-treatment group
participants at pre-test assessment. A ceiling effect appeared to have been encountered in this
methodology that may have been overcome if participants were permitted to physically contact
the animal/arachnid’s container and/or the animal/arachnid itself during BAT procedures.
Effect of time on participant’s performance.
The temporal stability of anxiety-induced cognitive processes such as those examined in
the present study is, of course, of critical importance, particularly in treatment outcome research
that is dependent on the sustained presence of a construct of interest barring intervention.
Unfortunately, the impact of time on the cognitive performance of this sample cannot be
adequately addressed due to the failure to reject the null hypothesis at pre-test. One may have
noted, however, the numerous sporadic significant or near-significant results, particularly on
tests of explicit memory that are mentioned in the Results section under the second question
group heading. Like the results of the exogenous cueing task, the fixed effect of time appeared to
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be the only significant effect, although there were some significant effects for group when each
assessment point was separately analyzed. The most striking element of these data is the lack of
clear pattern or consistency across time and, quite often, with the theories of selective processing
bias and explicit memory avoidance. The results found in this study are unfortunately reflective
in the empirical literature, particularly the literature examining anxiety-induced explicit memory
bias or avoidance, in that result consistency is not typical. One would be advised to consider this
lack of temporally consistent significant findings, most frequently those relevant to explicit
memory, in light of the preponderance of empirically studies that report significant findings
based only on a single assessment point.
In addition to the uncertain temporal stability of attention and memory processes in
fearful individuals, to which the present study offers no insight, one must also consider the
reliability of the measures of attentional bias and explicit memory avoidance, particularly given
that failure to replicate is quite common in these literatures. LeBel and Paunonen (2011), for
example, used a Monte Carlo simulation to ascertain the impact of random measurement error on
replicability of between-group mean difference effects obtained through use of implicit measures
of mental constructs, the emotional Stroop task and dot probe task included in this category.
Enumeration of the psychometric shortcomings, including unacceptably low levels of reliability,
of implicit measures was provided by these researchers, and they unsurprisingly reported low
probability of replication of an experimental effect as random measurement error/lack of
reliability affects the dependent variable. The researchers also mention the possibility of contextdependent factors (e.g. participant memories, present mood state, physical ailments) that may
contaminate mental processes assessed by implicit measures. Dishon-Berkovits and Algom
(2000) experimentally demonstrated the malleability of the Stroop interference effect with
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undergraduate participants through several contextual variances of traditional Stroop taskinclusive experiments. Consideration of the reliability of the measures in addition to the
numerous factors that may impact participant performance on these measures would be a useful
practice.
Relative contribution of state and trait anxiety to constructs of interest.
While the goal of this study was to distinguish the respective and combined impacts of
both state and trait anxiety on selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance,
accomplishing or even approaching that goal with the present sample is remarkably difficult give
the dramatic disproportionateness of anxiety group size. The vast majority of all participants
were grouped in the low trait and low state anxiety category at pre-test. Lack of significance in
most results with anxiety grouping as the independent variable may be a product of true absence
of impact of these variables on the constructs of interests. The more likely cause based on the
literature that has reported significant findings is that this study’s findings were absent due to
inadequate sampling. Nonetheless, perhaps most interesting in these findings is that, when state
and trait anxiety at pre-test was employed as the grouping variable, significant results were found
on the emotional Stroop task, which was non-significant at each assessment point and across
time when participants were grouped according to receipt of treatment or control. Results that
did achieve significance, while tenuous due to sampling issues, may be of evidentiary value to
the hypothesis that state and trait anxiety as well as their interplay may indeed impact differential
attention and memory processes. Thus, while the results of this study are certainly insufficient to
inform conclusions, one may derive that further investigation is warranted, particularly
investigation that focuses on attentional bias as the dependent variable. Another interesting area
of exploration based on the data is the impact of fluctuations in state anxiety over time in
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untreated anxious individuals; no-treatment participants in this study showed an unexpected
spontaneous drop in STAI – State subscale score at one-week follow-up followed by an almost
equivalent return to pre-test state anxiety levels. Using level of state anxiety at each assessment
point as the independent variable with a more heterogeneous sample may better explicate its
contribution to the constructs of interest over time, a task that this study was ill equipped to
complete.
Limitations of the Study
Several limitations of the current study may have impacted results and should be
acknowledged to prevent erroneous conclusions. Notably, a participant sample of this size has
the capability to detect only medium to large effect sizes, which may be insufficient to evaluate
the presence of selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance and their reaction to
treatment, particularly if the fearful sample randomized to the treatment or no-treatment may
have best been characterized as moderately fearful based on numerous anxiety measures (e.g.
STAI, BAT). One should note, however, that self-reported fear toward either a snake or spider in
participants assigned to either the treatment or no-treatment groups was high as reported on the
screening instruments FSQ and FSnQ. Thus, the limited sample size united with largely
uncertain but seemingly moderate fear levels may have influenced the ability of the measures
and the subsequent statistical analyses to demonstrate between-group mean differences.
Incorporate into these sampling issues the impact of participant attrition and confidence in the
results of this study diminishes further. While missing data due to attrition and technical failure
was addressed through appropriate statistical methods, these methods, which essentially
projected the likely missing data points based on a participant’s gathered data, were clearly not
preferred to actual participant data. Estimation methods are also not immune to the impact of
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small sample size. Along with limited sample size, the assistance of numerous research assistants
was both advantageous in that it reduced the likelihood of experimenter bias from a single
experimenter and disadvantageous in that it introduced potential protocol non-adherence.
In the spirit of the assertion that “confession should not have the goal of disarming
criticism” (Wilkinson, 1999, p. 602), the recognized limitations in the study discussed above
could be addressed in future studies. The obvious response to a small sample size would be to
increase the participant number in each group, although feasibility of that solution may dissuade
its implementation as had occurred in this instance. In order to combat the deleterious effects of
limited sample size and to enhance the ability to detect smaller effect sizes, the dependent
variable measures could have been altered to include the addition of trials on the emotional
Stroop task and the exogenous cueing task as well as with the addition of words to be recalled on
the three test of explicit recall. Participant workload must be considered with such a suggestion
as the addition of time to an already time-intensive research commitment may increase attrition
rates. In addition to the solution of expanding the dependent variables, more stringent criteria for
group admission could be employed such that a clear bimodal sample is created on the variable
of anxiety toward a snake or spider. Perhaps including only those fearful individuals who met
criteria for specific phobia would have been useful, as would have been incorporating a
behavioral measure of anxiety prior to group assignment rather than sole reliance on the selfreport screening data that was gleaned.
Along with practical limitations, theoretical limitations may also be useful to consider
when examining the results. This study failed to account for the possible presence of effortful
control (Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Hershey, 1994), a concept that is
congruent with Posner’s theories of voluntary and involuntary attentional functioning systems
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that are influenced by emotional states (Posner & Raichle, 1994). In the empirical literature on
anxiety-induced attentional bias, effortful control, which is conceptually considered a trait of
temperament, is defined as “the ability to control responses so as to withhold a dominant
response tendency while making a subdominant response” (Posner, Rothbart, Sheese, & Tang,
2007, p. 393); in the present context, it refers to the ability to use higher order learned coping
skills to address anxiety-inducing stimuli in an adaptive manner. While this study incorporated
the measurement of the more involuntary orientation of attention and used appropriate measures
to assess this, the ability to regulate attention through executive control could have proven
influential as this ability, which likely widely differs among participants if indeed linked to
temperament, may have a moderating effect on attentional bias. Those who are high in effortful
control may have the capacity to largely forego attentional bias (Derryberry & Reed, 2002;
Lonigan & Vasey, 2009). The Attentional Control Scale (Derryberry & Reed, 2002), a
measurement of one’s general capacity for attentional control, could have been administered in
Screening Phase assessments. This 20-item scale purports to assess the ability to focus attention,
to shift attention between tasks, and to flexibly control thought through participant ratings on a 4point Likert scale. In addition to the inclusion of a measure of effort control, use of slightly
different measures of explicit memory may be helpful in future studies. As suggested by
MacLeod and Mathews (2004), recognition tasks permit researchers to assess memory for
various types of stimuli not readily conducive to recall tasks. A recognition task for the pictures
shown during the exogenous cueing task might have produced evidence of memory bias given
that the threat-material is pictorial (i.e. not conducive to memory techniques such as mnemonic
devices) and is presented in a manner incompatible with prolonged encoding.
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A final theoretical limitation of this study that is reflective of the state of the related
empirical literature is the perhaps unwarranted separation of spatial selective attention, as
assessed by the exogenous cueing task, versus informational selective attention, as assessed by
the emotional Stroop task, the difference being the understanding of selective attention as a
purely interstimulus spatial “spotlight” in the former (e.g. attending to the location of feared
stimulus) versus selective attention as a intrastimulus characteristic gathering in the latter (e.g.
attending to the threatening characteristics of a stimulus; Shalev & Algom, 2000). As discussed
and empirically demonstrated in an experimental series by Shalev and Algom (2000), spatial and
dimensional understandings of selective attention are likely complementary but systematically
and anatomically (Posner & Raichle, 1994) unique forms of attentional processing. While an
advantage of the current study is its utilization of tests to examine both networks of attention,
Shalev and Algom (2000) distinctively demonstrated the possibility of assessing both of these
concurrently in a single task, thus reducing the extent of participant fatigue and streamlining a
study without omitting data collection opportunities.
Directions for Future Research
The results of the current study provide little information on either selective processing
bias or explicit memory avoidance; in fact, the major contribution of the current study lies within
its resounding failure. While the methodological limitations of the study likely impacted the
results, the present study is certainly not an anomaly in this particular empirical literature as
failures to replicate and null results are quite common, as noted in the literature review presented
in this manuscript. Thus, one is left to consider the functional utility of a construct that may or
may not be a reliable predictor or moderator of anxiety and which may or may not impact
treatment of anxiety. Marked differences in attentional bias have been observed not only across
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psychological disorders, but also within the diagnostic category of anxiety disorders. Becker,
Rinck, Margraf, and Roth (1999), for instance, reported differing color-naming response
latencies on the emotional Stroop task such that those with generalized anxiety disorder
demonstrated longer response latencies to all words with affective connotations, regardless of the
valence, and those with social phobia demonstrated longer response times to specific speechrelated words only. While the impact of psychological disorders on cognitive domains such as
attention and memory is intriguing and noteworthy from a learning perspective, attention and
memory disruption is not a diagnostic necessity of most anxiety disorders. Such disruption is
included as a possible symptom of some disorders.
Thus, one may question whether attention and memory processes in anxiety disorders, if
unstable and ephemeral as suggested by the empirical literature, are truly a hallmark of anxiety,
particularly given the changes in attentional bias among anxiety disorders and the difficulty
reliably detecting such bias in many cases. As mentioned in the literature review in this
manuscript, MacLeod and Mathews (2004) have doubted the utility of classifying explicit
memory bias or avoidance as a potential defining characteristic of anxiety, and perhaps
evaluation of the utility of selective processing bias is warranted as well. If indeed the field of
psychology collectively agrees upon cognitive disruption inclusive of attention and memory
processes as a trait of anxiety disorders, it is incumbent upon the field to determine how best to
use the current understanding of how these processes operate to instigate or maintain anxiety
symptoms, no small feat given the disagreements in the empirical literature. Researchers must
strive to distinguish how anxiety-induced cognitive disruption differs from cognitive disruption
caused by other psychological disorders and from other potential causes
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Conversely, however, if the instability of such maladaptive cognitive processes is due to
measurement error, which indeed seems to be at least partially accountable for null results,
premature dismissal of such potentially useful constructs would be unfortunate. Given the fairly
broad time range and volume of literature on anxiety-induced cognitive disruption, one may
mistakenly assume the adequacy and statistical appropriateness of the assessments typically
used; as was the case with the current study, the temptation to “put the cart before the horse” by
measuring constructs that are akin to a “moving target” with measures, particularly implicit
measures, that possess uncertain reliability and validity is ever present. The characteristics of the
measures used to assess these constructs, including their temporal reliability, is an important
preliminary direction for future research as confidence in the measures one will use should be a
prerequisite to measurement. Sensitivity and specificity is of paramount importance in validating
these measures. In the case of attention and memory measurement in anxiety, much can impact
results, including a participant’s sleep, caffeine intake, current stress, physical illness, medication
use, alcohol and drug use, and so forth. The need for psychometrically strong assessments in this
area of research, while challenging to provide, is clear.
A final consideration that is suggested by the results of this study is the stability of the
emotional experience of anxiety and the impact of that stability or lack thereof on assessment
and treatment of anxiety. Interestingly, participants in the no-treatment group showed an
unexplainable decline in state anxiety at one-week follow-up such that these participants almost
equated with the treatment group. This decline was followed by a return to pre-test levels of state
anxiety in the no-treatment group at one-month follow-up. While participants in this study
possessed a stimulus-specific fear that may not generalize to anxiety as a larger construct,
researchers may wish to consider unacknowledged fluctuations in anxiety-level as the
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assumption that untreated individuals experience stable symptoms may be invalid; indeed, the
construct of state anxiety as unstable should be expected given the presuppositions of that
construct. Tracking of symptoms over time with numerous points of assessment may permit a
more comprehensive picture of the presentation of anxiety disorders and account for how a
naturally evolving presentation may impact other constructs that are dependent on anxiety level.
In conclusion, the null results of the present study were likely obtained from the additive
effects of a variety of issues of diverse magnitudes. Despite the null results of this study and
other similar studies, there is research to suggest the presence of anxiety-induced cognitive
disruption, namely selective processing bias and explicit memory avoidance. This highlights the
difficulty in measuring these processes. Establishment of the presence of these processes,
including clarification regarding the conditions under which the constructs exist, is crucial. To
accomplish this, reliable and valid measures of these constructs must be employed. Longitudinal
trajectory of the cognitive processes as well as their reaction to treatment are important
subsequent future directions, but we must have a clear understanding of the processes prior to
pursuing additional and complex topics. We must also determine the role and utility of these
processes in the onset and/or maintenance of anxiety disorders to make the processes clinically
useful. A sturdy house necessitates a solid foundation; it would behoove researchers in the field
to solidify the basic understanding of attention and memory issues in anxiety disorders, including
delineating how such a pursuit is anticipated to improve clinician’s understanding and treatment
of anxiety disorders.
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Appendix A
Screening Phase Informed Consent Agreement
The Enduring Impact of One-Session Exposure Treatment on Selective Processing Bias and
Explicit Memory Avoidance in Snake- and Spider-fearful Participants
Investigators: Karen Stanley-Kime, M.S., and Ellen Koch, Ph.D.
Purpose: The purpose of this research study is to gain a better understanding of the effects of
anxiety treatment on thinking in those who are and are not fearful of snakes and spiders.
Procedure: This study begins with filling out four online assessment tools, including the Fear of
Spiders Questionnaire, the Fear of Snakes Questionnaire, the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales21 item version, and a short background survey. These questionnaires ask for information about
your fear toward spiders and snakes, general levels of depression and anxiety in your life, and
some personal information about you. You will also be asked for your contact information so
that, if you qualify for the study, the experimenter can contact you to invite you to further
participate in the second phase of the study if you are interested in doing so. The questionnaires
are brief and will take a maximum of 40 minutes to completely fill out, though you may finish
significantly sooner than that. Qualification for participating in the second phase of the study is
based on your responses to each of the surveys and not everyone will be invited to participate in
the second phase of the experiment. The second phase of the experiment will involve assignment
to one of three groups: one group of fearful individuals who will receive free one-session
exposure treatment (treatment group), one group of fearful individuals who will not receive the
treatment (no-treatment group), or the third group who are not fearful of either the snake or the
spider and who will not need treatment (control group). If you are assigned to the group of
fearful individuals who will receive treatment, you will be asked to physically contact a live
snake or spider if you are able to do so. This is a part of treatment and the experimenter will be
assisting you to get to the point that you are comfortable contacting the snake or spider. You will
not be forced to make contact at any time. If you are chosen to further participate, the
experimenter will contact you to provide further details about the second phase of the experiment
so you can decide if you would like to continue to the second phase of the experiment, which is
called the Experimental Phase. There will also be three follow-up phases of the experiment.
Risks: Risks of filling out these online surveys are minimal, though there is a chance that you
may become upset or anxious by some of the questions that are asked in these questionnaires. In
the event that you become upset by these surveys, you may seek free mental health assistance
from Snow Health Center Counseling Services if you are an Eastern Michigan University
student. Snow Health Center Counseling Services can be contacted at (734) 487-1118. If you are
not a student of Eastern Michigan University, you may seek therapy from the Eastern Michigan
University Psychology Clinic, though a fee for therapy sessions will be charged and you will be
solely responsible for that fee. The Eastern Michigan University Psychology Clinic may be
contacted at (734) 487-4987.
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Compensation: If you are an Eastern Michigan University student, you may receive extra credit
for your participation in this study only if it is approved by your instructor. If you indicate your
instructor and provide identifying information at the end of the survey, we will notify your
instructor of your participation. Your instructor can then assign extra credit points if approved by
him or her. The experimenters involved in this study can not guarantee or award any extra credit
points to you themselves. Decisions on extra credit are made completely by the instructor.
Benefits: There is no direct benefit to participants who complete the Screening Phase of this
study. If you are invited to further participate in the study, one of the benefits is that, if you are
fearful of either a spider or a snake, you will receive free one-session treatment for your small
animal fear during the course of the experiment in the case of membership in the experimental
treatment group. The treatment involves gradually approaching the live, caged snake or spider
with the assistance of the experimenter. The ultimate goal is to make you so comfortable that you
will be able to physically contact the animal without fear or anxiety. This treatment, which has
been shown to be effective and will take a maximum of 3 hours to be completed in one day, will
also be offered to you if you are assigned to the no-treatment group; you may request free onesession exposure treatment for your small animal fear after you have completed your
participation in the study. Treatment will take place on the fifth floor of Mark Jefferson hall by a
qualified graduate student in clinical psychology. This benefit does not apply to you if you are
not fearful of either a spider or a snake. An additional benefit is that your participation will
increase our knowledge of the effects of anxiety and possibly help us to improve anxiety
treatment.
Confidentiality: All the information collected from you is strictly confidential and will be
disclosed only to the experimenters of this study. That means that your name will not appear on
any papers on which this information is recorded. The forms will all be coded, and the
investigators will keep a separate master list with the names of participants and the
corresponding code numbers. Once the data are collected and analyzed, the master list will be
destroyed. All other forms will be retained for a minimum of five years in a locked file in 505D
Mark Jefferson. The results of this study will be reported in a dissertation and may be presented
at professional conferences or in journal articles. All results will be presented using group data
rather than individual data, and no identifying participant information will be provided in any
public dissemination of the results of this study.
Withdrawal Without Penalty: Participation in this study is voluntary. You will not be penalized
for refusing to participate in the study. Further, you are free to withdraw consent and discontinue
your involvement in the study at any time without penalty. You may stop filling out the surveys
at any time if you would like to withdraw consent.
Information regarding what to do if you have questions: If you have any questions about your
participation in this study, please feel free to contact either Karen Stanley-Kime or Dr. Ellen
Koch.
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Karen Stanley-Kime (primary student investigator): (734) xxx-xxxx or kstanley2@emich.edu.
Dr. Ellen Koch (primary investigator/faculty advisor): (734) 487-0189 or ellen.koch@emich.edu.
This research protocol and informed consent document has been reviewed and approved by the
Eastern Michigan University Human Subjects Review Committee for use from August 25, 2009
to August 25, 2010. If you have questions about the approval process, please contact Dr. Deb de
Laski-Smith (734.487.0042, Interim Dean of the Graduate School and Administrative Co-chair
of UHSRC, human.subjects@emich.edu).
By checking the box below, I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and accepted the terms
outlined above.

Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias 149
Appendix B
Experimental Phase Informed Consent Agreement
The Enduring Impact of One-Session Exposure Treatment on Selective Processing Bias and
Explicit Memory Avoidance in Snake- and Spider-fearful Participants
Investigators: Karen Stanley-Kime, M.S., and Ellen Koch, Ph.D.
Purpose: The purpose of this research study is to gain a better understanding of the effects of
anxiety treatment on thinking in those who are and are not fearful of snakes and spiders.
Procedure: This is the Experimental Phase of the above-named research study. You have been
assigned to one of three groups by the experimenter: one group of fearful individuals who will
receive free one-session treatment (treatment group), one group of fearful individuals who will
not receive the treatment (no-treatment group), or the third group who are not fearful of either
the snake or the spider and who will not need treatment (control group). The experiment will
begin with administration of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory.
After completion of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, those in the treatment group will receive
several cognitive assessment measures, including an exogenous cueing task and an emotional
Stroop task, the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, memory evaluation, and a behavioral
avoidance task. The exogenous cueing task involves you indicating the location of a target on a
computer screen while the emotional Stroop task involves you looking at words and indicating
the color of the ink in which they are printed. You will also complete the Shipley Institute of
Living Scale and three memory measures. During the behavioral avoidance task, you will be
asked to approach a caged snake or spider stimulus as much as you possibly can. The
experimenter will then work with treatment group participants to schedule a date and time for
him/her to come in to undergo treatment for fear of either a snake or a spider. This one session
in-vivo exposure treatment will be used to reduce fear of snakes/spiders, and will take a
maximum of 3 hours to complete. This treatment means that, with the help of the experimenter,
you will be exposed to a live caged snake or spider (depending on your individual fear) and
asked to perform various tasks related to the snake or spider in an effort to reduce anxiety. This
will include approaching the snake or spider. The eventual goal is to get you so comfortable that
you can physically contact the snake or spider. The snake used in exposure treatment will be a
corn snake; the spider used for exposure treatment will be a Chilean rose hair tarantula. You will
not be forced to make physical contact during treatment; this is your decision and the
experimenter will never force you to do anything as part of treatment. Hand sanitizer will be
available throughout the experiment as a precautionary measure to be used if you desire.
Following treatment, you will be asked again to complete the same cognitive assessment
measures as you did before, including an exogenous cueing task and an emotional Stroop task,
the Shipley Institute of Living Scale, memory evaluation, and a behavioral avoidance task. For
those individuals who are assigned to the treatment group, initial participation in this study will
take two separate days. The first day will require a time commitment of up to one hour and the
second day during which treatment will be provided will require a time commitment of up to
four hours.

Enduring Impact of Treatment on Cognitive Bias 150
If you are a member of the no-treatment group or the control group, you will not receive any
treatment; instead, you will simply be administered several cognitive measures after you
complete the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, the first of which will be an exogenous cueing task
followed by an emotional Stroop task. The exogenous cueing task involves you indicating the
location of a target on a computer screen while the emotional Stroop task involves you looking at
words and indicating the color of the ink in which they are printed. You will also complete the
Shipley Institute of Living Scale and three memory measures. After you have completed these
tasks, you will be asked to approach a caged snake or spider stimulus as much as you possibly
can. Those individuals who are in the experimental no-treatment group and the non-fearful group
can expect up to a one hour time commitment to be completed in one day. You will be asked to
return to take the same tests of cognition again, preferably within the same week.
For all participants, there are two additional follow-up appointments that are made at one week
and one month from the date you participated. These follow-up appointments will not involve
treatment, only cognitive assessment. The follow-up appointments will begin with administration
of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory. After completion of the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, you
will be asked to complete the same cognitive assessment measures as you did in the initial
Experimental Phase. One of these measures is called an emotional Stroop task and the other is an
exogenous cueing task. You will also complete the Shipley Institute of Living Scale and three
memory measures. After you have completed these tasks, you will be asked to approach a caged
snake or spider stimulus as much as you possibly can. Completion of these procedures requires
up to a one hour time commitment that is to be completed in one day.
Risks: As in many experimental studies, risks are present. You may experience elevations in
anxiety during this study. If you begin to feel very uncomfortable, you may take a break or leave
the situation if desired. You will choose how much you will approach the snake/spider. At no
time will the experimenter ever force you to approach or make contact with the snake/spider. If
you choose to make physical contact, you must do so only with the utmost care for the
animal’s/insect’s safety and your safety. The trained experimenter will monitor the situation to
make sure that there is no danger to yourself or the snake/spider. If an accidental injury occurs,
appropriate emergency measures will be taken; however, no compensation or additional
treatment will be made available. In the unlikely event that you need medical treatment, Snow
Health Center or the nearest hospital will be used and the experimenter will accompany you to
the treatment facility if you would like. You will be responsible for the cost of any medical
treatment you pursue. It is important to note that the snakes/spiders used in this study do have an
amount of venom that is medically insignificant for most people, but could possibly be harmful if
you are allergic to it. If you require counseling as a result of this study, it will be provided to you
free of cost by Eastern Michigan University’s Snow Health Center Counseling Services if you
are a currently enrolled student. Snow Health Center Counseling Services can be contacted at
(734) 487-1118. If you are not a student of Eastern Michigan University, you may seek therapy
from the Eastern Michigan University Psychology Clinic, though a fee for therapy sessions will
be charged and you will be solely responsible for that fee. The Eastern Michigan University
Psychology Clinic may be contacted at (734) 487-4987. In addition, other treatments for phobias
besides in vivo exposure treatment are available for you to pursue at any time.
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As with turtles, other reptiles, and some birds, there is the possibility of salmonella
contamination; however, handling precautions and sanitation of all areas that the snake comes
into contact with will be used to minimize this risk. In addition, hand sanitizer will be made
available throughout the experiment for participant use.
Compensation: If you are an Eastern Michigan University student, you may receive extra credit
for your participation in this study only if it is approved by your instructor. If you indicate that
you desire your instructor to be notified of your participation, the experimenter will sign a slip
stating that you participated in the study. Your instructor can then assign extra credit points if
approved by him or her. The experimenters involved in this study can not guarantee or award
any extra credit points to you themselves. Decisions on extra credit are made completely by the
instructor.
Benefits: If you are assigned to the treatment condition, you will receive the free one-session
treatment for your snake/spider fear described above. Fearful participants that do not receive
treatment during participation may choose to receive treatment after participating in the study in
full or in part. If you are in this group and would like the one-session treatment for snake or
spider fears, it will be offered to you free of charge once your participation in this study is
completed and will take place on the fifth floor of Mark Jefferson hall. This is a highly effective
treatment for quickly reducing fear; thus, there should be a beneficial reduction in the anxiety
that you feel when you are around or think about a spider or a snake. However, if new
information is released during the course of this study that negates the effectiveness of this
treatment, the treatment may be altered and you will be informed and given the opportunity to
consent to the new treatment. Finally, your participation will increase our knowledge of the
effects of anxiety and may help us to improve anxiety treatment.
Confidentiality: All information obtained from you will remain confidential. No identifying
information, such as your name, will be printed on any data form. Instead, a unique participant
number will be printed on all data forms. Once data is collected, it will be stored in a password
protected computer file in a locked office. Your name and contact information will not be
disclosed to any unauthorized individuals. The results of this study will be disseminated in the
form of a dissertation. Also, this study may be submitted for publication or may be presented at
various conferences. Your name and identifying information will not be mentioned in any
written document or verbal presentation regarding this study. You will be given a unique
participant number to conceal your identity and, once data is completely collected for this study,
you will be identified only by number and your name/contact information will be destroyed.
Withdrawal Without Penalty: Participation in this study is voluntary. You will not be penalized
for refusing to participate in the study. Further, you are free to withdraw consent and discontinue
your involvement in the study at any time without penalty. You are also free to request a brief
break at any point in the study if necessary. If you are in the no-treatment group and decide to
withdraw your consent at any time during the experiment, you are still eligible to receive onesession in vivo exposure treatment if you desire.
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Information regarding what to do if you have questions:
If you have any questions about your participation in this study, please feel free to contact either
Karen Stanley-Kime or Dr. Ellen Koch.
Karen Stanley-Kime (primary student investigator): (734) xxx-xxxx or kstanley2@emich.edu.
Dr. Ellen Koch (primary investigator/faculty advisor): (734) 487-0189 or ellen.koch@emich.edu.
This research protocol and informed consent document has been reviewed and approved by the
Eastern Michigan University Human Subjects Review Committee for use from August 25, 2009
to August 25, 2010. If you have questions about the approval process, please contact Dr. Deb de
Laski-Smith (734.487.0042, Interim Dean of the Graduate School and Administrative Co-chair
of UHSRC, human.subjects@emich.edu).
By signing this form, I acknowledge that I have read, understood, and accepted the terms
outlined above and have received a copy of this form.
___________________________________
Participant Signature

__________________
Date

___________________________________
Research Assistant Signature

__________________
Date
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Appendix C
Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ)
For each item, please record a number to indicate how much you agree with the statement.
Ratings can include any number between 0 (totally disagree) and 7 (totally agree).
Totally Disagree
Totally Agree
0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6 ----------7
____ 1. If I came across a spider now, I would get help from someone else to remove it.
____ 2. Currently, I am sometimes on the look out for spiders.
____ 3. If I saw a spider now, I would think it will harm me.
____ 4. I now think a lot about spiders.
____ 5. I would be somewhat afraid to enter a room now, where I have seen a spider before.
____ 6. I now would do anything to try to avoid a spider.
____ 7. Currently, I sometimes think about getting bit by a spider.
____ 8. If I encountered a spider now, I wouldn’t be able to deal effectively with it.
____ 9. If I encountered a spider now, it would take a long time to get it out of my mind.
____ 10. If I came across a spider now, I would leave the room.
____ 11. If I saw a spider now, I would think it will try to jump on me.
____ 12. If I saw a spider now, I would ask someone else to kill it.
____ 13. If I encountered a spider now, I would have images of it trying to get me.
____ 14. If I saw a spider now, I would be afraid of it.
____ 15. If I saw a spider now, I would feel very panicky.
____ 16. Spiders are one of my worst fears.
____ 17. I would feel very nervous if I saw a spider now.
____ 18. If I saw a spider now, I would probably break out in a sweat and my heart would beat
faster.
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Appendix D
Fear of Snakes Questionnaire (FSnQ)
For each item, please record a number to indicate how much you agree with the statement.
Ratings can include any number between 0 (totally disagree) and 7 (totally agree).
Totally Disagree
Totally Agree
0 ---------- 1 ---------- 2 ---------- 3 ---------- 4 ---------- 5 ---------- 6 ----------7
____ 1. If I came across a snake now, I would get help from someone else to get rid of it.
____ 2. Currently, I am sometimes on the look out for snakes.
____ 3. If I saw a snake now, I would think it will harm me.
____ 4. I now think a lot about snakes.
____ 5. I would be somewhat afraid to go to a place where I have seen a snake before.
____ 6. I now would do anything to try to avoid a snake.
____ 7. Currently, I sometimes think about getting bit by a snake.
____ 8. If I encountered a snake now, I wouldn’t be able to deal effectively with it.
____ 9. If I encountered a snake now, it would take a long time to get it out of my mind.
____ 10. If I came across a snake now, I would leave the vicinity of the animal.
____ 11. If I saw a snake now, I would think it will try to attack me.
____ 12. If I saw a snake now, I would ask someone else to get it away from me.
____ 13. If I encountered a snake now, I would have images of it trying to get me.
____ 14. If I saw a snake now, I would be afraid of it.
____ 15. If I saw a snake now, I would feel very panicky.
____ 16. Snakes are one of my worst fears.
____ 17. I would feel very nervous if I saw a snake now.
____ 18. If I saw a snake now, I would probably break out in a sweat and my heart would beat
faster.
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Appendix E
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales – 21-Item Version (DASS - 21)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please read each statement and choose the number which indicates how much
the statement applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
spend too much time on any statement. The rating scale is as follows:
0= Did not apply to me at all
1= Applied to me to some degree of some of the time
2= Applied to me a considerable degree, or a good part of the time
3= Applied to me very much, or most of the time.

1. I found it hard to wind down.
2. I was aware of dryness of my mouth.
3. I couldn’t seem to experience any positive feelings at all.
4. I experienced breathing difficulty (e.g., excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in the
absence of physical exertion).
5. I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things.
6. I tended to over-react to situations.
7. I experienced trembling (e.g., in the hands).
8. I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy.
9. I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make a fool of myself.
10. I felt that I had nothing to look forward to.
11. I found myself getting agitated.
12. I found it difficult to relax.
13. I felt down-hearted and blue.
14. I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with what I was doing.
15. I felt I was close to panic.
16. I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything.
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17. I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person.
18. I felt that I was rather touchy.
19. I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical exertion (e.g., sense of
heart rate increase, heart missing a beat).
20. I felt scared without any good reason.
21. I felt that life wasn’t worthwhile.
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Appendix F
Screening Phase Background Questionnaire
1. First name ___________
2. Age ________________
3. Sex

Male Female

4. Race/ethnicity (Choose one)
White/Caucasian
Pacific Islander
Black/African American
Middle Eastern
Hispanic/Latino
Native American
Alaskan Native
Asian
Multi-Racial/Multi-Ethnic (Please indicate: _________)
Other (Please indicate: _________)
I choose not to respond to this question.
5. Are you employed? Yes

No

6. If yes, what is your occupation?
7. Are you a current student of Eastern Michigan University? Yes

No

8. What is your current college standing (Choose one)
Did not attend any college
Some college, did not graduate and not currently enrolled
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Second Bachelors
Graduate Student (Masters or Doctoral level)
Graduate of a 2 year college
Graduate of a 4 year college
Completed Graduate/Professional School
9. Do you currently have any health conditions that may be worsened if you become
anxious or fearful, including any of the following? (Check all that apply)
None
Asthma
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Heart condition of any kind
Hypertension (high blood pressure)
Lung disease, including any shortness of breath or trouble breathing
Migraine
Neurological problem
Pregnancy or the possibility of pregnancy
Recurring chest pain
Seizure
Stroke
Ulcers
Other (please specify)
10. Have you ever experienced an intensely fearful or traumatic experience involving a
snake? Yes No
If yes, briefly describe the experience in the box provided.
11. Have you ever experienced an intensely fearful or traumatic experience involving a
spider? Yes No
If yes, briefly describe the experience in the box provided.
12. Have you ever experienced any kind of traumatic brain injury? Yes

No

13. Do you suffer from epilepsy, dementia, or any other condition that impacts brain
functioning? Yes
No
14. Have you ever been diagnosed with a learning disability? Yes

No

15. Have you ever been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)?
Yes
No
16. Are you color-blind or do you have current uncorrected vision problems that interfere
with sight?
Yes No
17. Do you have any known allergies to either a snake or a spider?

Yes

No

18. Is your immune system in any way compromised (by a virus such as HIV or by cancer
treatment, for instance)?
Yes
No
19. How did you hear about this study? (Choose all that apply)
Flyer In-class announcement Friend/family member Other (please indicate:________)
20. If you wish to be contacted for further participation in this study, do you prefer to be
contacted by phone or by email (you may check both)? Phone
Email I do not wish
to be contacted for further participation
Please provide the best phone number to reach you at and/or your email address.
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21. If you checked “phone,” what are the best days to reach you by phone? (Choose all that
apply)
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
22. If you checked “phone,” what are the best times to reach you by phone? (Choose all that
apply)
Morning (8am – 12pm)
Afternoon (12pm - 5pm)
Evening (5pm – 8pm)
If necessary, please note any additional calling instructions that the experimenter should
know.
23. If you would like your psychology instructor to be informed of your participation in this
phase of the experiment, please provide the following information. If you are not a
student of Eastern Michigan University or would not like any instructor to be informed of
your participation, you may skip this.
Your first name _________
Your last name _________
Your email address ___________
24. If you would like us to inform your instructor of your participation in this phase of the
experiment, please indicate which instructor you would like us to inform. If you are not a
student of Eastern Michigan University or would not like any instructor to be informed of
your participation, you may skip this. Please note that you can only select one instructor
from the list below. If you have special circumstances in which you need more than one
instructor notified, you may email the principle investigator at kstanley2@emich.edu.
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Appendix G
Words Used in Emotional Stroop Task and Explicit Memory Evaluation

Snake Threat Words

Spider Threat Words

Neutral Words

pierce

pierce

divert

Filler Words for
Word-stem Cued,
Recognition Tests
prey

deadly
kill

deadly
kill

excess
form

coil
tighten

dangerous

dangerous

conscious

crawl

predator
aggressive

predator
aggressive

nonsense
infectious

candy
meet

molt
fangs

molt
fangs

pave
equal

grocery
shower

bite
strike

bite
strike

pile
arrive

yesterday
feminine

venom

venom

tenet

delight

snake
slither

legs
scurry

metal
cement

audit
gate

viper
anaconda

spider
tarantula

diaper
explosion

key
leather

reptile

insect

prince

orchestra

cobra
hiss

hairy
web

navel
lure

panic
tangle

serpent
scales

itching
cobweb

quicken
riddle

tune
zero
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Appendix H
Free Recall Test
Participant Number: __________ Date: ____________ Experimenter: _______________
Assessment Period (circle one):
Pre-test
Post-test
One-week follow-up
One-month follow-up
Instructions: During the Word List Presentation, you saw a number of words on a computer
screen. Each word was presented individually on the screen. You were asked to pay close
attention to each word.
On the blanks below, clearly print each word that you can recall from that word list. Use one
blank for each word. If you are not sure of all the words, you may guess. You will have 10
minutes to complete this test. If you finish early, tell the experimenter so that you can move on to
the next test. Once you complete this test and give it to the experimenter, you will not be able to
return to it later to change your answers.
Example: __Card__________
________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________

________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
________________________________
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Appendix I
Word-Stem Cued Recall Test
Participant Number: __________ Date: ____________ Experimenter: _______________
Assessment Period: Pre-test
Instructions: During the Word List Presentation, you saw a number of words on a computer
screen. Each word was presented individually on the screen. You were asked to pay close
attention to each word.
The first two letters of a word are printed below; this is called a word-stem. The word-stem is
followed by a blank. First, notice the word-stem. Then try to recall the word that was presented
during the Word List Presentation that began with that word-stem. Print the letters that complete
the word on the blank following the word-stem. No words should be repeated. That is, you
should have different words for each word-stem. Not all of the word-stems below were shown in
the Word List Presentation. If you do not think that the word-stem is for a word you previously
saw during Word List Presentation, leave it blank and move on. You will have 10 minutes to
complete this test. If you finish early, tell the experimenter so that you can move on to the next
test. Once you complete this test and give it to the experimenter, you will not be able to return to
it later to change your answers.
rd______
Example: ca_rd
rd
1. pr_______________________

12. sh_______________________

2. fa_______________________

13. ye_______________________

3. co_______________________

14. re_______________________

4. qu_______________________

15. ki_______________________

5. ti________________________

16. pi_______________________

6. vi_______________________

17. pa_______________________

7. mo_______________________

18. fe_______________________

8. ca_______________________

19. di_______________________

9. me_______________________

20. eq_______________________

10. gr_______________________

21. de_______________________

11. me_______________________

22. au_______________________
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23. ga_______________________

32. or_______________________

24. di_______________________

33. pa_______________________

25. fo_______________________

34. se_______________________

26. pr_______________________

35. ta_______________________

27. pi_______________________

36. in_______________________

28. ke_______________________

37. sn_______________________

29. le_______________________

38. tu_______________________

30. bi_______________________

39. ze_______________________

31. ag_______________________

40. cr_______________________
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Appendix J
Recognition Test
Participant Number: __________ Date: ____________ Experimenter: _______________
Assessment Period (circle one):
Pre-test
Instructions: During the Word List Presentation, you saw a number of words on a computer
screen. Each word was presented individually on the screen. You were asked to pay close
attention to each word.
Below is a list of words. Some of these words were shown during Word List Presentation. Others
were not shown during Word List Presentation. Read the word and circle it if you remember
seeing it during Word List Presentation. If you do not think it was shown during Word List
Presentation, do nothing with that word; just leave it alone and move on to the next word. You
will have 10 minutes to complete this test. If you finish early, tell the experimenter so that you
can move on. Once you complete this test and give it to the experimenter, you will not be able to
return to it later to change your answers.
Example:

Card
Mark

Infectious

Coil

Prince

Grocery

Equal

Feminine

Form

Viper

Delight

Key

Panic

Molt

Meet

Audit

Aggressive

Candy

Zero

Kill

Divert

Fangs

Bite

Pave

Gate

Yesterday

Diaper

Orchestra

Shower

Tangle

Snake

Pile

Leather

Tune

Reptile

Metal

Crawl

Pierce

Prey

Serpent

Tighten

Quicken
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Appendix K
Participant BAT Record
Participant Number: _____________ Date: ________________ Experimenter: __________________
Type of animal: (Circle)
Rose Hair Tarantula
Corn Snake
Participant Group (Circle):
Control
Exp. Tx
Exp. No Tx
Assessment Period (Circle):
Pre-test
Post-test
One-week f.u. One-month f.u.
1. SUDS rating at the door: ________
2. Initial distance from the door that the participant traveled (record distance by looking at the tip
of the participants toes in relation to the ruler): ____________ feet
Note: If the participant is unable to enter the room or does not move past the door, please record 0
(zero) feet. If the participant travels the maximum 14 foot distance from the door, skip questions 3
and 4.
SUDS rating at initial stopping point: ________
3. Did you prompt the participant to move further than the initial stopping point? Yes No
Note: If you circled “Yes”, continue with the questions 3a and 3b below. If you circled “No”, go on to
Question 4.
a. Distance from the door that the participant traveled when prompted by the experimenter
(record distance by looking at the tip of the participants toes in relation to the ruler)
:____________ feet
b. SUDS rating at the prompted stopping point: __________
c. Was the participant able to go any further when again prompted by the experimenter?
Yes
No
Noted: If you circled “Yes”, go on to question 4. If you circled “No”, skip question 4 and
go on to question 5.
4. Final distance from the door that the participant traveled (record distance by looking at the tip
of the participants toes in relation to the ruler) : ____________ feet
Note: If the participant was unable to enter the room or never left the door, please record 0 (zero) feet.
SUDS rating at final stopping point: ________
5. Please indicate any physical signs of distress exhibited by the participant: (Circle)
Crying
Shaking
Groaning, whimpering, other verbalizations
Covering eyes
Attempting to look away (wall, floor) or turn back
Other (please describe below)
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Appendix L
Diagram of Study Procedures
Screening Phase
Informed Consent,
FSQ,
FSnQ,
DASS-21, background
questionnaire

Fearful Participants
Spiderfearful
Score
at/above 70
on FSQ,

Non-fearful Participants

Snakefearful
Score
at/above 70
on FSnQ,

Control
Scores
at/below 10
on either FSQ
or FSnQ
Random Selection
Random
Assignment
Experimental Phase
Study Introduction
Informed Consent

Treatment
N = 20

Notreatment
N = 20

Control
N = 20

Cognitive Assessment
Sequence (CAS)
•

Pre-test CAS

Exposure
Treatment,
Post-test CAS

Pre-test CAS

Pre-test CAS
•
•
•

Post-test CAS

Post-test CAS
•

One-week
Follow-up CAS

One-month
Follow-up CAS

One-week
Follow-up CAS

One-month
Follow-up CAS

One-week
Follow-up CAS

One-month
Follow-up CAS

•

•
•

State Trait Anxiety
Inventory (full for pretest, State subscale for all
other assessments)
Emotional Stroop Task
Exogenous Cueing Task
Shipley Institute of
Living Scale –
Vocabulary Subscale
Explicit Word List
Presentation
Shipley Institute of
Living Scale – Abstract
Thinking Subscale
Explicit Memory Tests
BAT with SUDs Rating
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Appendix M
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board of Eastern Michigan University Approval Letters

EASTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY
Education First
October 8, 2009
Karen Stanley-Kime
Psychology
Dear Karen Stanley-Kime:
The Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Eastern Michigan University has
granted approval to your proposal, “The Enduring Impact of One-Session Exposure Treatment
on Selective Processing Bias and Explicit Memory Avoidance in Snake- and Spider-fearful
Participants: An Examination of Treatment Outcome on Maladaptive Cognitive Processing
Immediately Post-Treatment and at One Week and One Month Follow-up.”
After careful review of your completion application, the IRB determined that the rights and
welfare of the individual subjects involved in this research are carefully guarded. Additionally,
the methods used to obtain informed consent are appropriate, and the individuals participating in
your study are not at risk.
You are reminded of your obligation to advise the IRB of any change in the protocol that might
alter your research in any manner that differs from that upon which this approval is based.
Approval of this project applies for one year from the date of this letter. If your data collection
continues beyond the one-year period, you must apply for a renewal.
On behalf of the Human Subjects Committee, I wish you success in conducting your research.
Sincerely,
Deb de Laski-Smith, Ph.D.
Interim Dean
Graduate School
Administrative Co-Chair
University Human Subjects Review Committee

Note: If project continues beyond the length of one year, please submit a continuation request
form by 8/25/10.
Reference # 090701
University Human Subjects Review Committee ⋅ Eastern Michigan University ⋅ 200 Boone Hall
Ypsilanti, Michigan 48197
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Appendix M (cnt’d)
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Appendix N
Screening Phase Opt-Out Questionnaire
1. What is the main reason that you decided to decline to be contacted for further
participation in this experiment (choose only your main reason from the list below)?
I do not have the time to participate further.
I have no interest in this project.
I am too frightened or nervous to participate in the next phase of the experiment.
I am not comfortable providing my contact information to the experimenter of this study.
I do not understand what further participation would involve.
I do not feel like continued participation in this project could benefit me.
I disagree with the purposes of this research project.
I do not participate in research projects in general
Other (please specify)
2. Please rate how applicable the statements below are to you using the following scale:
1 = Completely False
2 = Somewhat False
3 = Somewhat True
4 = Completely True
I am afraid that I would be forced to see a snake or spider if I participated in this
experiment.
I am afraid that I would be forced to touch a snake or spider if I participated in this
experiment.
If I were selected to be in the treatment group, I would not be able to overcome my fear
even with treatment.
I am much too scared of snakes and/or spiders to be a part of this study.
Something bad would happen to me if I chose to participate further (i.e. have a panic
attack, bite by a snake or spider).
I am afraid that I might lose control if I become too fearful during the study.
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Appendix O
Eastern Michigan University’s Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee Approval

